/* Copyright (c) 2016, Google Inc. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include <algorithm> #include <functional> #include <string> #include <vector> #include <gtest/gtest.h> #include <openssl/bio.h> #include <openssl/bytestring.h> #include <openssl/crypto.h> #include <openssl/curve25519.h> #include <openssl/digest.h> #include <openssl/err.h> #include <openssl/pem.h> #include <openssl/pool.h> #include <openssl/x509.h> #include <openssl/x509v3.h> #include "../internal.h" #include "../test/test_util.h" std::string GetTestData(const char *path); static const char kCrossSigningRootPEM[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "MIICcTCCAdqgAwIBAgIIagJHiPvE0MowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwPDEaMBgGA1UE\n" "ChMRQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxHjAcBgNVBAMTFUNyb3NzLXNpZ25pbmcgUm9v\n" "dCBDQTAgFw0xNTAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFowPDEaMBgGA1UE\n" "ChMRQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxHjAcBgNVBAMTFUNyb3NzLXNpZ25pbmcgUm9v\n" "dCBDQTCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEAwo3qFvSB9Zmlbpzn9wJp\n" "ikI75Rxkatez8VkLqyxbOhPYl2Haz8F5p1gDG96dCI6jcLGgu3AKT9uhEQyyUko5\n" "EKYasazSeA9CQrdyhPg0mkTYVETnPM1W/ebid1YtqQbq1CMWlq2aTDoSGAReGFKP\n" "RTdXAbuAXzpCfi/d8LqV13UCAwEAAaN6MHgwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgIEMB0GA1Ud\n" "JQQWMBQGCCsGAQUFBwMBBggrBgEFBQcDAjAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MBkGA1Ud\n" "DgQSBBBHKHC7V3Z/3oLvEZx0RZRwMBsGA1UdIwQUMBKAEEcocLtXdn/egu8RnHRF\n" "lHAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADgYEAnglibsy6mGtpIXivtlcz4zIEnHw/lNW+r/eC\n" "CY7evZTmOoOuC/x9SS3MF9vawt1HFUummWM6ZgErqVBOXIB4//ykrcCgf5ZbF5Hr\n" "+3EFprKhBqYiXdD8hpBkrBoXwn85LPYWNd2TceCrx0YtLIprE2R5MB2RIq8y4Jk3\n" "YFXvkME=\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; static const char kRootCAPEM[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "MIICVTCCAb6gAwIBAgIIAj5CwoHlWuYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwLjEaMBgGA1UE\n" "ChMRQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxEDAOBgNVBAMTB1Jvb3QgQ0EwIBcNMTUwMTAx\n" "MDAwMDAwWhgPMjEwMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaMC4xGjAYBgNVBAoTEUJvcmluZ1NTTCBU\n" "RVNUSU5HMRAwDgYDVQQDEwdSb290IENBMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCB\n" "iQKBgQDpDn8RDOZa5oaDcPZRBy4CeBH1siSSOO4mYgLHlPE+oXdqwI/VImi2XeJM\n" "2uCFETXCknJJjYG0iJdrt/yyRFvZTQZw+QzGj+mz36NqhGxDWb6dstB2m8PX+plZ\n" "w7jl81MDvUnWs8yiQ/6twgu5AbhWKZQDJKcNKCEpqa6UW0r5nwIDAQABo3oweDAO\n" "BgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAgQwHQYDVR0lBBYwFAYIKwYBBQUHAwEGCCsGAQUFBwMCMA8G\n" "A1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wGQYDVR0OBBIEEEA31wH7QC+4HH5UBCeMWQEwGwYDVR0j\n" "BBQwEoAQQDfXAftAL7gcflQEJ4xZATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOBgQDXylEK77Za\n" "kKeY6ZerrScWyZhrjIGtHFu09qVpdJEzrk87k2G7iHHR9CAvSofCgEExKtWNS9dN\n" "+9WiZp/U48iHLk7qaYXdEuO07No4BYtXn+lkOykE+FUxmA4wvOF1cTd2tdj3MzX2\n" "kfGIBAYhzGZWhY3JbhIfTEfY1PNM1pWChQ==\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; static const char kRootCrossSignedPEM[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "MIICYzCCAcygAwIBAgIIAj5CwoHlWuYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwPDEaMBgGA1UE\n" "ChMRQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxHjAcBgNVBAMTFUNyb3NzLXNpZ25pbmcgUm9v\n" "dCBDQTAgFw0xNTAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFowLjEaMBgGA1UE\n" "ChMRQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxEDAOBgNVBAMTB1Jvb3QgQ0EwgZ8wDQYJKoZI\n" "hvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAOkOfxEM5lrmhoNw9lEHLgJ4EfWyJJI47iZiAseU\n" "8T6hd2rAj9UiaLZd4kza4IURNcKSckmNgbSIl2u3/LJEW9lNBnD5DMaP6bPfo2qE\n" "bENZvp2y0Habw9f6mVnDuOXzUwO9SdazzKJD/q3CC7kBuFYplAMkpw0oISmprpRb\n" "SvmfAgMBAAGjejB4MA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwICBDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggrBgEFBQcD\n" "AQYIKwYBBQUHAwIwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAZBgNVHQ4EEgQQQDfXAftAL7gc\n" "flQEJ4xZATAbBgNVHSMEFDASgBBHKHC7V3Z/3oLvEZx0RZRwMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB\n" "CwUAA4GBAErTxYJ0en9HVRHAAr5OO5wuk5Iq3VMc79TMyQLCXVL8YH8Uk7KEwv+q\n" "9MEKZv2eR/Vfm4HlXlUuIqfgUXbwrAYC/YVVX86Wnbpy/jc73NYVCq8FEZeO+0XU\n" "90SWAPDdp+iL7aZdimnMtG1qlM1edmz8AKbrhN/R3IbA2CL0nCWV\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; static const char kIntermediatePEM[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "MIICXjCCAcegAwIBAgIJAKJMH+7rscPcMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMC4xGjAYBgNV\n" "BAoTEUJvcmluZ1NTTCBURVNUSU5HMRAwDgYDVQQDEwdSb290IENBMCAXDTE1MDEw\n" "MTAwMDAwMFoYDzIxMDAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjA2MRowGAYDVQQKExFCb3JpbmdTU0wg\n" "VEVTVElORzEYMBYGA1UEAxMPSW50ZXJtZWRpYXRlIENBMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB\n" "AQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC7YtI0l8ocTYJ0gKyXTtPL4iMJCNY4OcxXl48jkncVG1Hl\n" "blicgNUa1r9m9YFtVkxvBinb8dXiUpEGhVg4awRPDcatlsBSEBuJkiZGYbRcAmSu\n" "CmZYnf6u3aYQ18SU8WqVERPpE4cwVVs+6kwlzRw0+XDoZAczu8ZezVhCUc6NbQID\n" "AQABo3oweDAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAgQwHQYDVR0lBBYwFAYIKwYBBQUHAwEGCCsG\n" "AQUFBwMCMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wGQYDVR0OBBIEEIwaaKi1dttdV3sfjRSy\n" "BqMwGwYDVR0jBBQwEoAQQDfXAftAL7gcflQEJ4xZATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOB\n" "gQCvnolNWEHuQS8PFVVyuLR+FKBeUUdrVbSfHSzTqNAqQGp0C9fk5oCzDq6ZgTfY\n" "ESXM4cJhb3IAnW0UM0NFsYSKQJ50JZL2L3z5ZLQhHdbs4RmODGoC40BVdnJ4/qgB\n" "aGSh09eQRvAVmbVCviDK2ipkWNegdyI19jFfNP5uIkGlYg==\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; static const char kIntermediateSelfSignedPEM[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "MIICZjCCAc+gAwIBAgIJAKJMH+7rscPcMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMDYxGjAYBgNV\n" "BAoTEUJvcmluZ1NTTCBURVNUSU5HMRgwFgYDVQQDEw9JbnRlcm1lZGlhdGUgQ0Ew\n" "IBcNMTUwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhgPMjEwMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaMDYxGjAYBgNVBAoTEUJv\n" "cmluZ1NTTCBURVNUSU5HMRgwFgYDVQQDEw9JbnRlcm1lZGlhdGUgQ0EwgZ8wDQYJ\n" "KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBALti0jSXyhxNgnSArJdO08viIwkI1jg5zFeX\n" "jyOSdxUbUeVuWJyA1RrWv2b1gW1WTG8GKdvx1eJSkQaFWDhrBE8Nxq2WwFIQG4mS\n" "JkZhtFwCZK4KZlid/q7dphDXxJTxapURE+kThzBVWz7qTCXNHDT5cOhkBzO7xl7N\n" "WEJRzo1tAgMBAAGjejB4MA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwICBDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggrBgEF\n" "BQcDAQYIKwYBBQUHAwIwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAZBgNVHQ4EEgQQjBpoqLV2\n" "211Xex+NFLIGozAbBgNVHSMEFDASgBCMGmiotXbbXVd7H40UsgajMA0GCSqGSIb3\n" "DQEBCwUAA4GBALcccSrAQ0/EqQBsx0ZDTUydHXXNP2DrUkpUKmAXIe8McqIVSlkT\n" "6H4xz7z8VRKBo9j+drjjtCw2i0CQc8aOLxRb5WJ8eVLnaW2XRlUqAzhF0CrulfVI\n" "E4Vs6ZLU+fra1WAuIj6qFiigRja+3YkZArG8tMA9vtlhTX/g7YBZIkqH\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; static const char kLeafPEM[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "MIICXjCCAcegAwIBAgIIWjO48ufpunYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwNjEaMBgGA1UE\n" "ChMRQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxGDAWBgNVBAMTD0ludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBDQTAg\n" "Fw0xNTAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFowMjEaMBgGA1UEChMRQm9y\n" "aW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxFDASBgNVBAMTC2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3\n" "DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDD0U0ZYgqShJ7oOjsyNKyVXEHqeafmk/bAoPqY/h1c\n" "oPw2E8KmeqiUSoTPjG5IXSblOxcqpbAXgnjPzo8DI3GNMhAf8SYNYsoH7gc7Uy7j\n" "5x8bUrisGnuTHqkqH6d4/e7ETJ7i3CpR8bvK16DggEvQTudLipz8FBHtYhFakfdh\n" "TwIDAQABo3cwdTAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBaAwHQYDVR0lBBYwFAYIKwYBBQUHAwEG\n" "CCsGAQUFBwMCMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwGQYDVR0OBBIEEKN5pvbur7mlXjeMEYA0\n" "4nUwGwYDVR0jBBQwEoAQjBpoqLV2211Xex+NFLIGozANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOB\n" "gQBj/p+JChp//LnXWC1k121LM/ii7hFzQzMrt70bny406SGz9jAjaPOX4S3gt38y\n" "rhjpPukBlSzgQXFg66y6q5qp1nQTD1Cw6NkKBe9WuBlY3iYfmsf7WT8nhlT1CttU\n" "xNCwyMX9mtdXdQicOfNjIGUCD5OLV5PgHFPRKiHHioBAhg==\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; static const char kLeafNoKeyUsagePEM[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "MIICNTCCAZ6gAwIBAgIJAIFQGaLQ0G2mMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMDYxGjAYBgNV\n" "BAoTEUJvcmluZ1NTTCBURVNUSU5HMRgwFgYDVQQDEw9JbnRlcm1lZGlhdGUgQ0Ew\n" "IBcNMTUwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhgPMjEwMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaMDcxGjAYBgNVBAoTEUJv\n" "cmluZ1NTTCBURVNUSU5HMRkwFwYDVQQDExBldmlsLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMIGfMA0G\n" "CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDOKoZe75NPz77EOaMMl4/0s3PyQw++zJvp\n" "ejHAxZiTPCJgMbEHLrSzNoHdopg+CLUH5bE4wTXM8w9Inv5P8OAFJt7gJuPUunmk\n" "j+NoU3QfzOR6BroePcz1vXX9jyVHRs087M/sLqWRHu9IR+/A+UTcBaWaFiDVUxtJ\n" "YOwFMwjNPQIDAQABo0gwRjAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMBkGA1UdDgQSBBBJfLEUWHq1\n" "27rZ1AVx2J5GMBsGA1UdIwQUMBKAEIwaaKi1dttdV3sfjRSyBqMwDQYJKoZIhvcN\n" "AQELBQADgYEALVKN2Y3LZJOtu6SxFIYKxbLaXhTGTdIjxipZhmbBRDFjbZjZZOTe\n" "6Oo+VDNPYco4rBexK7umYXJyfTqoY0E8dbiImhTcGTEj7OAB3DbBomgU1AYe+t2D\n" "uwBqh4Y3Eto+Zn4pMVsxGEfUpjzjZDel7bN1/oU/9KWPpDfywfUmjgk=\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; static const char