/*
* Copyright (C) 2017 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#define LOG_TAG "keymaster_hidl_hal_test"
#include <cutils/log.h>
#include <iostream>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <cutils/properties.h>
#include <keymasterV4_0/attestation_record.h>
#include <keymasterV4_0/key_param_output.h>
#include <keymasterV4_0/openssl_utils.h>
#include "KeymasterHidlTest.h"
static bool arm_deleteAllKeys = false;
static bool dump_Attestations = false;
namespace android {
namespace hardware {
template <typename T>
bool operator==(const hidl_vec<T>& a, const hidl_vec<T>& b) {
if (a.size() != b.size()) {
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i) {
if (a[i] != b[i]) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
namespace keymaster {
namespace V4_0 {
bool operator==(const AuthorizationSet& a, const AuthorizationSet& b) {
return a.size() == b.size() && std::equal(a.begin(), a.end(), b.begin());
}
bool operator==(const KeyCharacteristics& a, const KeyCharacteristics& b) {
// This isn't very efficient. Oh, well.
AuthorizationSet a_sw(a.softwareEnforced);
AuthorizationSet b_sw(b.softwareEnforced);
AuthorizationSet a_tee(b.hardwareEnforced);
AuthorizationSet b_tee(b.hardwareEnforced);
a_sw.Sort();
b_sw.Sort();
a_tee.Sort();
b_tee.Sort();
return a_sw == b_sw && a_tee == b_tee;
}
namespace test {
namespace {
template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag, typename ValueT>
bool contains(hidl_vec<KeyParameter>& set, TypedTag<tag_type, tag> ttag, ValueT expected_value) {
size_t count = std::count_if(set.begin(), set.end(), [&](const KeyParameter& param) {
return param.tag == tag && accessTagValue(ttag, param) == expected_value;
});
return count == 1;
}
template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag>
bool contains(hidl_vec<KeyParameter>& set, TypedTag<tag_type, tag>) {
size_t count = std::count_if(set.begin(), set.end(),
[&](const KeyParameter& param) { return param.tag == tag; });
return count > 0;
}
constexpr char hex_value[256] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, // '0'..'9'
0, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, // 'A'..'F'
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, // 'a'..'f'
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
string hex2str(string a) {
string b;
size_t num = a.size() / 2;
b.resize(num);
for (size_t i = 0; i < num; i++) {
b[i] = (hex_value[a[i * 2] & 0xFF] << 4) + (hex_value[a[i * 2 + 1] & 0xFF]);
}
return b;
}
char nibble2hex[16] = {'0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
'8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f'};
string bin2hex(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& data) {
string retval;
retval.reserve(data.size() * 2 + 1);
for (uint8_t byte : data) {
retval.push_back(nibble2hex[0x0F & (byte >> 4)]);
retval.push_back(nibble2hex[0x0F & byte]);
}
return retval;
}
string rsa_key = hex2str(
"30820275020100300d06092a864886f70d01010105000482025f3082025b"
"02010002818100c6095409047d8634812d5a218176e45c41d60a75b13901"
"f234226cffe776521c5a77b9e389417b71c0b6a44d13afe4e4a2805d46c9"
"da2935adb1ff0c1f24ea06e62b20d776430a4d435157233c6f916783c30e"
"310fcbd89b85c2d56771169785ac12bca244abda72bfb19fc44d27c81e1d"
"92de284f4061edfd99280745ea6d2502030100010281801be0f04d9cae37"
"18691f035338308e91564b55899ffb5084d2460e6630257e05b3ceab0297"
"2dfabcd6ce5f6ee2589eb67911ed0fac16e43a444b8c861e544a05933657"
"72f8baf6b22fc9e3c5f1024b063ac080a7b2234cf8aee8f6c47bbf4fd3ac"
"e7240290bef16c0b3f7f3cdd64ce3ab5912cf6e32f39ab188358afcccd80"
"81024100e4b49ef50f765d3b24dde01aceaaf130f2c76670a91a61ae08af"
"497b4a82be6dee8fcdd5e3f7ba1cfb1f0c926b88f88c92bfab137fba2285"
"227b83c342ff7c55024100ddabb5839c4c7f6bf3d4183231f005b31aa58a"
"ffdda5c79e4cce217f6bc930dbe563d480706c24e9ebfcab28a6cdefd324"
"b77e1bf7251b709092c24ff501fd91024023d4340eda3445d8cd26c14411"
"da6fdca63c1ccd4b80a98ad52b78cc8ad8beb2842c1d280405bc2f6c1bea"
"214a1d742ab996b35b63a82a5e470fa88dbf823cdd02401b7b57449ad30d"
"1518249a5f56bb98294d4b6ac12ffc86940497a5a5837a6cf946262b4945"
"26d328c11e1126380fde04c24f916dec250892db09a6d77cdba351024077"
"62cd8f4d050da56bd591adb515d24d7ccd32cca0d05f866d583514bd7324"
"d5f33645e8ed8b4a1cb3cc4a1d67987399f2a09f5b3fb68c88d5e5d90ac3"
"3492d6");
string ec_256_key = hex2str(
"308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30"
"6b0201010420737c2ecd7b8d1940bf2930aa9b4ed3ff941eed09366bc032"
