// ParamTLS has limited size. Everything that does not fit is considered fully // initialized. // RUN: %clangxx_msan -O0 %s -o %t && %run %t // RUN: %clangxx_msan -fsanitize-memory-track-origins -O0 %s -o %t && %run %t // RUN: %clangxx_msan -fsanitize-memory-track-origins=2 -O0 %s -o %t && %run %t // // AArch64 fails with: // void f801(S<801>): Assertion `__msan_test_shadow(&s, sizeof(s)) == -1' failed // XFAIL: aarch64 #include <sanitizer/msan_interface.h> #include <assert.h> // This test assumes that ParamTLS size is 800 bytes. // This test passes poisoned values through function argument list. // In case of overflow, argument is unpoisoned. #define OVERFLOW(x) assert(__msan_test_shadow(&x, sizeof(x)) == -1) // In case of no overflow, it is still poisoned. #define NO_OVERFLOW(x) assert(__msan_test_shadow(&x, sizeof(x)) == 0) #if defined(__x86_64__) // In x86_64, if argument is partially outside tls, it is considered completly // unpoisoned #define PARTIAL_OVERFLOW(x) OVERFLOW(x) #else // In other archs, bigger arguments are splitted in multiple IR arguments, so // they are considered poisoned till tls limit. Checking last byte of such arg: #define PARTIAL_OVERFLOW(x) assert(__msan_test_shadow((char *)(&(x) + 1) - 1, 1) == -1) #endif template<int N> struct S { char x[N]; }; void f100(S<100> s) { NO_OVERFLOW(s); } void f800(S<800> s) { NO_OVERFLOW(s); } void f801(S<801> s) { PARTIAL_OVERFLOW(s); } void f1000(S<1000> s) { PARTIAL_OVERFLOW(s); } void f_many(int a, double b, S<800> s, int c, double d) { NO_OVERFLOW(a); NO_OVERFLOW(b); PARTIAL_OVERFLOW(s); OVERFLOW(c); OVERFLOW(d); } // -8 bytes for "int a", aligned by 8 // -2 to make "int c" a partial fit void f_many2(int a, S<800 - 8 - 2> s, int c, double d) { NO_OVERFLOW(a); NO_OVERFLOW(s); PARTIAL_OVERFLOW(c); OVERFLOW(d); } int main(void) { S<100> s100; S<800> s800; S<801> s801; S<1000> s1000; f100(s100); f800(s800); f801(s801); f1000(s1000); int i; double d; f_many(i, d, s800, i, d); S<800 - 8 - 2> s788; f_many2(i, s788, i, d); return 0; }