kForgeryPEM[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "MIICZzCCAdCgAwIBAgIIdTlMzQoKkeMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwNzEaMBgGA1UE\n" "ChMRQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxGTAXBgNVBAMTEGV2aWwuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20w\n" "IBcNMTUwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhgPMjEwMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaMDoxGjAYBgNVBAoTEUJv\n" "cmluZ1NTTCBURVNUSU5HMRwwGgYDVQQDExNmb3JnZXJ5LmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMIGf\n" "MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDADTwruBQZGb7Ay6s9HiYv5d1lwtEy\n" "xQdA2Sy8Rn8uA20Q4KgqwVY7wzIZ+z5Butrsmwb70gdG1XU+yRaDeE7XVoW6jSpm\n" "0sw35/5vJbTcL4THEFbnX0OPZnvpuZDFUkvVtq5kxpDWsVyM24G8EEq7kPih3Sa3\n" "OMhXVXF8kso6UQIDAQABo3cwdTAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBaAwHQYDVR0lBBYwFAYI\n" "KwYBBQUHAwEGCCsGAQUFBwMCMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwGQYDVR0OBBIEEEYJ/WHM\n" "8p64erPWIg4/liwwGwYDVR0jBBQwEoAQSXyxFFh6tdu62dQFcdieRjANBgkqhkiG\n" "9w0BAQsFAAOBgQA+zH7bHPElWRWJvjxDqRexmYLn+D3Aivs8XgXQJsM94W0EzSUf\n" "DSLfRgaQwcb2gg2xpDFoG+W0vc6O651uF23WGt5JaFFJJxqjII05IexfCNhuPmp4\n" "4UZAXPttuJXpn74IY1tuouaM06B3vXKZR+/ityKmfJvSwxacmFcK+2ziAg==\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; // kExamplePSSCert is an example RSA-PSS self-signed certificate, signed with // the default hash functions. static const char kExamplePSSCert[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "MIICYjCCAcagAwIBAgIJAI3qUyT6SIfzMBIGCSqGSIb3DQEBCjAFogMCAWowRTEL\n" "MAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxEzARBgNVBAgMClNvbWUtU3RhdGUxITAfBgNVBAoMGEludGVy\n" "bmV0IFdpZGdpdHMgUHR5IEx0ZDAeFw0xNDEwMDkxOTA5NTVaFw0xNTEwMDkxOTA5\n" "NTVaMEUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkFVMRMwEQYDVQQIDApTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQK\n" "DBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQwgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0A\n" "MIGJAoGBAPi4bIO0vNmoV8CltFl2jFQdeesiUgR+0zfrQf2D+fCmhRU0dXFahKg8\n" "0u9aTtPel4rd/7vPCqqGkr64UOTNb4AzMHYTj8p73OxaymPHAyXvqIqDWHYg+hZ3\n" "13mSYwFIGth7Z/FSVUlO1m5KXNd6NzYM3t2PROjCpywrta9kS2EHAgMBAAGjUDBO\n" "MB0GA1UdDgQWBBTQQfuJQR6nrVrsNF1JEflVgXgfEzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTQQfuJ\n" "QR6nrVrsNF1JEflVgXgfEzAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MBIGCSqGSIb3DQEBCjAFogMC\n" "AWoDgYEASUy2RZcgNbNQZA0/7F+V1YTLEXwD16bm+iSVnzGwtexmQVEYIZG74K/w\n" "xbdZQdTbpNJkp1QPjPfh0zsatw6dmt5QoZ8K8No0DjR9dgf+Wvv5WJvJUIQBoAVN\n" "Z0IL+OQFz6+LcTHxD27JJCebrATXZA0wThGTQDm7crL+a+SujBY=\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; // kBadPSSCertPEM is a self-signed RSA-PSS certificate with bad parameters. static const char kBadPSSCertPEM[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "MIIDdjCCAjqgAwIBAgIJANcwZLyfEv7DMD4GCSqGSIb3DQEBCjAxoA0wCwYJYIZI\n" "AWUDBAIBoRowGAYJKoZIhvcNAQEIMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAaIEAgIA3jAnMSUwIwYD\n" "VQQDDBxUZXN0IEludmFsaWQgUFNTIGNlcnRpZmljYXRlMB4XDTE1MTEwNDE2MDIz\n" "NVoXDTE1MTIwNDE2MDIzNVowJzElMCMGA1UEAwwcVGVzdCBJbnZhbGlkIFBTUyBj\n" "ZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMTaM7WH\n" "qVCAGAIA+zL1KWvvASTrhlq+1ePdO7wsrWX2KiYoTYrJYTnxhLnn0wrHqApt79nL\n" "IBG7cfShyZqFHOY/IzlYPMVt+gPo293gw96Fds5JBsjhjkyGnOyr9OUntFqvxDbT\n" "IIFU7o9IdxD4edaqjRv+fegVE+B79pDk4s0ujsk6dULtCg9Rst0ucGFo19mr+b7k\n" "dbfn8pZ72ZNDJPueVdrUAWw9oll61UcYfk75XdrLk6JlL41GrYHc8KlfXf43gGQq\n" "QfrpHkg4Ih2cI6Wt2nhFGAzrlcorzLliQIUJRIhM8h4IgDfpBpaPdVQLqS2pFbXa\n" "5eQjqiyJwak2vJ8CAwEAAaNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFCt180N4oGUt5LbzBwQ4Ia+2\n" "4V97MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFCt180N4oGUt5LbzBwQ4Ia+24V97MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMB\n" "Af8wMQYJKoZIhvcNAQEKMCSgDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgGhDTALBgkqhkiG9w0BAQii\n" "BAICAN4DggEBAAjBtm90lGxgddjc4Xu/nbXXFHVs2zVcHv/mqOZoQkGB9r/BVgLb\n" "xhHrFZ2pHGElbUYPfifdS9ztB73e1d4J+P29o0yBqfd4/wGAc/JA8qgn6AAEO/Xn\n" "plhFeTRJQtLZVl75CkHXgUGUd3h+ADvKtcBuW9dSUncaUrgNKR8u/h/2sMG38RWY\n" "DzBddC/66YTa3r7KkVUfW7yqRQfELiGKdcm+bjlTEMsvS+EhHup9CzbpoCx2Fx9p\n" "NPtFY3yEObQhmL1JyoCRWqBE75GzFPbRaiux5UpEkns+i3trkGssZzsOuVqHNTNZ\n" "lC9+9hPHIoc9UMmAQNo1vGIW3NWVoeGbaJ8=\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; static const char kRSAKey[] = "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n" "MIICXgIBAAKBgQDYK8imMuRi/03z0K1Zi0WnvfFHvwlYeyK9Na6XJYaUoIDAtB92\n" "kWdGMdAQhLciHnAjkXLI6W15OoV3gA/ElRZ1xUpxTMhjP6PyY5wqT5r6y8FxbiiF\n" "KKAnHmUcrgfVW28tQ+0rkLGMryRtrukXOgXBv7gcrmU7G1jC2a7WqmeI8QIDAQAB\n" "AoGBAIBy09Fd4DOq/Ijp8HeKuCMKTHqTW1xGHshLQ6jwVV2vWZIn9aIgmDsvkjCe\n" "i6ssZvnbjVcwzSoByhjN8ZCf/i15HECWDFFh6gt0P5z0MnChwzZmvatV/FXCT0j+\n" "WmGNB/gkehKjGXLLcjTb6dRYVJSCZhVuOLLcbWIV10gggJQBAkEA8S8sGe4ezyyZ\n" "m4e9r95g6s43kPqtj5rewTsUxt+2n4eVodD+ZUlCULWVNAFLkYRTBCASlSrm9Xhj\n" "QpmWAHJUkQJBAOVzQdFUaewLtdOJoPCtpYoY1zd22eae8TQEmpGOR11L6kbxLQsk\n" "aMly/DOnOaa82tqAGTdqDEZgSNmCeKKknmECQAvpnY8GUOVAubGR6c+W90iBuQLj\n" "LtFp/9ihd2w/PoDwrHZaoUYVcT4VSfJQog/k7kjE4MYXYWL8eEKg3WTWQNECQQDk\n" "104Wi91Umd1PzF0ijd2jXOERJU1wEKe6XLkYYNHWQAe5l4J4MWj9OdxFXAxIuuR/\n" "tfDwbqkta4xcux67//khAkEAvvRXLHTaa6VFzTaiiO8SaFsHV3lQyXOtMrBpB5jd\n" "moZWgjHvB2W9Ckn7sDqsPB+U2tyX0joDdQEyuiMECDY8oQ==\n" "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"; // kCRLTestRoot is a test root certificate. It has private key: // // -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- // MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAo16WiLWZuaymsD8n5SKPmxV1y6jjgr3BS/dUBpbrzd1aeFzN // lI8l2jfAnzUyp+I21RQ+nh/MhqjGElkTtK9xMn1Y+S9GMRh+5R/Du0iCb1tCZIPY // 07Tgrb0KMNWe0v2QKVVruuYSgxIWodBfxlKO64Z8AJ5IbnWpuRqO6rctN9qUoMlT // IAB6dL4G0tDJ/PGFWOJYwOMEIX54bly2wgyYJVBKiRRt4f7n8H922qmvPNA9idmX // 9G1VAtgV6x97XXi7ULORIQvn9lVQF6nTYDBJhyuPB+mLThbLP2o9orxGx7aCtnnB // ZUIxUvHNOI0FaSaZH7Fi0xsZ/GkG2HZe7ImPJwIDAQABAoIBAQCJF9MTHfHGkk+/ // DwCXlA0Wg0e6hBuHl10iNobYkMWIl/xXjOknhYiqOqb181py76472SVC5ERprC+r // Lf0PXzqKuA117mnkwT2bYLCL9Skf8WEhoFLQNbVlloF6wYjqXcYgKYKh8HgQbZl4 // aLg2YQl2NADTNABsUWj/4H2WEelsODVviqfFs725lFg9KHDI8zxAZXLzDt/M9uVL // GxJiX12tr0AwaeAFZ1oPM/y+LznM3N3+Ht3jHHw3jZ/u8Z1RdAmdpu3bZ6tbwGBr // 9edsH5rKkm9aBvMrY7eX5VHqaqyRNFyG152ZOJh4XiiFG7EmgTPCpaHo50Y018Re // grVtk+FBAoGBANY3lY+V8ZOwMxSHes+kTnoimHO5Ob7nxrOC71i27x+4HHsYUeAr // /zOOghiDIn+oNkuiX5CIOWZKx159Bp65CPpCbTb/fh+HYnSgXFgCw7XptycO7LXM // 5GwR5jSfpfzBFdYxjxoUzDMFBwTEYRTm0HkUHkH+s+ajjw5wqqbcGLcfAoGBAMM8 // DKW6Tb66xsf708f0jonAjKYTLZ+WOcwsBEWSFHoY8dUjvW5gqx5acHTEsc5ZTeh4 // BCFLa+Mn9cuJWVJNs09k7Xb2PNl92HQ4GN2vbdkJhExbkT6oLDHg1hVD0w8KLfz1 // lTAW6pS+6CdOHMEJpvqx89EgU/1GgIQ1fXYczE75AoGAKeJoXdDFkUjsU+FBhAPu // TDcjc80Nm2QaF9NMFR5/lsYa236f06MGnQAKM9zADBHJu/Qdl1brUjLg1HrBppsr // RDNkw1IlSOjhuUf5hkPUHGd8Jijm440SRIcjabqla8wdBupdvo2+d2NOQgJbsQiI // ToQ+fkzcxAXK3Nnuo/1436UCgYBjLH7UNOZHS8OsVM0I1r8NVKVdu4JCfeJQR8/H // s2P5ffBir+wLRMnH+nMDreMQiibcPxMCArkERAlE4jlgaJ38Z62E76KLbLTmnJRt // EC9Bv+bXjvAiHvWMRMUbOj/ddPNVez7Uld+FvdBaHwDWQlvzHzBWfBCOKSEhh7Z6 // qDhUqQKBgQDPMDx2i5rfmQp3imV9xUcCkIRsyYQVf8Eo7NV07IdUy/otmksgn4Zt // Lbf3v2dvxOpTNTONWjp2c+iUQo8QxJCZr5Sfb21oQ9Ktcrmc/CY7LeBVDibXwxdM // vRG8kBzvslFWh7REzC3u06GSVhyKDfW93kN2cKVwGoahRlhj7oHuZQ== // -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- static const char kCRLTestRoot[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "MIIDbzCCAlegAwIBAgIJAODri7v0dDUFMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAME4xCzAJBgNV\n" "BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRYwFAYDVQQHDA1Nb3VudGFpbiBW\n" "aWV3MRIwEAYDVQQKDAlCb3JpbmdTU0wwHhcNMTYwOTI2MTUwNjI2WhcNMjYwOTI0\n" "MTUwNjI2WjBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQG\n" "A1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJQm9yaW5nU1NMMIIBIjANBgkq\n" "hkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAo16WiLWZuaymsD8n5SKPmxV1y6jjgr3B\n" "S/dUBpbrzd1aeFzNlI8l2jfAnzUyp+I21RQ+nh/MhqjGElkTtK9xMn1Y+S9GMRh+\n" "5R/Du0iCb1tCZIPY07Tgrb0KMNWe0v2QKVVruuYSgxIWodBfxlKO64Z8AJ5IbnWp\n" "uRqO6rctN9qUoMlTIAB6dL4G0tDJ/PGFWOJYwOMEIX54bly2wgyYJVBKiRRt4f7n\n" "8H922qmvPNA9idmX9G1VAtgV6x97XXi7ULORIQvn9lVQF6nTYDBJhyuPB+mLThbL\n" "P2o9orxGx7aCtnnBZUIxUvHNOI0FaSaZH7Fi0xsZ/GkG2HZe7ImPJwIDAQABo1Aw\n" "TjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUWPt3N5cZ/CRvubbrkqfBnAqhq94wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUWPt3\n" "N5cZ/CRvubbrkqfBnAqhq94wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOC\n" "AQEAORu6M0MOwXy+3VEBwNilfTxyqDfruQsc1jA4PT8Oe8zora1WxE1JB4q2FJOz\n" "EAuM3H/NXvEnBuN+ITvKZAJUfm4NKX97qmjMJwLKWe1gVv+VQTr63aR7mgWJReQN\n" "XdMztlVeZs2dppV6uEg3ia1X0G7LARxGpA9ETbMyCpb39XxlYuTClcbA5ftDN99B\n" "3Xg9KNdd++Ew22O3HWRDvdDpTO/JkzQfzi3sYwUtzMEonENhczJhGf7bQMmvL/w5\n" "24Wxj4Z7KzzWIHsNqE/RIs6RV3fcW61j/mRgW2XyoWnMVeBzvcJr9NXp4VQYmFPw\n" "amd8GKMZQvP0ufGnUn7D7uartA==\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; static const char kCRLTestLeaf[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "MIIDkDCCAnigAwIBAgICEAAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwTjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMx\n" "EzARBgNVBAgMCkNhbGlmb3JuaWExFjAUBgNVBAcMDU1vdW50YWluIFZpZXcxEjAQ\n" "BgNVBAoMCUJvcmluZ1NTTDAeFw0xNjA5MjYxNTA4MzFaFw0xNzA5MjYxNTA4MzFa\n" "MEsxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRIwEAYDVQQKDAlC\n" "b3JpbmdTU0wxEzARBgNVBAMMCmJvcmluZy5zc2wwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUA\n" "A4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc5v1S1M0W+QWM+raWfO0LH8uvqEwuJQgODqMaGnSlWUx9\n" "8iQcnWfjyPja3lWg9K62hSOFDuSyEkysKHDxijz5R93CfLcfnVXjWQDJe7EJTTDP\n" "ozEvxN6RjAeYv7CF000euYr3QT5iyBjg76+bon1p0jHZBJeNPP1KqGYgyxp+hzpx\n" "e0gZmTlGAXd8JQK4v8kpdYwD6PPifFL/jpmQpqOtQmH/6zcLjY4ojmqpEdBqIKIX\n" "+saA29hMq0+NK3K+wgg31RU+cVWxu3tLOIiesETkeDgArjWRS1Vkzbi4v9SJxtNu\n" "OZuAxWiynRJw3JwH/OFHYZIvQqz68ZBoj96cepjPAgMBAAGjezB5MAkGA1UdEwQC\n" "MAAwLAYJYIZIAYb4QgENBB8WHU9wZW5TU0wgR2VuZXJhdGVkIENlcnRpZmljYXRl\n" "MB0GA1UdDgQWBBTGn0OVVh/aoYt0bvEKG+PIERqnDzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRY+3c3\n" "lxn8JG+5tuuSp8GcCqGr3jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAd2nM8gCQN2Dc8QJw\n" "XSZXyuI3DBGGCHcay/3iXu0JvTC3EiQo8J6Djv7WLI0N5KH8mkm40u89fJAB2lLZ\n" "ShuHVtcC182bOKnePgwp9CNwQ21p0rDEu/P3X46ZvFgdxx82E9xLa0tBB8PiPDWh\n" "lV16jbaKTgX5AZqjnsyjR5o9/mbZVupZJXx5Syq+XA8qiJfstSYJs4KyKK9UOjql\n" "ICkJVKpi2ahDBqX4MOH4SLfzVk8pqSpviS6yaA1RXqjpkxiN45WWaXDldVHMSkhC\n" "5CNXsXi4b1nAntu89crwSLA3rEwzCWeYj+BX7e1T9rr3oJdwOU/2KQtW1js1yQUG\n" "tjJMFw==\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; static const char