"99986481f3a4d859a14403420004bf85d7720d07c25461683bc648b4778a"
"9a14dd8a024e3bdd8c7ddd9ab2b528bbc7aa1b51f14ebbbb0bd0ce21bcc4"
"1c6eb00083cf3376d11fd44949e0b2183bfe");
string ec_521_key = hex2str(
"3081EE020100301006072A8648CE3D020106052B810400230481D63081D3"
"02010104420011458C586DB5DAA92AFAB03F4FE46AA9D9C3CE9A9B7A006A"
"8384BEC4C78E8E9D18D7D08B5BCFA0E53C75B064AD51C449BAE0258D54B9"
"4B1E885DED08ED4FB25CE9A1818903818600040149EC11C6DF0FA122C6A9"
"AFD9754A4FA9513A627CA329E349535A5629875A8ADFBE27DCB932C05198"
"6377108D054C28C6F39B6F2C9AF81802F9F326B842FF2E5F3C00AB7635CF"
"B36157FC0882D574A10D839C1A0C049DC5E0D775E2EE50671A208431BB45"
"E78E70BEFE930DB34818EE4D5C26259F5C6B8E28A652950F9F88D7B4B2C9"
"D9");
string ec_256_key_rfc5915 =
hex2str("308193020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107047930"
"770201010420782370a8c8ce5537baadd04dcff079c8158cfa9c67b818b3"
"8e8d21c9fa750c1da00a06082a8648ce3d030107a14403420004e2cc561e"
"e701da0ad0ef0d176bb0c919d42e79c393fdc1bd6c4010d85cf2cf8e68c9"
"05464666f98dad4f01573ba81078b3428570a439ba3229fbc026c550682f");
string ec_256_key_sec1 =
hex2str("308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30"
"6b0201010420782370a8c8ce5537baadd04dcff079c8158cfa9c67b818b3"
"8e8d21c9fa750c1da14403420004e2cc561ee701da0ad0ef0d176bb0c919"
"d42e79c393fdc1bd6c4010d85cf2cf8e68c905464666f98dad4f01573ba8"
"1078b3428570a439ba3229fbc026c550682f");
struct RSA_Delete {
void operator()(RSA* p) { RSA_free(p); }
};
X509* parse_cert_blob(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& blob) {
const uint8_t* p = blob.data();
return d2i_X509(nullptr, &p, blob.size());
}
bool verify_chain(const hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>>& chain, const std::string& msg,
const std::string& signature) {
{
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx_verify;
X509_Ptr signing_cert(parse_cert_blob(chain[0]));
EVP_PKEY_Ptr signing_pubkey(X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert.get()));
EXPECT_TRUE(signing_pubkey);
ERR_print_errors_cb(
[](const char* str, size_t len, void* ctx) -> int {
(void)ctx;
std::cerr << std::string(str, len) << std::endl;
return 1;
},
nullptr);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx_verify);
bool result = false;
EXPECT_TRUE((result = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx_verify, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL,
signing_pubkey.get())));
EXPECT_TRUE(
(result = result && EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx_verify, msg.c_str(), msg.size())));
EXPECT_TRUE((result = result && EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(
&md_ctx_verify,
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(signature.c_str()),
signature.size())));
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx_verify);
if (!result) return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < chain.size(); ++i) {
X509_Ptr key_cert(parse_cert_blob(chain[i]));
X509_Ptr signing_cert;
if (i < chain.size() - 1) {
signing_cert.reset(parse_cert_blob(chain[i + 1]));
} else {
signing_cert.reset(parse_cert_blob(chain[i]));
}
EXPECT_TRUE(!!key_cert.get() && !!signing_cert.get());
if (!key_cert.get() || !signing_cert.get()) return false;
EVP_PKEY_Ptr signing_pubkey(X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert.get()));
EXPECT_TRUE(!!signing_pubkey.get());
if (!signing_pubkey.get()) return false;
EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_verify(key_cert.get(), signing_pubkey.get()))
<< "Verification of certificate " << i << " failed "
<< "OpenSSL error string: " << ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL);
char* cert_issuer = //
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(key_cert.get()), nullptr, 0);
char* signer_subj =
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(signing_cert.get()), nullptr, 0);
EXPECT_STREQ(cert_issuer, signer_subj) << "Cert " << i << " has wrong issuer.";
if (i == 0) {
char* cert_sub = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(key_cert.get()), nullptr, 0);
EXPECT_STREQ("/CN=Android Keystore Key", cert_sub)
<< "Cert " << i << " has wrong subject.";
OPENSSL_free(cert_sub);
}
OPENSSL_free(cert_issuer);
OPENSSL_free(signer_subj);
if (dump_Attestations) std::cout << bin2hex(chain[i]) << std::endl;
}
return true;
}
// Extract attestation record from cert. Returned object is still part of cert; don't free it
// separately.
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* get_attestation_record(X509* certificate) {
ASN1_OBJECT_Ptr oid(OBJ_txt2obj(kAttestionRecordOid, 1 /* dotted string format */));
EXPECT_TRUE(!!oid.get());
if (!oid.get()) return nullptr;
int location = X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(certificate, oid.get(), -1 /* search from beginning */);
EXPECT_NE(-1, location) << "Attestation extension not found in certificate";
if (location == -1) return nullptr;
X509_EXTENSION* attest_rec_ext = X509_get_ext(certificate, location);
EXPECT_TRUE(!!attest_rec_ext)
<< "Found attestation extension but couldn't retrieve it? Probably a BoringSSL bug.";
if (!attest_rec_ext) return nullptr;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(attest_rec_ext);
EXPECT_TRUE(!!attest_rec) << "Attestation extension contained no data";
return attest_rec;
}
bool tag_in_list(const KeyParameter& entry) {
// Attestations don't contain everything in key authorization lists, so we need to filter
// the key lists to produce the lists that we expect to match the attestations.
auto tag_list = {
Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID, Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS, Tag::EC_CURVE, Tag::HARDWARE_TYPE,
};
return std::find(tag_list.begin(), tag_list.end(), entry.tag) != tag_list.end();
}
AuthorizationSet filter_tags(const AuthorizationSet& set) {
AuthorizationSet filtered;
std::remove_copy_if(set.begin(), set.end(), std::back_inserter(filtered), tag_in_list);
return filtered;
}
std::string make_string(const uint8_t* data, size_t length) {
return std::string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(data), length);
}
template <size_t N>
std::string make_string(const uint8_t (&a)[N]) {
return make_string(a, N);
}
bool avb_verification_enabled() {
char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
return property_get("ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state", value, "") != 0;
}
} // namespace
bool verify_attestation_record(const string& challenge, const string& app_id,
AuthorizationSet expected_sw_enforced,
AuthorizationSet expected_hw_enforced, SecurityLevel security_level,
const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& attestation_cert,
std::chrono::time_point<std::chrono::system_clock> creation_time) {
X509_Ptr cert(parse_cert_blob(attestation_cert));
EXPECT_TRUE(!!cert.get());
if (!cert.get()) return false;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = get_attestation_record(cert.get());
EXPECT_TRUE(!!attest_rec);
if (!attest_rec) return false;
AuthorizationSet att_sw_enforced;
AuthorizationSet att_hw_enforced;
uint32_t att_attestation_version;
uint32_t att_keymaster_version;
SecurityLevel att_attestation_security_level;
SecurityLevel att_keymaster_security_level;
HidlBuf att_challenge;
HidlBuf att_unique_id;
HidlBuf att_app_id;
auto error = parse_attestation_record(attest_rec->data, //
attest_rec->length, //
&att_attestation_version, //
&att_attestation_security_level, //
&att_keymaster_version, //
&att_keymaster_security_level, //
&att_challenge, //
&att_sw_enforced, //
&att_hw_enforced, //
&att_unique_id);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error);
if (error != ErrorCode::OK) return false;
EXPECT_TRUE(att_attestation_version == 3);
expected_sw_enforced.push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf(app_id));
EXPECT_EQ(att_keymaster_version, 4U);
EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_keymaster_security_level);
EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_attestation_security_level);
EXPECT_EQ(challenge.length(), att_challenge.size());
EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(challenge.data(), att_challenge.data(), challenge.length()));
char property_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {};
// TODO(b/136282179): When running under VTS-on-GSI the TEE-backed
// keymaster implementation will report YYYYMM dates instead of YYYYMMDD
// for the BOOT_PATCH_LEVEL.
if (avb_verification_enabled()) {
for (int i = 0; i < att_hw_enforced.size(); i++) {
if (att_hw_enforced[i].tag == TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL ||
att_hw_enforced[i].tag == TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL) {
std::string date = std::to_string(att_hw_enforced[i].f.integer);
// strptime seems to require delimiters, but the tag value will
// be YYYYMMDD
date.insert(6, "-");
date.insert(4, "-");
EXPECT_EQ(date.size(), 10);
struct tm time;
strptime(date.c_str(), "%Y-%m-%d", &time);
// Day of the month (0-31)
EXPECT_GE(time.tm_mday, 0);
EXPECT_LT(time.tm_mday, 32);
// Months since Jan (0-11)
EXPECT_GE(time.tm_mon, 0);
EXPECT_LT(time.tm_mon, 12);
// Years since 1900
EXPECT_GT(time.tm_year, 110);
EXPECT_LT(time.tm_year, 200);
}
}
}
// Check to make sure boolean values are properly encoded. Presence of a boolean tag indicates
// true. A provided boolean tag that can be pulled back out of the certificate indicates correct
// encoding. No need to check if it's in both lists, since the AuthorizationSet compare below
// will handle mismatches of tags.
EXPECT_TRUE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED));
// Alternatively this checks the opposite - a false boolean tag (one that isn't provided in
// the authorization list during key generation) isn't being attested to in the certificate.
EXPECT_FALSE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
EXPECT_FALSE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
KeymasterHidlTest::CheckCreationDateTime(att_sw_enforced, creation_time);
if (att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC)) {
// For ECDSA keys, either an EC_CURVE or a KEY_SIZE can be specified, but one must be.