kBasicCRL[] = "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n" "MIIBpzCBkAIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n" "CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ\n" "Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoA4wDDAKBgNV\n" "HRQEAwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAnrBKKgvd9x9zwK9rtUvVeFeJ7+LN\n" "ZEAc+a5oxpPNEsJx6hXoApYEbzXMxuWBQoCs5iEBycSGudct21L+MVf27M38KrWo\n" "eOkq0a2siqViQZO2Fb/SUFR0k9zb8xl86Zf65lgPplALun0bV/HT7MJcl04Tc4os\n" "dsAReBs5nqTGNEd5AlC1iKHvQZkM//MD51DspKnDpsDiUVi54h9C1SpfZmX8H2Vv\n" "diyu0fZ/bPAM3VAGawatf/SyWfBMyKpoPXEG39oAzmjjOj8en82psn7m474IGaho\n" "/vBbhl1ms5qQiLYPjm4YELtnXQoFyC72tBjbdFd/ZE9k4CNKDbxFUXFbkw==\n" "-----END X509 CRL-----\n"; static const char kRevokedCRL[] = "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n" "MIIBvjCBpwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n" "CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ\n" "Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEyNDRaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEyNDRaMBUwEwICEAAX\n" "DTE2MDkyNjE1MTIyNlqgDjAMMAoGA1UdFAQDAgECMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IB\n" "AQCUGaM4DcWzlQKrcZvI8TMeR8BpsvQeo5BoI/XZu2a8h//PyRyMwYeaOM+3zl0d\n" "sjgCT8b3C1FPgT+P2Lkowv7rJ+FHJRNQkogr+RuqCSPTq65ha4WKlRGWkMFybzVH\n" "NloxC+aU3lgp/NlX9yUtfqYmJek1CDrOOGPrAEAwj1l/BUeYKNGqfBWYJQtPJu+5\n" "OaSvIYGpETCZJscUWODmLEb/O3DM438vLvxonwGqXqS0KX37+CHpUlyhnSovxXxp\n" "Pz4aF+L7OtczxL0GYtD2fR9B7TDMqsNmHXgQrixvvOY7MUdLGbd4RfJL3yA53hyO\n" "xzfKY2TzxLiOmctG0hXFkH5J\n" "-----END X509 CRL-----\n"; static const char kBadIssuerCRL[] = "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n" "MIIBwjCBqwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBSMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n" "CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzEWMBQGA1UECgwN\n" "Tm90IEJvcmluZ1NTTBcNMTYwOTI2MTUxMjQ0WhcNMTYxMDI2MTUxMjQ0WjAVMBMC\n" "AhAAFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEyMjZaoA4wDDAKBgNVHRQEAwIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF\n" "AAOCAQEAlBmjOA3Fs5UCq3GbyPEzHkfAabL0HqOQaCP12btmvIf/z8kcjMGHmjjP\n" "t85dHbI4Ak/G9wtRT4E/j9i5KML+6yfhRyUTUJKIK/kbqgkj06uuYWuFipURlpDB\n" "cm81RzZaMQvmlN5YKfzZV/clLX6mJiXpNQg6zjhj6wBAMI9ZfwVHmCjRqnwVmCUL\n" "TybvuTmkryGBqREwmSbHFFjg5ixG/ztwzON/Ly78aJ8Bql6ktCl9+/gh6VJcoZ0q\n" "L8V8aT8+Ghfi+zrXM8S9BmLQ9n0fQe0wzKrDZh14EK4sb7zmOzFHSxm3eEXyS98g\n" "Od4cjsc3ymNk88S4jpnLRtIVxZB+SQ==\n" "-----END X509 CRL-----\n"; // kKnownCriticalCRL is kBasicCRL but with a critical issuing distribution point // extension. static const char kKnownCriticalCRL[] = "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n" "MIIBujCBowIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n" "CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ\n" "Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoCEwHzAKBgNV\n" "HRQEAwIBATARBgNVHRwBAf8EBzAFoQMBAf8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAA+3\n" "i+5e5Ub8sccfgOBs6WVJFI9c8gvJjrJ8/dYfFIAuCyeocs7DFXn1n13CRZ+URR/Q\n" "mVWgU28+xeusuSPYFpd9cyYTcVyNUGNTI3lwgcE/yVjPaOmzSZKdPakApRxtpKKQ\n" "NN/56aQz3bnT/ZSHQNciRB8U6jiD9V30t0w+FDTpGaG+7bzzUH3UVF9xf9Ctp60A\n" "3mfLe0scas7owSt4AEFuj2SPvcE7yvdOXbu+IEv21cEJUVExJAbhvIweHXh6yRW+\n" "7VVeiNzdIjkZjyTmAzoXGha4+wbxXyBRbfH+XWcO/H+8nwyG8Gktdu2QB9S9nnIp\n" "o/1TpfOMSGhMyMoyPrk=\n" "-----END X509 CRL-----\n"; // kUnknownCriticalCRL is kBasicCRL but with an unknown critical extension. static const char kUnknownCriticalCRL[] = "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n" "MIIBvDCBpQIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n" "CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ\n" "Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoCMwITAKBgNV\n" "HRQEAwIBATATBgwqhkiG9xIEAYS3CQABAf8EADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEA\n" "GvBP0xqL509InMj/3493YVRV+ldTpBv5uTD6jewzf5XdaxEQ/VjTNe5zKnxbpAib\n" "Kf7cwX0PMSkZjx7k7kKdDlEucwVvDoqC+O9aJcqVmM6GDyNb9xENxd0XCXja6MZC\n" "yVgP4AwLauB2vSiEprYJyI1APph3iAEeDm60lTXX/wBM/tupQDDujKh2GPyvBRfJ\n" "+wEDwGg3ICwvu4gO4zeC5qnFR+bpL9t5tOMAQnVZ0NWv+k7mkd2LbHdD44dxrfXC\n" "nhtfERx99SDmC/jtUAJrGhtCO8acr7exCeYcduN7KKCm91OeCJKK6OzWst0Og1DB\n" "kwzzU2rL3G65CrZ7H0SZsQ==\n" "-----END X509 CRL-----\n"; // kUnknownCriticalCRL2 is kBasicCRL but with a critical issuing distribution // point extension followed by an unknown critical extension static const char kUnknownCriticalCRL2[] = "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n" "MIIBzzCBuAIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n" "CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ\n" "Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoDYwNDAKBgNV\n" "HRQEAwIBATARBgNVHRwBAf8EBzAFoQMBAf8wEwYMKoZIhvcSBAGEtwkAAQH/BAAw\n" "DQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBACTcpQC8jXL12JN5YzOcQ64ubQIe0XxRAd30p7qB\n" "BTXGpgqBjrjxRfLms7EBYodEXB2oXMsDq3km0vT1MfYdsDD05S+SQ9CDsq/pUfaC\n" "E2WNI5p8WircRnroYvbN2vkjlRbMd1+yNITohXYXCJwjEOAWOx3XIM10bwPYBv4R\n" "rDobuLHoMgL3yHgMHmAkP7YpkBucNqeBV8cCdeAZLuhXFWi6yfr3r/X18yWbC/r2\n" "2xXdkrSqXLFo7ToyP8YKTgiXpya4x6m53biEYwa2ULlas0igL6DK7wjYZX95Uy7H\n" "GKljn9weIYiMPV/BzGymwfv2EW0preLwtyJNJPaxbdin6Jc=\n" "-----END X509 CRL-----\n"; // kEd25519Cert is a self-signed Ed25519 certificate. static const char kEd25519Cert[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "MIIBkTCCAUOgAwIBAgIJAJwooam0UCDmMAUGAytlcDBFMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTET\n" "MBEGA1UECAwKU29tZS1TdGF0ZTEhMB8GA1UECgwYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lkZ2l0cyBQ\n" "dHkgTHRkMB4XDTE0MDQyMzIzMjE1N1oXDTE0MDUyMzIzMjE1N1owRTELMAkGA1UE\n" "BhMCQVUxEzARBgNVBAgMClNvbWUtU3RhdGUxITAfBgNVBAoMGEludGVybmV0IFdp\n" "ZGdpdHMgUHR5IEx0ZDAqMAUGAytlcAMhANdamAGCsQq31Uv+08lkBzoO4XLz2qYj\n" "Ja8CGmj3B1Eao1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUoux7eV+fJK2v3ah6QPU/lj1/+7UwHwYD\n" "VR0jBBgwFoAUoux7eV+fJK2v3ah6QPU/lj1/+7UwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAFBgMr\n" "ZXADQQBuCzqji8VP9xU8mHEMjXGChX7YP5J664UyVKHKH9Z1u4wEbB8dJ3ScaWSL\n" "r+VHVKUhsrvcdCelnXRrrSD7xWAL\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; // kEd25519CertNull is an invalid self-signed Ed25519 with an explicit NULL in // the signature algorithm. static const char kEd25519CertNull[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "MIIBlTCCAUWgAwIBAgIJAJwooam0UCDmMAcGAytlcAUAMEUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkFV\n" "MRMwEQYDVQQIDApTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRz\n" "IFB0eSBMdGQwHhcNMTQwNDIzMjMyMTU3WhcNMTQwNTIzMjMyMTU3WjBFMQswCQYD\n" "VQQGEwJBVTETMBEGA1UECAwKU29tZS1TdGF0ZTEhMB8GA1UECgwYSW50ZXJuZXQg\n" "V2lkZ2l0cyBQdHkgTHRkMCowBQYDK2VwAyEA11qYAYKxCrfVS/7TyWQHOg7hcvPa\n" "piMlrwIaaPcHURqjUDBOMB0GA1UdDgQWBBSi7Ht5X58kra/dqHpA9T+WPX/7tTAf\n" "BgNVHSMEGDAWgBSi7Ht5X58kra/dqHpA9T+WPX/7tTAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MAcG\n" "AytlcAUAA0EA70uefNocdJohkKPNROKVyBuBD3LXMyvmdTklsaxSRY3PcZdOohlr\n" "recgVPpVS7B+d9g4EwtZXIh4lodTBDHBBw==\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; // kSANTypesLeaf is a leaf certificate (signed by |kSANTypesRoot|) which // contains SANS for example.com, test@example.com, 127.0.0.1, and // https://example.com/. (The latter is useless for now since crypto/x509 // doesn't deal with URI SANs directly.) static const char kSANTypesLeaf[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "MIIClzCCAgCgAwIBAgIJAOjwnT/iW+qmMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMCsxFzAVBgNV\n" "BAoTDkJvcmluZ1NTTCBUZXN0MRAwDgYDVQQDEwdSb290IENBMB4XDTE1MDEwMTAw\n" "MDAwMFoXDTI1MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowLzEXMBUGA1UEChMOQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRlc3Qx\n" "FDASBgNVBAMTC2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKB\n" "gQDbRn2TLhInBki8Bighq37EtqJd/h5SRYh6NkelCA2SQlvCgcC+l3mYQPtPbRT9\n" "KxOLwqUuZ9jUCZ7WIji3Sgt0cyvCNPHRk+WW2XR781ifbGE8wLBB1NkrKyQjd1sc\n" "O711Xc4gVM+hY4cdHiTE8x0aUIuqthRD7ZendWL0FMhS1wIDAQABo4G+MIG7MA4G\n" "A1UdDwEB/wQEAwIFoDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggrBgEFBQcDAQYIKwYBBQUHAwIwDAYD\n" "VR0TAQH/BAIwADAZBgNVHQ4EEgQQn5EWH0NDPkmm3m22gNefYDAbBgNVHSMEFDAS\n" "gBBAN9cB+0AvuBx+VAQnjFkBMEQGA1UdEQQ9MDuCC2V4YW1wbGUuY29tgRB0ZXN0\n" "QGV4YW1wbGUuY29thwR/AAABhhRodHRwczovL2V4YW1wbGUuY29tLzANBgkqhkiG\n" "9w0BAQsFAAOBgQBtwJvY6+Tk6D6DOtDVaNoJ5y8E25CCuE/Ga4OuIcYJas+yLckf\n" "dZwUV3GUG2oBXl2MrpUFxXd4hKBO1CmlBY+hZEeIx0Yp6QWK9P/vnZeydOTP26mk\n" "jusJ2PqSmtKNU1Zcaba4d29oFejmOAfeguhR8AHpsc/zHEaS5Q9cJsuJcw==\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; // -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- // MIICWwIBAAKBgQDbRn2TLhInBki8Bighq37EtqJd/h5SRYh6NkelCA2SQlvCgcC+ // l3mYQPtPbRT9KxOLwqUuZ9jUCZ7WIji3Sgt0cyvCNPHRk+WW2XR781ifbGE8wLBB // 1NkrKyQjd1scO711Xc4gVM+hY4cdHiTE8x0aUIuqthRD7ZendWL0FMhS1wIDAQAB // AoGACwf7z0i1DxOI2zSwFimLghfyCSp8mgT3fbZ3Wj0SebYu6ZUffjceneM/AVrq // gGYHYLOVHcWJqfkl7X3hPo9SDhzLx0mM545/q21ZWCwjhswH7WiCEqV2/zeDO9WU // NIO1VU0VoLm0AQ7ZvwnyB+fpgF9kkkDtbBJW7XWrfNVtlnECQQD97YENpEJ3X1kj // 3rrkrHWDkKAyoWWY1i8Fm7LnganC9Bv6AVwgn5ZlE/479aWHF8vbOFEA3pFPiNZJ // t9FTCfpJAkEA3RCXjGI0Y6GALFLwEs+nL/XZAfJaIpJEZVLCVosYQOSaMS4SchfC // GGYVquT7ZgKk9uvz89Fg87OtBMWS9lrkHwJADGkGLKeBhBoJ3kHtem2fVK3F1pOi // xoR5SdnhNYVVyaxqjZ5xZTrHe+stOrr3uxGDqhQniVZXXb6/Ul0Egv1y2QJAVg/h // kAujba4wIhFf2VLyOZ+yjil1ocPj0LZ5Zgvcs1bMGJ1hHP3W2HzVrqRaowoggui1 // HpTC891dXGA2qKYV7QJAFDmT2A7OVvh3y4AEgzVwHrDmCMwMHKjCIntS7fjxrJnF // YvJUG1zoHwUVrxxbR3DbpTODlktLcl/0b97D0IkH3w== // -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- static const char kSANTypesRoot[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "MIICTTCCAbagAwIBAgIIAj5CwoHlWuYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwKzEXMBUGA1UE\n" "ChMOQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRlc3QxEDAOBgNVBAMTB1Jvb3QgQ0EwHhcNMTUwMTAxMDAw\n" "MDAwWhcNMjUwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3JpbmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQ\n" "MA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEA6Q5/\n" "EQzmWuaGg3D2UQcuAngR9bIkkjjuJmICx5TxPqF3asCP1SJotl3iTNrghRE1wpJy\n" "SY2BtIiXa7f8skRb2U0GcPkMxo/ps9+jaoRsQ1m+nbLQdpvD1/qZWcO45fNTA71J\n" "1rPMokP+rcILuQG4VimUAySnDSghKamulFtK+Z8CAwEAAaN6MHgwDgYDVR0PAQH/\n" "BAQDAgIEMB0GA1UdJQQWMBQGCCsGAQUFBwMBBggrBgEFBQcDAjAPBgNVHRMBAf8E\n" "BTADAQH/MBkGA1UdDgQSBBBAN9cB+0AvuBx+VAQnjFkBMBsGA1UdIwQUMBKAEEA3\n" "1wH7QC+4HH5UBCeMWQEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADgYEAc4N6hTE62/3gwg+kyc2f\n" "c/Jj1mHrOt+0NRaBnmvbmNpsEjHS96Ef4Wt/ZlPXPkkv1C1VosJnOIMF3Q522wRH\n" "bqaxARldS12VAa3gcWisDWD+SqSyDxjyojz0XDiJkTrFuCTCUiZO+1GLB7SO10Ms\n" "d5YVX0c90VMnUhF/dlrqS9U=\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; // -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- // MIICXAIBAAKBgQDpDn8RDOZa5oaDcPZRBy4CeBH1siSSOO4mYgLHlPE+oXdqwI/V // Imi2XeJM2uCFETXCknJJjYG0iJdrt/yyRFvZTQZw+QzGj+mz36NqhGxDWb6dstB2 // m8PX+plZw7jl81MDvUnWs8yiQ/6twgu5AbhWKZQDJKcNKCEpqa6UW0r5nwIDAQAB // AoGALEF5daZqc+aEsp8X1yky3nsoheyPL0kqSBWii33IFemZgKcSaRnAoqjPWWLS // 8dHj0I/4rej2MW8iuezVSpDak9tK5boHORC3w4p/wifkizQkLt1DANxTVbzcKvrt // aZ7LjVaKkhjRJbLddniowFHkkWVbUccjvzcUd7Y2VuLbAhECQQDq4FE88aHio8zg // bxSd0PwjEFwLYQTR19u812SoR8PmR6ofIL+pDwOV+fVs+OGcAAOgkhIukOrksQ4A // 1cKtnyhXAkEA/gRI+u3tZ7UE1twIkBfZ6IvCdRodkPqHAYIxMRLzL+MhyZt4MEGc // Ngb/F6U9/WOBFnoR/PI7IwE3ejutzKcL+QJBAKh+6eilk7QKPETZi1m3/dmNt+p1 // 3EZJ65pqjwxmB3Rg/vs7vCMk4TarTdSyKu+F1xRPFfoP/mK3Xctdjj6NyhsCQAYF // 7/0TOzfkUPMPUJyqFB6xgbDpJ55ScnUUsznoqx+NkTWInDb4t02IqO/UmT2y6FKy // Hk8TJ1fTJY+ebqaVp3ECQApx9gQ+n0zIhx97FMUuiRse73xkcW4+pZ8nF+8DmeQL // /JKuuFGmzkG+rUbXFmo/Zg2ozVplw71NnQJ4znPsf7A= // -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- // The following four certificates were generated with this Go program, varying // |includeNetscapeExtension| and defining rootKeyPEM and rootCertPEM to be // strings containing the kSANTypesRoot, above. // package main // import ( // "crypto/ecdsa" // "crypto/elliptic" // "crypto/rand" // "crypto/x509" // "crypto/x509/pkix" // "encoding/asn1" // "encoding/pem" // "math/big" // "os" // "time" // ) // const includeNetscapeExtension = true // func main() { // block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(rootKeyPEM)) // rootPriv, _ := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes) // block, _ = pem.Decode([]byte(rootCertPEM)) // root, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes) // interTemplate := &x509.Certificate{ // SerialNumber: big.NewInt(2), // Subject: pkix.Name{ // CommonName: "No Basic Constraints (Netscape)", // }, // NotBefore: time.Date(2000, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC), // NotAfter: time.Date(2099, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC), // } // if includeNetscapeExtension { // interTemplate.ExtraExtensions = []pkix.Extension{ // pkix.Extension{ // Id: asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{2, 16, 840, 1, 113730, 1, 1}), // Value: []byte{0x03, 0x02, 2, 0x04}, // }, // } // } else { // interTemplate.KeyUsage = x509.KeyUsageCertSign // } // interKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader) // interDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, interTemplate, root, &interKey.PublicKey, rootPriv) // if err != nil { // panic(err) // } // pem.Encode(os.Stdout, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: interDER}) // inter, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(interDER) // leafTemplate := &x509.Certificate{ // SerialNumber: big.NewInt(3), // Subject: pkix.Name{ // CommonName: "Leaf from CA with no Basic Constraints", // }, // NotBefore: time.Date(2000, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC), // NotAfter: time.Date(2099, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC), // BasicConstraintsValid: true, // } // leafKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader) // leafDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, leafTemplate, inter, &leafKey.PublicKey, interKey) // if err != nil { // panic(err) // } // pem.Encode(os.Stdout, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: leafDER}) // } // kNoBasicConstraintsCertSignIntermediate doesn't have isCA set, but contains // certSign in the keyUsage. static const char kNoBasicConstraintsCertSignIntermediate[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "MIIBqjCCAROgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp\n" "bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y\n" "MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowHzEdMBsGA1UEAxMUTm8gQmFzaWMgQ29uc3RyYWludHMw\n" "WTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAASEFMblfxIEDO8My7wHtHWTuDzNyID1\n" "OsPkMGkn32O/pSyXxXuAqDeFoMVffUMTyfm8JcYugSEbrv2qEXXM4bZRoy8wLTAO\n" "BgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAgQwGwYDVR0jBBQwEoAQQDfXAftAL7gcflQEJ4xZATANBgkq\n" "hkiG9w0BAQsFAAOBgQC1Lh6hIAm3K5kRh5iIydU0YAEm7eV6ZSskERDUq3DLJyl9\n" "ZUZCHUzvb464dkwZjeNzaUVS1pdElJslwX3DtGgeJLJGCnk8zUjBjaNrrDm0kzPW\n" "xKt/6oif1ci/KCKqKNXJAIFbc4e+IiBpenwpxHk3If4NM+Ek0nKoO8Uj0NkgTQ==\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; static const char kNoBasicConstraintsCertSignLeaf[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "MIIBUDCB96ADAgECAgEDMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCMB8xHTAbBgNVBAMTFE5vIEJhc2lj\n" "IENvbnN0cmFpbnRzMCAXDTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFoYDzIwOTkwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjAx\n" "MS8wLQYDVQQDEyZMZWFmIGZyb20gQ0Egd2l0aCBubyBCYXNpYyBDb25zdHJhaW50\n" "czBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABEsYPMwzdJKjB+2gpC90ib2ilHoB\n" "w/arQ6ikUX0CNUDDaKaOu/jF39ogzVlg4lDFrjCKShSfCCcrwgONv70IZGijEDAO\n" "MAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAwRQIgbV7R99yM+okXSIs6Fp3o\n" "eCOXiDL60IBxaTOcLS44ywcCIQDbn87Gj5cFgHBYAkzdHqDsyGXkxQTHDq9jmX24\n" "Djy3Zw==\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; // kNoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCAIntermediate doesn't have isCA set, but contains // a Netscape certificate-type extension that asserts a type of "SSL CA". static const char kNoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCAIntermediate[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "MIIBuDCCASGgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp\n" "bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y\n" "MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowKjEoMCYGA1UEAxMfTm8gQmFzaWMgQ29uc3RyYWludHMg\n" "KE5ldHNjYXBlKTBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABCeMbmCaOtMzXBqi\n" "PrCdNOH23CkaawUA+pAezitAN4RXS1O2CGK5sJjGPVVeogROU8G7/b+mU+ciZIzH\n" "1PP8FJKjMjAwMBsGA1UdIwQUMBKAEEA31wH7QC+4HH5UBCeMWQEwEQYJYIZIAYb4\n" "QgEBBAQDAgIEMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4GBAAgNWjh7cfBTClTAk+Ml//5xb9Ju\n" "tkBhG6Rm+kkMD+qiSMO6t7xS7CsA0+jIBjkdEYaLZ3oxtQCBdZsVNxUvRxZ0AUfF\n" "G3DtRFTsrI1f7IQhpMuqEMF4shPW+5x54hrq0Fo6xMs6XoinJZcTUaaB8EeXRF6M\n" "P9p6HuyLrmn0c/F0\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; static const char kNoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCALeaf[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "MIIBXDCCAQKgAwIBAgIBAzAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAqMSgwJgYDVQQDEx9ObyBCYXNp\n" "YyBDb25zdHJhaW50cyAoTmV0c2NhcGUpMCAXDTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFoYDzIwOTkw\n" "MTAxMDAwMDAwWjAxMS8wLQYDVQQDEyZMZWFmIGZyb20gQ0Egd2l0aCBubyBCYXNp\n" "YyBDb25zdHJhaW50czBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABDlJKolDu3R2\n" "tPqSDycr0QJcWhxdBv76V0EEVflcHRxED6vAioTEcnQszt1OfKtBZvjlo0yp6i6Q\n" "DaYit0ZInmWjEDAOMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAwRQIhAJsh\n" "aZL6BHeEfoUBj1oZ2Ln91qzj3UCVMJ+vrmwAFdYyAiA3wp2JphgchvmoUFuzPXwj\n" "XyPwWPbymSTpzKhB4xB7qQ==\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; static const char kSelfSignedMismatchAlgorithms[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "MIIFMjCCAxqgAwIBAgIJAL0mG5fOeJ7xMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBDQUAMC0xCzAJBgNV\n" "BAYTAkdCMQ8wDQYDVQQHDAZMb25kb24xDTALBgNVBAoMBFRlc3QwIBcNMTgwOTE3\n" "MTIxNzU3WhgPMjExODA4MjQxMjE3NTdaMC0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAkdCMQ8wDQYDVQQH\n" "DAZMb25kb24xDTALBgNVBAoMBFRlc3QwggIiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4ICDwAw\n" "ggIKAoICAQDCMhBrRAGGw+n2GdctBr/cEK4FZA6ajiHjihgpCHoSBdyL4R2jGKLS\n" "g0WgaMXa1HpkKN7LcIySosEBPlmcRkr1RqbEvQStOSvoFCXYvtx3alM6HTbXMcDR\n" "mqoKoABP6LXsPSoMWIgqMtP2X9EOppzHVIK1yFYFfbIlvYUV2Ka+MuMe0Vh5wvD1\n" "4GanPb+cWSKgdRSVQovCCMY3yWtZKVEaxRpCsk/mYYIFWz0tcgMjIKwDx1XXgiAV\n" "nU6NK43xbaw3XhtnaD/pv9lhTTbNrlcln9LjTD097BaK4R+1AEPHnpfxA9Ui3upn\n" "kbsNUdGdOB0ksZi/vd7lh833YgquQUIAhYrbfvq/HFCpVV1gljzlS3sqULYpLE//\n" "i3OsuL2mE+CYIJGpIi2GeJJWXciNMTJDOqTn+fRDtVb4RPp4Y70DJirp7XzaBi3q\n" "H0edANCzPSRCDbZsOhzIXhXshldiXVRX666DDlbMQgLTEnNKrkwv6DmU8o15XQsb\n" "8k1Os2YwXmkEOxUQ7AJZXVTZSf6UK9Znmdq1ZrHjybMfRUkHVxJcnKvrxfryralv\n" "gzfvu+D6HuxrCo3Ojqa+nDgIbxKEBtdrcsMhq1jWPFhjwo1fSadAkKOfdCAuXJRD\n" "THg3b4Sf+W7Cpc570YHrIpBf7WFl2XsPcEM0mJZ5+yATASCubNozQwIDAQABo1Mw\n" "UTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUES0hupZSqY21JOba10QyZuxm91EwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUES0h\n" "upZSqY21JOba10QyZuxm91EwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF\n" "AAOCAgEABTN5S30ng/RMpBweDm2N561PdpaCdiRXtAFCRVWR2mkDYC/Xj9Vqe6be\n" "PyM7L/5OKYVjzF1yJu67z/dx+ja5o+41g17jdqla7hyPx+9B4uRyDh+1KJTa+duj\n" "mw/aA1LCr6O6W4WizDOsChJ6FaB2Y1+GlFnKWb5nUdhVJqXQE1WOX9dZnw8Y4Npd\n" "VmAsjWot0BZorJrt3fwfcv3QfA896twkbo7Llv/8qzg4sXZXZ4ZtgAOqnPngiSn+\n" "JT/vYCXZ406VvAFpFqMcVz2dO/VGuL8lGIMHRKNyafrsV81EzH1W/XmRWOgvgj6r\n" "yQI63ln/AMY72HQ97xLkE1xKunGz6bK5Ug5+O43Uftc4Mb6MUgzo+ZqEQ3Ob+cAV\n" "cvjmtwDaPO/O39O5Xq0tLTlkn2/cKf4OQ6S++GDxzyRVHh5JXgP4j9+jfZY57Woy\n" "R1bE7N50JjY4cDermBJKdlBIjL7UPhqmLyaG7V0hBitFlgGBUCcJtJOV0xYd5aF3\n" "pxNkvMXhBmh95fjxJ0cJjpO7tN1RAwtMMNgsl7OUbuVRQCHOPW5DgP5qY21jDeRn\n" "BY82382l+9QzykmJLI5MZnmj4BA9uIDCwMtoTTvP++SsvhUAbuvh7MOOUQL0EY4m\n" "KStYq7X9PKseN+PvmfeoffIKc5R/Ha39oi7cGMVHCr8aiEhsf94=\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; // CertFromPEM parses the given, NUL-terminated pem block and returns an // |X509*|. static bssl::UniquePtr<X509> CertFromPEM(const char *pem) { bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(pem, strlen(pem))); return bssl::UniquePtr<X509>( PEM_read_bio_X509(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr)); } // CRLFromPEM