EXPECT_TRUE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE) ||
att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE));
}
// Test root of trust elements
HidlBuf verified_boot_key;
keymaster_verified_boot_t verified_boot_state;
bool device_locked;
HidlBuf verified_boot_hash;
error = parse_root_of_trust(attest_rec->data, attest_rec->length, &verified_boot_key,
&verified_boot_state, &device_locked, &verified_boot_hash);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error);
if (avb_verification_enabled()) {
property_get("ro.boot.vbmeta.digest", property_value, "nogood");
EXPECT_NE(strcmp(property_value, "nogood"), 0);
string prop_string(property_value);
EXPECT_EQ(prop_string.size(), 64);
EXPECT_EQ(prop_string, bin2hex(verified_boot_hash));
property_get("ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state", property_value, "nogood");
EXPECT_NE(strcmp(property_value, "nogood"), 0);
if (!strcmp(property_value, "unlocked")) {
EXPECT_FALSE(device_locked);
} else {
EXPECT_TRUE(device_locked);
}
}
// Verified boot key should be all 0's if the boot state is not verified or self signed
std::string empty_boot_key(32, '\0');
std::string verified_boot_key_str((const char*)verified_boot_key.data(),
verified_boot_key.size());
property_get("ro.boot.verifiedbootstate", property_value, "nogood");
EXPECT_NE(property_value, "nogood");
if (!strcmp(property_value, "green")) {
EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_VERIFIED);
EXPECT_NE(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
verified_boot_key.size()));
} else if (!strcmp(property_value, "yellow")) {
EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_SELF_SIGNED);
EXPECT_NE(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
verified_boot_key.size()));
} else if (!strcmp(property_value, "orange")) {
EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_UNVERIFIED);
EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
verified_boot_key.size()));
} else if (!strcmp(property_value, "red")) {
EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_FAILED);
EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(verified_boot_key.data(), empty_boot_key.data(),
verified_boot_key.size()));
} else {
EXPECT_TRUE(false);
}
att_sw_enforced.Sort();
expected_sw_enforced.Sort();
EXPECT_EQ(filter_tags(expected_sw_enforced), filter_tags(att_sw_enforced));
att_hw_enforced.Sort();
expected_hw_enforced.Sort();
EXPECT_EQ(filter_tags(expected_hw_enforced), filter_tags(att_hw_enforced));
return true;
}
class NewKeyGenerationTest : public KeymasterHidlTest {
protected:
void CheckBaseParams(const KeyCharacteristics& keyCharacteristics) {
// TODO(swillden): Distinguish which params should be in which auth list.
AuthorizationSet auths(keyCharacteristics.hardwareEnforced);
auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(keyCharacteristics.softwareEnforced));
EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED));
EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN));
EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::VERIFY));
// Verify that App ID, App data and ROT are NOT included.
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST));
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_APPLICATION_ID));
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA));
// Check that some unexpected tags/values are NOT present.
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT));
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT));
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, 301U));
// Now check that unspecified, defaulted tags are correct.
EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME));
EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version()))
<< "OS version is " << os_version() << " key reported "
<< auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_VERSION);
EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level()))
<< "OS patch level is " << os_patch_level() << " key reported "
<< auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL);
}
void CheckCharacteristics(const HidlBuf& key_blob,
const KeyCharacteristics& key_characteristics) {
KeyCharacteristics retrieved_chars;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GetCharacteristics(key_blob, &retrieved_chars));
EXPECT_EQ(key_characteristics, retrieved_chars);
}
};
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.Rsa
*
* Verifies that keymaster can generate all required RSA key sizes, and that the resulting keys have
* correct characteristics.
*/
TEST_F(NewKeyGenerationTest, Rsa) {
for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
HidlBuf key_blob;
KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(key_size, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
&key_blob, &key_characteristics));
ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
AuthorizationSet crypto_params;
if (IsSecure()) {
crypto_params = key_characteristics.hardwareEnforced;
} else {
crypto_params = key_characteristics.softwareEnforced;
}
EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA));
EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
<< "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 3U));
CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
}
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaCheckCreationDateTime
*
* Verifies that creation date time is correct.
*/
TEST_F(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaCheckCreationDateTime) {
KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
auto creation_time = std::chrono::system_clock::now();
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
GetCharacteristics(key_blob_, &key_characteristics);
AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = key_characteristics.softwareEnforced;
CheckCreationDateTime(sw_enforced, creation_time);
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.NoInvalidRsaSizes
*
* Verifies that keymaster cannot generate any RSA key sizes that are designated as invalid.
*/
TEST_F(NewKeyGenerationTest, NoInvalidRsaSizes) {
for (auto key_size : InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
HidlBuf key_blob;
KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(key_size, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
&key_blob, &key_characteristics));
}
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaNoDefaultSize
*
* Verifies that failing to specify a key size for RSA key generation returns UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
*/
TEST_F(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaNoDefaultSize) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA)
.Authorization(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 3U)
.SigningKey()));
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.Ecdsa
*
* Verifies that keymaster can generate all required EC key sizes, and that the resulting keys have
* correct characteristics.
*/
TEST_F(NewKeyGenerationTest, Ecdsa) {
for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
HidlBuf key_blob;
KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
ASSERT_EQ(
ErrorCode::OK,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(key_size).Digest(Digest::NONE),
&key_blob, &key_characteristics));
ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
AuthorizationSet crypto_params;
if (IsSecure()) {
crypto_params = key_characteristics.hardwareEnforced;
} else {
crypto_params = key_characteristics.softwareEnforced;
}
EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
<< "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
}
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.EcCheckCreationDateTime
*
* Verifies that creation date time is correct.