parses the given, NUL-terminated pem block and returns an // |X509_CRL*|. static bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> CRLFromPEM(const char *pem) { bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(pem, strlen(pem))); return bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL>( PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr)); } // PrivateKeyFromPEM parses the given, NUL-terminated pem block and returns an // |EVP_PKEY*|. static bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> PrivateKeyFromPEM(const char *pem) { bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio( BIO_new_mem_buf(const_cast<char *>(pem), strlen(pem))); return bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY>( PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr)); } // CertsToStack converts a vector of |X509*| to an OpenSSL STACK_OF(X509), // bumping the reference counts for each certificate in question. static bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509)> CertsToStack( const std::vector<X509 *> &certs) { bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509)> stack(sk_X509_new_null()); if (!stack) { return nullptr; } for (auto cert : certs) { if (!bssl::PushToStack(stack.get(), bssl::UpRef(cert))) { return nullptr; } } return stack; } // CRLsToStack converts a vector of |X509_CRL*| to an OpenSSL // STACK_OF(X509_CRL), bumping the reference counts for each CRL in question. static bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_CRL)> CRLsToStack( const std::vector<X509_CRL *> &crls) { bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_CRL)> stack(sk_X509_CRL_new_null()); if (!stack) { return nullptr; } for (auto crl : crls) { if (!bssl::PushToStack(stack.get(), bssl::UpRef(crl))) { return nullptr; } } return stack; } static int Verify(X509 *leaf, const std::vector<X509 *> &roots, const std::vector<X509 *> &intermediates, const std::vector<X509_CRL *> &crls, unsigned long flags, bool use_additional_untrusted, std::function<void(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *)> configure_callback) { bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509)> roots_stack(CertsToStack(roots)); bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509)> intermediates_stack( CertsToStack(intermediates)); bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_CRL)> crls_stack(CRLsToStack(crls)); if (!roots_stack || !intermediates_stack || !crls_stack) { return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; } bssl::UniquePtr<X509_STORE_CTX> ctx(X509_STORE_CTX_new()); bssl::UniquePtr<X509_STORE> store(X509_STORE_new()); if (!ctx || !store) { return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; } if (use_additional_untrusted) { X509_STORE_set0_additional_untrusted(store.get(), intermediates_stack.get()); } if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init( ctx.get(), store.get(), leaf, use_additional_untrusted ? nullptr : intermediates_stack.get())) { return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; } X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(ctx.get(), roots_stack.get()); X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx.get(), crls_stack.get()); X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (param == nullptr) { return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; } X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(param, 1474934400 /* Sep 27th, 2016 */); X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(param, 16); if (configure_callback) { configure_callback(param); } if (flags) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(param, flags); } X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(ctx.get(), param); ERR_clear_error(); if (X509_verify_cert(ctx.get()) != 1) { return X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx.get()); } return X509_V_OK; } static int Verify(X509 *leaf, const std::vector<X509 *> &roots, const std::vector<X509 *> &intermediates, const std::vector<X509_CRL *> &crls, unsigned long flags = 0) { const int r1 = Verify(leaf, roots, intermediates, crls, flags, false, nullptr); const int r2 = Verify(leaf, roots, intermediates, crls, flags, true, nullptr); if (r1 != r2) { fprintf(stderr, "Verify with, and without, use_additional_untrusted gave different " "results: %d vs %d.\n", r1, r2); return false; } return r1; } TEST(X509Test, TestVerify) { bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cross_signing_root(CertFromPEM(kCrossSigningRootPEM)); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(CertFromPEM(kRootCAPEM)); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root_cross_signed(CertFromPEM(kRootCrossSignedPEM)); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate(CertFromPEM(kIntermediatePEM)); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate_self_signed( CertFromPEM(kIntermediateSelfSignedPEM)); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kLeafPEM)); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf_no_key_usage(CertFromPEM(kLeafNoKeyUsagePEM)); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> forgery(CertFromPEM(kForgeryPEM)); ASSERT_TRUE(cross_signing_root); ASSERT_TRUE(root); ASSERT_TRUE(root_cross_signed); ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate); ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate_self_signed); ASSERT_TRUE(leaf); ASSERT_TRUE(forgery); ASSERT_TRUE(leaf_no_key_usage); std::vector<X509*> empty; std::vector<X509_CRL*> empty_crls; ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, Verify(leaf.get(), empty, empty, empty_crls)); ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, Verify(leaf.get(), empty, {intermediate.get()}, empty_crls)); ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, empty_crls)); ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {cross_signing_root.get()}, {intermediate.get(), root_cross_signed.get()}, empty_crls)); ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {cross_signing_root.get(), root.get()}, {intermediate.get(), root_cross_signed.get()}, empty_crls)); /* This is the “altchains” test – we remove the cross-signing CA but include * the cross-sign in the intermediates. */ ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get(), root_cross_signed.get()}, empty_crls)); ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get(), root_cross_signed.get()}, empty_crls, X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)); ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, Verify(forgery.get(), {intermediate_self_signed.get()}, {leaf_no_key_usage.get()}, empty_crls)); /* Test that one cannot skip Basic Constraints checking with a contorted set * of roots and intermediates. This is a regression test for CVE-2015-1793. */ ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, Verify(forgery.get(), {intermediate_self_signed.get(), root_cross_signed.get()}, {leaf_no_key_usage.get(), intermediate.get()}, empty_crls)); } static const char kHostname[] = "example.com"; static const char kWrongHostname[] = "example2.com"; static const char kEmail[] = "test@example.com"; static const char kWrongEmail[] = "test2@example.com"; static const uint8_t kIP[4] = {127, 0, 0, 1}; static const uint8_t kWrongIP[4] = {127, 0, 0, 2}; static const char kIPString[] = "127.0.0.1"; static const char kWrongIPString[] = "127.0.0.2"; TEST(X509Test, ZeroLengthsWithX509PARAM) { bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kSANTypesLeaf)); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(CertFromPEM(kSANTypesRoot)); ASSERT_TRUE(leaf); ASSERT_TRUE(root); std::vector<X509_CRL *> empty_crls; struct X509Test { const char *correct_value; size_t correct_value_len; const char *incorrect_value; size_t incorrect_value_len; int (*func)(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *, const char *, size_t); int mismatch_error; }; const std::vector<X509Test> kTests = { {kHostname, strlen(kHostname), kWrongHostname, strlen(kWrongHostname), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH}, {kEmail, strlen(kEmail), kWrongEmail, strlen(kWrongEmail), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH}, }; for (size_t i = 0; i < kTests.size(); i++) { SCOPED_TRACE(i); const X509Test &test = kTests[i]; // The correct value should work. ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false, [&test](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { ASSERT_TRUE(test.func(param, test.correct_value, test.correct_value_len)); })); // The wrong value should trigger a verification error. ASSERT_EQ(test.mismatch_error, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false, [&test](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { ASSERT_TRUE(test.func(param, test.incorrect_value, test.incorrect_value_len)); })); // Passing zero as the length, unlike OpenSSL, should trigger an error and // should cause verification to fail. ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false, [&test](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { ASSERT_FALSE(test.func(param, test.correct_value, 0)); })); // Passing an empty value should be an error when setting and should cause // verification to fail. ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false, [&test](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { ASSERT_FALSE(test.func(param, nullptr, 0)); })); // Passing a value with embedded NULs should also be an error and should // also cause verification to fail. ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false, [&test](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { ASSERT_FALSE(test.func(param, "a", 2)); })); } // IP addresses work slightly differently: // The correct value should still work. ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false, [](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip( param, kIP, sizeof(kIP))); })); // Incorrect values should still fail. ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false, [](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(param, kWrongIP, sizeof(kWrongIP))); })); // Zero length values should trigger an error when setting and cause // verification to always fail. ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false, [](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { ASSERT_FALSE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(param, kIP, 0)); })); // ... and so should NULL values. ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false, [](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { ASSERT_FALSE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(param, nullptr, 0)); })); // Zero bytes in an IP address are, of course, fine. This is tested above // because |kIP| contains zeros. } TEST(X509Test, ZeroLengthsWithCheckFunctions) { bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kSANTypesLeaf)); EXPECT_EQ( 1, X509_check_host(leaf.get(), kHostname, strlen(kHostname), 0, nullptr)); EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_host(leaf.get(), kWrongHostname, strlen(kWrongHostname), 0, nullptr)); EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_check_email(leaf.get(), kEmail, strlen(kEmail), 0)); EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_email(leaf.get(), kWrongEmail, strlen(kWrongEmail), 0)); EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_check_ip(leaf.get(), kIP, sizeof(kIP), 0)); EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_ip(leaf.get(), kWrongIP, sizeof(kWrongIP), 0)); EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_check_ip_asc(leaf.get(), kIPString, 0)); EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_ip_asc(leaf.get(), kWrongIPString, 0)); // OpenSSL supports passing zero as the length for host and email. We do not // and it should always fail. EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_host(leaf.get(), kHostname, 0, 0, nullptr)); EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_host(leaf.get(), kWrongHostname, 0, 0, nullptr)); EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_email(leaf.get(), kEmail, 0, 0)); EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_email(leaf.get(), kWrongEmail, 0, 0)); EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_ip(leaf.get(), kIP, 0, 0)); EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_ip(leaf.get(), kWrongIP, 0, 0)); // Unlike all the other functions, |X509_check_ip_asc| doesn't take a length, // so it cannot be zero. } TEST(X509Test, TestCRL) { bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(CertFromPEM(kCRLTestRoot)); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kCRLTestLeaf)); bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> basic_crl(CRLFromPEM(kBasicCRL)); bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> revoked_crl(CRLFromPEM(kRevokedCRL)); bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> bad_issuer_crl(CRLFromPEM(kBadIssuerCRL)); bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> known_critical_crl(CRLFromPEM(kKnownCriticalCRL)); bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> unknown_critical_crl( CRLFromPEM(kUnknownCriticalCRL)); bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> unknown_critical_crl2( CRLFromPEM(kUnknownCriticalCRL2)); ASSERT_TRUE(root); ASSERT_TRUE(leaf); ASSERT_TRUE(basic_crl); ASSERT_TRUE(revoked_crl); ASSERT_TRUE(bad_issuer_crl); ASSERT_TRUE(known_critical_crl); ASSERT_TRUE(unknown_critical_crl); ASSERT_TRUE(unknown_critical_crl2); ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()}, {basic_crl.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)); ASSERT_EQ( X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()}, {basic_crl.get(), revoked_crl.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)); std::vector<X509_CRL *> empty_crls; ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()}, empty_crls, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)); ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()}, {bad_issuer_crl.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)); ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()}, {known_critical_crl.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)); ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()}, {unknown_critical_crl.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)); ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()}, {unknown_critical_crl2.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)); } TEST(X509Test, ManyNamesAndConstraints) { bssl::UniquePtr<X509> many_constraints( CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/many_constraints.pem").c_str())); ASSERT_TRUE(many_constraints); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> many_names1( CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/many_names1.pem").c_str())); ASSERT_TRUE(many_names1); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> many_names2( CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/many_names2.pem").c_str())); ASSERT_TRUE(many_names2); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> many_names3( CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/many_names3.pem").c_str())); ASSERT_TRUE(many_names3); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> some_names1( CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/some_names1.pem").c_str())); ASSERT_TRUE(some_names1); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> some_names2( CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/some_names2.pem").c_str())); ASSERT_TRUE(some_names2); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> some_names3( CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/some_names3.pem").c_str())); ASSERT_TRUE(some_names3); EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, Verify(many_names1.get(), {many_constraints.get()}, {many_constraints.get()}, {})); EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, Verify(many_names2.get(), {many_constraints.get()}, {many_constraints.get()}, {})); EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, Verify(many_names3.get(), {many_constraints.get()}, {many_constraints.get()}, {})); EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(some_names1.get(), {many_constraints.get()}, {many_constraints.get()}, {})); EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(some_names2.get(), {many_constraints.get()}, {many_constraints.get()}, {})); EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(some_names3.get(), {many_constraints.get()}, {many_constraints.get()}, {})); } TEST(X509Test, TestPSS) { bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kExamplePSSCert)); ASSERT_TRUE(cert); bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get())); ASSERT_TRUE(pkey); ASSERT_TRUE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get())); } TEST(X509Test, TestPSSBadParameters) { bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kBadPSSCertPEM)); ASSERT_TRUE(cert); bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get())); ASSERT_TRUE(pkey); ASSERT_FALSE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get())); ERR_clear_error(); } TEST(X509Test, TestEd25519) { bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kEd25519Cert)); ASSERT_TRUE(cert); bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get())); ASSERT_TRUE(pkey); ASSERT_TRUE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get())); } TEST(X509Test, TestEd25519BadParameters) { bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kEd25519CertNull)); ASSERT_TRUE(cert); bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get())); ASSERT_TRUE(pkey); ASSERT_FALSE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get())); uint32_t err = ERR_get_error(); ASSERT_EQ(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_GET_LIB(err)); ASSERT_EQ(X509_R_INVALID_PARAMETER, ERR_GET_REASON(err)); ERR_clear_error(); } static bool SignatureRoundTrips(EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { // Make a certificate like signed with |md_ctx|'s settings.' bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kLeafPEM)); if (!cert || !X509_sign_ctx(cert.get(), md_ctx)) { return false; } // Ensure that |pkey| may still be used to verify the resulting signature. All // settings in |md_ctx| must have been serialized appropriately. return !!X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey); } TEST(X509Test, RSASign) { bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(PrivateKeyFromPEM(kRSAKey)); ASSERT_TRUE(pkey); // Test PKCS#1 v1.5. bssl::ScopedEVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; ASSERT_TRUE( EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey.get())); ASSERT_TRUE(SignatureRoundTrips(md_ctx.get(), pkey.get())); // Test RSA-PSS with custom parameters. md_ctx.Reset(); EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), &pkey_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey.get())); ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkey_ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)); ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkey_ctx, EVP_sha512())); ASSERT_TRUE(SignatureRoundTrips(md_ctx.get(), pkey.get())); } TEST(X509Test, Ed25519Sign) { uint8_t pub_bytes[32], priv_bytes[64]; ED25519_keypair(pub_bytes, priv_bytes); bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pub(EVP_PKEY_new_ed25519_public(pub_bytes)); ASSERT_TRUE(pub); bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> priv(EVP_PKEY_new_ed25519_private(priv_bytes)); ASSERT_TRUE(priv); bssl::ScopedEVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; ASSERT_TRUE( EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, priv.get())); ASSERT_TRUE(SignatureRoundTrips(md_ctx.get(), pub.get())); } static bool PEMToDER(bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> *out, size_t *out_len, const char *pem) { bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(pem, strlen(pem))); if (!bio) { return false; } char *name, *header; uint8_t *data; long data_len; if (!PEM_read_bio(bio.get(), &name, &header, &data, &data_len)) { fprintf(stderr, "failed to read PEM data.