*/
TEST_F(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcCheckCreationDateTime) {
KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
auto creation_time = std::chrono::system_clock::now();
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(256)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)));
GetCharacteristics(key_blob_, &key_characteristics);
AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = key_characteristics.softwareEnforced;
CheckCreationDateTime(sw_enforced, creation_time);
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaDefaultSize
*
* Verifies that failing to specify a key size for EC key generation returns UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
*/
TEST_F(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaDefaultSize) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC)
.SigningKey()
.Digest(Digest::NONE)));
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaInvalidSize
*
* Verifies that specifying an invalid key size for EC key generation returns UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
*/
TEST_F(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaInvalidSize) {
for (auto key_size : InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
HidlBuf key_blob;
KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
ASSERT_EQ(
ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(key_size).Digest(Digest::NONE),
&key_blob, &key_characteristics));
}
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(190).Digest(Digest::NONE)));
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaMismatchKeySize
*
* Verifies that specifying mismatched key size and curve for EC key generation returns
* INVALID_ARGUMENT.
*/
TEST_F(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaMismatchKeySize) {
if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.EcdsaSigningKey(224)
.Authorization(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)));
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAllValidSizes
*
* Verifies that keymaster supports all required EC key sizes.
*/
TEST_F(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAllValidSizes) {
auto valid_sizes = ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC);
for (size_t size : valid_sizes) {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(size).Digest(Digest::NONE)))
<< "Failed to generate size: " << size;
CheckCharacteristics(key_blob_, key_characteristics_);
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaInvalidCurves
*
* Verifies that keymaster does not support any curve designated as unsupported.
*/
TEST_F(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAllValidCurves) {
Digest digest;
if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
digest = Digest::SHA_2_256;
} else {
digest = Digest::SHA_2_512;
}
for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
EXPECT_EQ(
ErrorCode::OK,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(curve).Digest(digest)))
<< "Failed to generate key on curve: " << curve;
CheckCharacteristics(key_blob_, key_characteristics_);
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.Hmac
*
* Verifies that keymaster supports all required digests, and that the resulting keys have correct
* characteristics.
*/
TEST_F(NewKeyGenerationTest, Hmac) {
for (auto digest : ValidDigests(false /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */)) {
HidlBuf key_blob;
KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
constexpr size_t key_size = 128;
ASSERT_EQ(
ErrorCode::OK,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().HmacKey(key_size).Digest(digest).Authorization(
TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128),
&key_blob, &key_characteristics));
ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
AuthorizationSet hardwareEnforced = key_characteristics.hardwareEnforced;
AuthorizationSet softwareEnforced = key_characteristics.softwareEnforced;
if (IsSecure()) {
EXPECT_TRUE(hardwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC));
EXPECT_TRUE(hardwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
<< "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
} else {
EXPECT_TRUE(softwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC));
EXPECT_TRUE(softwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
<< "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
}
CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
}
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.HmacCheckKeySizes
*
* Verifies that keymaster supports all key sizes, and rejects all invalid key sizes.
*/
TEST_F(NewKeyGenerationTest, HmacCheckKeySizes) {
for (size_t key_size = 0; key_size <= 512; ++key_size) {
if (key_size < 64 || key_size % 8 != 0) {
// To keep this test from being very slow, we only test a random fraction of non-byte
// key sizes. We test only ~10% of such cases. Since there are 392 of them, we expect
// to run ~40 of them in each run.
if (key_size % 8 == 0 || random() % 10 == 0) {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.HmacKey(key_size)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 256)))
<< "HMAC key size " << key_size << " invalid";
}
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.HmacKey(key_size)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 256)))
<< "Failed to generate HMAC key of size " << key_size;
CheckCharacteristics(key_blob_, key_characteristics_);
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
}
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.HmacCheckMinMacLengths
*
* Verifies that keymaster supports all required MAC lengths and rejects all invalid lengths. This
* test is probabilistic in order to keep the runtime down, but any failure prints out the specific
* MAC length that failed, so reproducing a failed run will be easy.
*/
TEST_F(NewKeyGenerationTest, HmacCheckMinMacLengths) {
for (size_t min_mac_length = 0; min_mac_length <= 256; ++min_mac_length) {
if (min_mac_length < 64 || min_mac_length % 8 != 0) {
// To keep this test from being very long, we only test a random fraction of non-byte
// lengths. We test only ~10% of such cases. Since there are 172 of them, we expect to
// run ~17 of them in each run.
if (min_mac_length % 8 == 0 || random() % 10 == 0) {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.HmacKey(128)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, min_mac_length)))
<< "HMAC min mac length " << min_mac_length << " invalid.";
}
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.HmacKey(128)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, min_mac_length)))
<< "Failed to generate HMAC key with min MAC length " << min_mac_length;
CheckCharacteristics(key_blob_, key_characteristics_);
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
}
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.HmacMultipleDigests
*
* Verifies that keymaster rejects HMAC key generation with multiple specified digest algorithms.
*/
TEST_F(NewKeyGenerationTest, HmacMultipleDigests) {
if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.HmacKey(128)
.Digest(Digest::SHA1)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.HmacDigestNone
*
* Verifies that keymaster rejects HMAC key generation with no digest or Digest::NONE
*/
TEST_F(NewKeyGenerationTest, HmacDigestNone) {
ASSERT_EQ(
ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().HmacKey(128).Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.HmacKey(128)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
}
typedef KeymasterHidlTest SigningOperationsTest;
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
*
* Verifies that raw RSA signature operations succeed.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, RsaSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)));
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
string signature = SignMessage(
message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaGetKeyCharacteristicsRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData
*
* Verifies that getting RSA key characteristics requires the correct app ID/data.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, RsaGetKeyCharacteristicsRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData) {
HidlBuf key_blob;
KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("clientid"))
.Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, HidlBuf("appdata")),
&key_blob, &key_characteristics));
CheckGetCharacteristics(key_blob, HidlBuf("clientid"), HidlBuf("appdata"),
&key_characteristics);
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaUseRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData
*
* Verifies that using an RSA key requires the correct app ID/data.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, RsaUseRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("clientid"))
.Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, HidlBuf("appdata"))));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
AbortIfNeeded();
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("clientid"))));
AbortIfNeeded();
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, HidlBuf("appdata"))));
AbortIfNeeded();
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, HidlBuf("appdata"))
.Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("clientid"))));
AbortIfNeeded();
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssSha256Success
*
* Verifies that RSA-PSS signature operations succeed.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPssSha256Success) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)));
// Use large message, which won't work without digesting.
string message(1024, 'a');
string signature = SignMessage(
message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaPaddingNoneDoesNotAllowOther
*
* Verifies that keymaster rejects signature operations that specify a padding mode when the key
* supports only unpadded operations.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPaddingNoneDoesNotAllowOther) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
string signature;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.NoUserConfirmation
*
* Verifies that keymaster rejects signing operations for keys with
* TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED and no valid confirmation token
* presented.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, NoUserConfirmation) {
if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Authorization(TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED)));
const string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
string signature;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::NO_USER_CONFIRMATION, Finish(message, &signature));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1Sha256Success
*
* Verifies that digested RSA-PKCS1 signature operations succeed.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1Sha256Success) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
string message(1024, 'a');
string signature = SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1NoDigestSuccess
*
* Verifies that undigested RSA-PKCS1 signature operations succeed.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1NoDigestSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
string message(53, 'a');
string signature = SignMessage(
message,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1NoDigestTooLarge
*
* Verifies that undigested RSA-PKCS1 signature operations fail with the correct error code when
* given a too-long message.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1NoDigestTooLong) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
string message(257, 'a');
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
string signature;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &signature));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssSha512TooSmallKey
*
* Verifies that undigested RSA-PSS signature operations fail with the correct error code when
* used with a key that is too small for the message.
*
* A PSS-padded message is of length salt_size + digest_size + 16 (sizes in bits), and the keymaster
* specification requires that salt_size == digest_size, so the message will be digest_size * 2 +
* 16. Such a message can only be signed by a given key if the key is at least that size. This test
* uses SHA512, which has a digest_size == 512, so the message size is 1040 bits, too large for a
* 1024-bit key.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPssSha512TooSmallKey) {
if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_512)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)));
EXPECT_EQ(
ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_512).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingTooLong
*
* Verifies that raw RSA signature operations fail with the correct error code when
* given a too-long message.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingTooLong) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
// One byte too long
string message(2048 / 8 + 1, 'a');
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
string result;
ErrorCode finish_error_code = Finish(message, &result);
EXPECT_TRUE(finish_error_code == ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ||
finish_error_code == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
// Very large message that should exceed the transfer buffer size of any reasonable TEE.
message = string(128 * 1024, 'a');
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
finish_error_code = Finish(message, &result);
EXPECT_TRUE(finish_error_code == ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ||
finish_error_code == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaAbort
*
* Verifies that operations can be aborted correctly. Uses an RSA signing operation for the test,
* but the behavior should be algorithm and purpose-independent.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, RsaAbort) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Abort(op_handle_));
// Another abort should fail
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE, Abort(op_handle_));
// Set to sentinel, so TearDown() doesn't try to abort again.
op_handle_ = kOpHandleSentinel;
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaUnsupportedPadding
*
* Verifies that RSA operations fail with the correct error (but key gen succeeds) when used with a
* padding mode inappropriate for RSA.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, RsaUnsupportedPadding) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256 /* supported digest */)
.Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
ASSERT_EQ(
ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssNoDigest
*
* Verifies that RSA PSS operations fail when no digest is used. PSS requires a digest.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, RsaNoDigest) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)));
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)));
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssNoDigest
*
* Verifies that RSA operations fail when no padding mode is specified. PaddingMode::NONE is
* supported in some cases (as validated in other tests), but a mode must be specified.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, RsaNoPadding) {
// Padding must be specified
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaKey(2048, 65537)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.SigningKey()
.Digest(Digest::NONE)));
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE)));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaShortMessage
*
* Verifies that raw RSA signatures succeed with a message shorter than the key size.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, RsaTooShortMessage) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
// Barely shorter
string message(2048 / 8 - 1, 'a');
SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
// Much shorter
message = "a";
SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaSignWithEncryptionKey
*
* Verifies that RSA encryption keys cannot be used to sign.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, RsaSignWithEncryptionKey) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaSignTooLargeMessage
*
* Verifies that attempting a raw signature of a message which is the same length as the key, but
* numerically larger than the public modulus, fails with the correct error.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, RsaSignTooLargeMessage) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
// Largest possible message will always be larger than the public modulus.