\n"); return false; } OPENSSL_free(name); OPENSSL_free(header); out->reset(data); *out_len = data_len; return true; } TEST(X509Test, TestFromBuffer) { size_t data_len; bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data; ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data, &data_len, kRootCAPEM)); bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf( CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(data.get(), data_len, nullptr)); ASSERT_TRUE(buf); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(X509_parse_from_buffer(buf.get())); ASSERT_TRUE(root); const uint8_t *enc_pointer = root->cert_info->enc.enc; const uint8_t *buf_pointer = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buf.get()); ASSERT_GE(enc_pointer, buf_pointer); ASSERT_LT(enc_pointer, buf_pointer + CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buf.get())); buf.reset(); /* This ensures the X509 took a reference to |buf|, otherwise this will be a * reference to free memory and ASAN should notice. */ ASSERT_EQ(0x30, enc_pointer[0]); } TEST(X509Test, TestFromBufferWithTrailingData) { size_t data_len; bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data; ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data, &data_len, kRootCAPEM)); std::unique_ptr<uint8_t[]> trailing_data(new uint8_t[data_len + 1]); OPENSSL_memcpy(trailing_data.get(), data.get(), data_len); bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf_trailing_data( CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(trailing_data.get(), data_len + 1, nullptr)); ASSERT_TRUE(buf_trailing_data); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root_trailing_data( X509_parse_from_buffer(buf_trailing_data.get())); ASSERT_FALSE(root_trailing_data); } TEST(X509Test, TestFromBufferModified) { size_t data_len; bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data; ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data, &data_len, kRootCAPEM)); bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf( CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(data.get(), data_len, nullptr)); ASSERT_TRUE(buf); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(X509_parse_from_buffer(buf.get())); ASSERT_TRUE(root); bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_INTEGER> fourty_two(ASN1_INTEGER_new()); ASN1_INTEGER_set(fourty_two.get(), 42); X509_set_serialNumber(root.get(), fourty_two.get()); ASSERT_EQ(static_cast<long>(data_len), i2d_X509(root.get(), nullptr)); X509_CINF_set_modified(root->cert_info); ASSERT_NE(static_cast<long>(data_len), i2d_X509(root.get(), nullptr)); } TEST(X509Test, TestFromBufferReused) { size_t data_len; bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data; ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data, &data_len, kRootCAPEM)); bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf( CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(data.get(), data_len, nullptr)); ASSERT_TRUE(buf); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(X509_parse_from_buffer(buf.get())); ASSERT_TRUE(root); size_t data2_len; bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data2; ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data2, &data2_len, kLeafPEM)); X509 *x509p = root.get(); const uint8_t *inp = data2.get(); X509 *ret = d2i_X509(&x509p, &inp, data2_len); ASSERT_EQ(root.get(), ret); ASSERT_EQ(nullptr, root->buf); // Free |data2| and ensure that |root| took its own copy. Otherwise the // following will trigger a use-after-free. data2.reset(); uint8_t *i2d = nullptr; int i2d_len = i2d_X509(root.get(), &i2d); ASSERT_GE(i2d_len, 0); bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> i2d_storage(i2d); ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data2, &data2_len, kLeafPEM)); ASSERT_EQ(static_cast<long>(data2_len), i2d_len); ASSERT_EQ(0, OPENSSL_memcmp(data2.get(), i2d, i2d_len)); ASSERT_EQ(nullptr, root->buf); } TEST(X509Test, TestFailedParseFromBuffer) { static const uint8_t kNonsense[] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}; bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf( CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(kNonsense, sizeof(kNonsense), nullptr)); ASSERT_TRUE(buf); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(X509_parse_from_buffer(buf.get())); ASSERT_FALSE(cert); ERR_clear_error(); // Test a buffer with trailing data. size_t data_len; bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data; ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data, &data_len, kRootCAPEM)); std::unique_ptr<uint8_t[]> data_with_trailing_byte(new uint8_t[data_len + 1]); OPENSSL_memcpy(data_with_trailing_byte.get(), data.get(), data_len); data_with_trailing_byte[data_len] = 0; bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf_with_trailing_byte( CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(data_with_trailing_byte.get(), data_len + 1, nullptr)); ASSERT_TRUE(buf_with_trailing_byte); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root( X509_parse_from_buffer(buf_with_trailing_byte.get())); ASSERT_FALSE(root); ERR_clear_error(); } TEST(X509Test, TestPrintUTCTIME) { static const struct { const char *val, *want; } asn1_utctime_tests[] = { {"", "Bad time value"}, // Correct RFC 5280 form. Test years < 2000 and > 2000. {"090303125425Z", "Mar 3 12:54:25 2009 GMT"}, {"900303125425Z", "Mar 3 12:54:25 1990 GMT"}, {"000303125425Z", "Mar 3 12:54:25 2000 GMT"}, // Correct form, bad values. {"000000000000Z", "Bad time value"}, {"999999999999Z", "Bad time value"}, // Missing components. Not legal RFC 5280, but permitted. {"090303125425", "Mar 3 12:54:25 2009"}, {"9003031254", "Mar 3 12:54:00 1990"}, {"9003031254Z", "Mar 3 12:54:00 1990 GMT"}, // GENERALIZEDTIME confused for UTCTIME. {"20090303125425Z", "Bad time value"}, // Legal ASN.1, but not legal RFC 5280. {"9003031254+0800", "Bad time value"}, {"9003031254-0800", "Bad time value"}, // Trailing garbage. {"9003031254Z ", "Bad time value"}, }; for (auto t : asn1_utctime_tests) { SCOPED_TRACE(t.val); bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_UTCTIME> tm(ASN1_UTCTIME_new()); bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())); // Use this instead of ASN1_UTCTIME_set() because some callers get // type-confused and pass ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME to ASN1_UTCTIME_print(). // ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string() is stricter, and would reject the inputs in // question. ASSERT_TRUE(ASN1_STRING_set(tm.get(), t.val, strlen(t.val))); const int ok = ASN1_UTCTIME_print(bio.get(), tm.get()); const uint8_t *contents; size_t len; ASSERT_TRUE(BIO_mem_contents(bio.get(), &contents, &len)); EXPECT_EQ(ok, (strcmp(t.want, "Bad time value") != 0) ? 1 : 0); EXPECT_EQ(t.want, std::string(reinterpret_cast<const char *>(contents), len)); } } TEST(X509Test, PrettyPrintIntegers) { static const char *kTests[] = { // Small numbers are pretty-printed in decimal. "0", "-1", "1", "42", "-42", "256", "-256", // Large numbers are pretty-printed in hex to avoid taking quadratic time. "0x0123456789", "-0x0123456789", }; for (const char *in : kTests) { SCOPED_TRACE(in); BIGNUM *bn = nullptr; ASSERT_TRUE(BN_asc2bn(&bn, in)); bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> free_bn(bn); { bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_INTEGER> asn1(BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, nullptr)); ASSERT_TRUE(asn1); bssl::UniquePtr<char> out(i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(nullptr, asn1.get())); ASSERT_TRUE(out.get()); EXPECT_STREQ(in, out.get()); } { bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_ENUMERATED> asn1(BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED(bn, nullptr)); ASSERT_TRUE(asn1); bssl::UniquePtr<char> out(i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED(nullptr, asn1.get())); ASSERT_TRUE(out.get()); EXPECT_STREQ(in, out.get()); } } } TEST(X509Test, X509NameSet) { bssl::UniquePtr<X509_NAME> name(X509_NAME_new()); EXPECT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt( name.get(), "C", MBSTRING_ASC, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>("US"), -1, -1, 0)); EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_entry_count(name.get()), 1); EXPECT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt( name.get(), "C", MBSTRING_ASC, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>("CA"), -1, -1, 0)); EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_entry_count(name.get()), 2); EXPECT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt( name.get(), "C", MBSTRING_ASC, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>("UK"), -1, -1, 0)); EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_entry_count(name.get()), 3); EXPECT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt( name.get(), "C", MBSTRING_ASC, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>("JP"), -1, 1, 0)); EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_entry_count(name.get()), 4); // Check that the correct entries get incremented when inserting new entry. EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(name.get(), 1)), 1); EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(name.get(), 2)), 2); } TEST(X509Test, StringDecoding) { static const struct { std::vector<uint8_t> in; int type; const char *expected; } kTests[] = { // Non-minimal, two-byte UTF-8. {{0xc0, 0x81}, V_ASN1_UTF8STRING, nullptr}, // Non-minimal, three-byte UTF-8. {{0xe0, 0x80, 0x81}, V_ASN1_UTF8STRING, nullptr}, // Non-minimal, four-byte UTF-8. {{0xf0, 0x80, 0x80, 0x81}, V_ASN1_UTF8STRING, nullptr}, // Truncated, four-byte UTF-8. {{0xf0, 0x80, 0x80}, V_ASN1_UTF8STRING, nullptr}, // Low-surrogate value. {{0xed, 0xa0, 0x80}, V_ASN1_UTF8STRING, nullptr}, // High-surrogate value. {{0xed, 0xb0, 0x81}, V_ASN1_UTF8STRING, nullptr}, // Initial BOMs should be rejected from UCS-2 and UCS-4. {{0xfe, 0xff, 0, 88}, V_ASN1_BMPSTRING, nullptr}, {{0, 0, 0xfe, 0xff, 0, 0, 0, 88}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, nullptr}, // Otherwise, BOMs should pass through. {{0, 88, 0xfe, 0xff}, V_ASN1_BMPSTRING, "X\xef\xbb\xbf"}, {{0, 0, 0, 88, 0, 0, 0xfe, 0xff}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, "X\xef\xbb\xbf"}, // The maximum code-point should pass though. {{0, 16, 0xff, 0xfd}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, "\xf4\x8f\xbf\xbd"}, // Values outside the Unicode space should not. {{0, 17, 0, 0}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, nullptr}, // Non-characters should be rejected. {{0, 1, 0xff, 0xff}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, nullptr}, {{0, 1, 0xff, 0xfe}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, nullptr}, {{0, 0, 0xfd, 0xd5}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, nullptr}, // BMPString is UCS-2, not UTF-16, so surrogate pairs are invalid. {{0xd8, 0, 0xdc, 1}, V_ASN1_BMPSTRING, nullptr}, }; for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kTests); i++) { SCOPED_TRACE(i); const auto& test = kTests[i]; ASN1_STRING s; s.type = test.type; s.