string message(2048 / 8, static_cast<char>(0xff));
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
string signature;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, Finish(message, &signature));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaAllSizesAndHashes
*
* Verifies that ECDSA operations succeed with all possible key sizes and hashes.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaAllSizesAndHashes) {
for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
for (auto digest : ValidDigests(false /* withNone */, false /* withMD5 */)) {
ErrorCode error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
.Digest(digest));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Failed to generate ECDSA key with size " << key_size
<< " and digest " << digest;
if (error != ErrorCode::OK) continue;
string message(1024, 'a');
if (digest == Digest::NONE) message.resize(key_size / 8);
SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
}
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaAllCurves
*
* Verifies that ECDSA operations succeed with all possible curves.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaAllCurves) {
for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
ErrorCode error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Failed to generate ECDSA key with curve " << curve;
if (error != ErrorCode::OK) continue;
string message(1024, 'a');
SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256));
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaNoDigestHugeData
*
* Verifies that ECDSA operations support very large messages, even without digesting. This should
* work because ECDSA actually only signs the leftmost L_n bits of the message, however large it may
* be. Not using digesting is a bad idea, but in some cases digesting is done by the framework.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaNoDigestHugeData) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(256)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)));
string message(1 * 1024, 'a');
SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.EcGetKeyCharacteristicsRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData
*
* Verifies that getting EC key characteristics requires the correct app ID/data.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, EcGetKeyCharacteristicsRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData) {
HidlBuf key_blob;
KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(256)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("clientid"))
.Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, HidlBuf("appdata")),
&key_blob, &key_characteristics));
CheckGetCharacteristics(key_blob, HidlBuf("clientid"), HidlBuf("appdata"),
&key_characteristics);
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.EcUseRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData
*
* Verifies that using an EC key requires the correct app ID/data.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, EcUseRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(256)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("clientid"))
.Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, HidlBuf("appdata"))));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE)));
AbortIfNeeded();
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("clientid"))));
AbortIfNeeded();
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, HidlBuf("appdata"))));
AbortIfNeeded();
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, HidlBuf("appdata"))
.Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("clientid"))));
AbortIfNeeded();
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.AesEcbSign
*
* Verifies that attempts to use AES keys to sign fail in the correct way.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, AesEcbSign) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.SigningKey()
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)));
AuthorizationSet out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSet() /* in_params */, &out_params));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE,
Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, AuthorizationSet() /* in_params */, &out_params));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.HmacAllDigests
*
* Verifies that HMAC works with all digests.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, HmacAllDigests) {
for (auto digest : ValidDigests(false /* withNone */, false /* withMD5 */)) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.HmacKey(128)
.Digest(digest)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 160)))
<< "Failed to create HMAC key with digest " << digest;
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
string signature = MacMessage(message, digest, 160);
EXPECT_EQ(160U / 8U, signature.size())
<< "Failed to sign with HMAC key with digest " << digest;
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.HmacSha256TooLargeMacLength
*
* Verifies that HMAC fails in the correct way when asked to generate a MAC larger than the digest
* size.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, HmacSha256TooLargeMacLength) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.HmacKey(128)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 256)));
AuthorizationSet output_params;
EXPECT_EQ(
ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH,
Begin(
KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 264),
&output_params, &op_handle_));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.HmacSha256TooSmallMacLength