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(test.in.data()); s.length = test.in.size(); uint8_t *utf8; const int utf8_len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&utf8, &s); EXPECT_EQ(utf8_len < 0, test.expected == nullptr); if (utf8_len >= 0) { if (test.expected != nullptr) { EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(test.expected), Bytes(utf8, utf8_len)); } OPENSSL_free(utf8); } else { ERR_clear_error(); } } } TEST(X509Test, NoBasicConstraintsCertSign) { bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(CertFromPEM(kSANTypesRoot)); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate( CertFromPEM(kNoBasicConstraintsCertSignIntermediate)); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kNoBasicConstraintsCertSignLeaf)); ASSERT_TRUE(root); ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate); ASSERT_TRUE(leaf); // The intermediate has keyUsage certSign, but is not marked as a CA in the // basicConstraints. EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {}, 0)); } TEST(X509Test, NoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCA) { bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(CertFromPEM(kSANTypesRoot)); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate( CertFromPEM(kNoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCAIntermediate)); bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kNoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCALeaf)); ASSERT_TRUE(root); ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate); ASSERT_TRUE(leaf); // The intermediate has a Netscape certificate type of "SSL CA", but is not // marked as a CA in the basicConstraints. EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {}, 0)); } TEST(X509Test, MismatchAlgorithms) { bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kSelfSignedMismatchAlgorithms)); ASSERT_TRUE(cert); bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get())); ASSERT_TRUE(pkey); EXPECT_FALSE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get())); uint32_t err = ERR_get_error(); EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_GET_LIB(err)); EXPECT_EQ(X509_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH, ERR_GET_REASON(err)); } TEST(X509Test, PEMX509Info) { std::string cert = kRootCAPEM; auto cert_obj = CertFromPEM(kRootCAPEM); ASSERT_TRUE(cert_obj); std::string rsa = kRSAKey; auto rsa_obj = PrivateKeyFromPEM(kRSAKey); ASSERT_TRUE(rsa_obj); std::string crl = kBasicCRL; auto crl_obj = CRLFromPEM(kBasicCRL); ASSERT_TRUE(crl_obj); std::string unknown = "-----BEGIN UNKNOWN-----\n" "AAAA\n" "-----END UNKNOWN-----\n"; std::string invalid = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "AAAA\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; // Each X509_INFO contains at most one certificate, CRL, etc. The format // creates a new X509_INFO when a repeated type is seen. std::string pem = // The first few entries have one of everything in different orders. cert + rsa + crl + rsa + crl + cert + // Unknown types are ignored. crl + unknown + cert + rsa + // Seeing a new certificate starts a new entry, so now we have a bunch of // certificate-only entries. cert + cert + cert + // The key folds into the certificate's entry. cert + rsa + // Doubled keys also start new entries. rsa + rsa + rsa + rsa + crl + // As do CRLs. crl + crl; const struct ExpectedInfo { const X509 *cert; const EVP_PKEY *key; const X509_CRL *crl; } kExpected[] = { {cert_obj.get(), rsa_obj.get(), crl_obj.get()}, {cert_obj.get(), rsa_obj.get(), crl_obj.get()}, {cert_obj.get(), rsa_obj.get(), crl_obj.get()}, {cert_obj.get(), nullptr, nullptr}, {cert_obj.get(), nullptr, nullptr}, {cert_obj.get(), nullptr, nullptr}, {cert_obj.get(), rsa_obj.get(), nullptr}, {nullptr, rsa_obj.get(), nullptr}, {nullptr, rsa_obj.get(), nullptr}, {nullptr, rsa_obj.get(), nullptr}, {nullptr, rsa_obj.get(), crl_obj.get()}, {nullptr, nullptr, crl_obj.get()}, {nullptr, nullptr, crl_obj.get()}, }; auto check_info = [](const ExpectedInfo *expected, const X509_INFO *info) { if (expected->cert != nullptr) { EXPECT_EQ(0, X509_cmp(expected->cert, info->x509)); } else { EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, info->x509); } if (expected->crl != nullptr) { EXPECT_EQ(0, X509_CRL_cmp(expected->crl, info->crl)); } else { EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, info->crl); } if (expected->key != nullptr) { ASSERT_NE(nullptr, info->x_pkey); // EVP_PKEY_cmp returns one if the keys are equal. EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_PKEY_cmp(expected->key, info->x_pkey->dec_pkey)); } else { EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, info->x_pkey); } }; bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(pem.data(), pem.size())); ASSERT_TRUE(bio); bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_INFO)> infos( PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr)); ASSERT_TRUE(infos); ASSERT_EQ(OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected), sk_X509_INFO_num(infos.get())); for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected); i++) { SCOPED_TRACE(i); check_info(&kExpected[i], sk_X509_INFO_value(infos.get(), i)); } // Passing an existing stack appends to it. bio.reset(BIO_new_mem_buf(pem.data(), pem.size())); ASSERT_TRUE(bio); ASSERT_EQ(infos.get(), PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio.get(), infos.get(), nullptr, nullptr)); ASSERT_EQ(2 * OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected), sk_X509_INFO_num(infos.get())); for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected); i++) { SCOPED_TRACE(i); check_info(&kExpected[i], sk_X509_INFO_value(infos.get(), i)); check_info( &kExpected[i], sk_X509_INFO_value(infos.get(), i + OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected))); } // Gracefully handle errors in both the append and fresh cases. std::string bad_pem = cert + cert + invalid; bio.reset(BIO_new_mem_buf(bad_pem.data(), bad_pem.size())); ASSERT_TRUE(bio); bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_INFO)> infos2( PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr)); EXPECT_FALSE(infos2); bio.reset(BIO_new_mem_buf(bad_pem.data(), bad_pem.size())); ASSERT_TRUE(bio); EXPECT_FALSE( PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio.get(), infos.get(), nullptr, nullptr)); EXPECT_EQ(2 * OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected), sk_X509_INFO_num(infos.get())); } TEST(X509Test, ReadBIOEmpty) { bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(nullptr, 0)); ASSERT_TRUE(bio); // CPython expects |ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG| on EOF, to terminate a series of // certificates. bssl::UniquePtr<X509> x509(d2i_X509_bio(bio.get(), nullptr)); EXPECT_FALSE(x509); uint32_t err = ERR_get_error(); EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ERR_GET_LIB(err)); EXPECT_EQ(ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG, ERR_GET_REASON(err)); } TEST(X509Test, ReadBIOOneByte) { bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf("\x30", 1)); ASSERT_TRUE(bio); // CPython expects |ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG| on EOF, to terminate a series of // certificates. This EOF appeared after some data, however, so we do not wish // to signal EOF. bssl::UniquePtr<X509> x509(d2i_X509_bio(bio.get(), nullptr)); EXPECT_FALSE(x509); uint32_t err = ERR_get_error(); EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ERR_GET_LIB(err)); EXPECT_EQ(ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA, ERR_GET_REASON(err)); } TEST(X509Test, PartialBIOReturn) { // Create a filter BIO that only reads and writes one byte at a time. bssl::UniquePtr<BIO_METHOD> method(BIO_meth_new(0, nullptr)); ASSERT_TRUE(method); ASSERT_TRUE(BIO_meth_set_create(method.get(), [](BIO *b) -> int { BIO_set_init(b, 1); return 1; })); ASSERT_TRUE( BIO_meth_set_read(method.get(), [](BIO *b, char *out, int len) -> int { return BIO_read(BIO_next(b), out, std::min(len, 1)); })); ASSERT_TRUE(BIO_meth_set_write( method.get(), [](BIO *b, const char *in, int len) -> int { return BIO_write(BIO_next(b), in, std::min(len, 1)); })); bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new(method.get())); ASSERT_TRUE(bio); BIO *mem_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); ASSERT_TRUE(mem_bio); BIO_push(bio.get(), mem_bio); // BIO_push takes ownership. bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kLeafPEM)); ASSERT_TRUE(cert); uint8_t *der = nullptr; int der_len = i2d_X509(cert.get(), &der); ASSERT_GT(der_len, 0); bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_der(der); // Write the certificate into the BIO. Though we only write one byte at a // time, the write should succeed. ASSERT_EQ(1, i2d_X509_bio(bio.get(), cert.get())); const uint8_t *der2; size_t der2_len; ASSERT_TRUE(BIO_mem_contents(mem_bio, &der2, &der2_len)); EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(der, static_cast<size_t>(der_len)), Bytes(der2, der2_len)); // Read the certificate back out of the BIO. Though we only read one byte at a // time, the read should succeed. bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert2(d2i_X509_bio(bio.get(), nullptr)); ASSERT_TRUE(cert2); EXPECT_EQ(0, X509_cmp(cert.get(), cert2.get())); }