*
* Verifies that HMAC fails in the correct way when asked to generate a MAC smaller than the
* specified minimum MAC length.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, HmacSha256TooSmallMacLength) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.HmacKey(128)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
AuthorizationSet output_params;
EXPECT_EQ(
ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH,
Begin(
KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 120),
&output_params, &op_handle_));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.HmacRfc4231TestCase3
*
* Validates against the test vectors from RFC 4231 test case 3.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, HmacRfc4231TestCase3) {
string key(20, 0xaa);
string message(50, 0xdd);
uint8_t sha_224_expected[] = {
0x7f, 0xb3, 0xcb, 0x35, 0x88, 0xc6, 0xc1, 0xf6, 0xff, 0xa9, 0x69, 0x4d, 0x7d, 0x6a,
0xd2, 0x64, 0x93, 0x65, 0xb0, 0xc1, 0xf6, 0x5d, 0x69, 0xd1, 0xec, 0x83, 0x33, 0xea,
};
uint8_t sha_256_expected[] = {
0x77, 0x3e, 0xa9, 0x1e, 0x36, 0x80, 0x0e, 0x46, 0x85, 0x4d, 0xb8,
0xeb, 0xd0, 0x91, 0x81, 0xa7, 0x29, 0x59, 0x09, 0x8b, 0x3e, 0xf8,
0xc1, 0x22, 0xd9, 0x63, 0x55, 0x14, 0xce, 0xd5, 0x65, 0xfe,
};
uint8_t sha_384_expected[] = {
0x88, 0x06, 0x26, 0x08, 0xd3, 0xe6, 0xad, 0x8a, 0x0a, 0xa2, 0xac, 0xe0,
0x14, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x6f, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x35, 0xd9, 0x47, 0xac, 0x9f, 0xeb,
0xe8, 0x3e, 0xf4, 0xe5, 0x59, 0x66, 0x14, 0x4b, 0x2a, 0x5a, 0xb3, 0x9d,
0xc1, 0x38, 0x14, 0xb9, 0x4e, 0x3a, 0xb6, 0xe1, 0x01, 0xa3, 0x4f, 0x27,
};
uint8_t sha_512_expected[] = {
0xfa, 0x73, 0xb0, 0x08, 0x9d, 0x56, 0xa2, 0x84, 0xef, 0xb0, 0xf0, 0x75, 0x6c,
0x89, 0x0b, 0xe9, 0xb1, 0xb5, 0xdb, 0xdd, 0x8e, 0xe8, 0x1a, 0x36, 0x55, 0xf8,
0x3e, 0x33, 0xb2, 0x27, 0x9d, 0x39, 0xbf, 0x3e, 0x84, 0x82, 0x79, 0xa7, 0x22,
0xc8, 0x06, 0xb4, 0x85, 0xa4, 0x7e, 0x67, 0xc8, 0x07, 0xb9, 0x46, 0xa3, 0x37,
0xbe, 0xe8, 0x94, 0x26, 0x74, 0x27, 0x88, 0x59, 0xe1, 0x32, 0x92, 0xfb,
};
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_256, make_string(sha_256_expected));
if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_224, make_string(sha_224_expected));
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_384, make_string(sha_384_expected));
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_512, make_string(sha_512_expected));
}
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.HmacRfc4231TestCase5
*
* Validates against the test vectors from RFC 4231 test case 5.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, HmacRfc4231TestCase5) {
string key(20, 0x0c);
string message = "Test With Truncation";
uint8_t sha_224_expected[] = {
0x0e, 0x2a, 0xea, 0x68, 0xa9, 0x0c, 0x8d, 0x37,
0xc9, 0x88, 0xbc, 0xdb, 0x9f, 0xca, 0x6f, 0xa8,
};
uint8_t sha_256_expected[] = {
0xa3, 0xb6, 0x16, 0x74, 0x73, 0x10, 0x0e, 0xe0,
0x6e, 0x0c, 0x79, 0x6c, 0x29, 0x55, 0x55, 0x2b,
};
uint8_t sha_384_expected[] = {
0x3a, 0xbf, 0x34, 0xc3, 0x50, 0x3b, 0x2a, 0x23,
0xa4, 0x6e, 0xfc, 0x61, 0x9b, 0xae, 0xf8, 0x97,
};
uint8_t sha_512_expected[] = {
0x41, 0x5f, 0xad, 0x62, 0x71, 0x58, 0x0a, 0x53,
0x1d, 0x41, 0x79, 0xbc, 0x89, 0x1d, 0x87, 0xa6,
};
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_256, make_string(sha_256_expected));
if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_224, make_string(sha_224_expected));
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_384, make_string(sha_384_expected));
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_512, make_string(sha_512_expected));
}
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.HmacRfc4231TestCase6
*
* Validates against the test vectors from RFC 4231 test case 6.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, HmacRfc4231TestCase6) {
string key(131, 0xaa);
string message = "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key - Hash Key First";
uint8_t sha_224_expected[] = {
0x95, 0xe9, 0xa0, 0xdb, 0x96, 0x20, 0x95, 0xad, 0xae, 0xbe, 0x9b, 0x2d, 0x6f, 0x0d,
0xbc, 0xe2, 0xd4, 0x99, 0xf1, 0x12, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0xb7, 0x27, 0x3f, 0xa6, 0x87, 0x0e,
};
uint8_t sha_256_expected[] = {
0x60, 0xe4, 0x31, 0x59, 0x1e, 0xe0, 0xb6, 0x7f, 0x0d, 0x8a, 0x26,
0xaa, 0xcb, 0xf5, 0xb7, 0x7f, 0x8e, 0x0b, 0xc6, 0x21, 0x37, 0x28,
0xc5, 0x14, 0x05, 0x46, 0x04, 0x0f, 0x0e, 0xe3, 0x7f, 0x54,
};
uint8_t sha_384_expected[] = {
0x4e, 0xce, 0x08, 0x44, 0x85, 0x81, 0x3e, 0x90, 0x88, 0xd2, 0xc6, 0x3a,
0x04, 0x1b, 0xc5, 0xb4, 0x4f, 0x9e, 0xf1, 0x01, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x58, 0x8f,
0x3c, 0xd1, 0x1f, 0x05, 0x03, 0x3a, 0xc4, 0xc6, 0x0c, 0x2e, 0xf6, 0xab,
0x40, 0x30, 0xfe, 0x82, 0x96, 0x24, 0x8d, 0xf1, 0x63, 0xf4, 0x49, 0x52,
};
uint8_t sha_512_expected[] = {
0x80, 0xb2, 0x42, 0x63, 0xc7, 0xc1, 0xa3, 0xeb, 0xb7, 0x14, 0x93, 0xc1, 0xdd,
0x7b, 0xe8, 0xb4, 0x9b, 0x46, 0xd1, 0xf4, 0x1b, 0x4a, 0xee, 0xc1, 0x12, 0x1b,
0x01, 0x37, 0x83, 0xf8, 0xf3, 0x52, 0x6b, 0x56, 0xd0, 0x37, 0xe0, 0x5f, 0x25,
0x98, 0xbd, 0x0f, 0xd2, 0x21, 0x5d, 0x6a, 0x1e, 0x52, 0x95, 0xe6, 0x4f, 0x73,
0xf6, 0x3f, 0x0a, 0xec, 0x8b, 0x91, 0x5a, 0x98, 0x5d, 0x78, 0x65, 0x98,
};
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_256, make_string(sha_256_expected));
if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_224, make_string(sha_224_expected));
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_384, make_string(sha_384_expected));
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_512, make_string(sha_512_expected));
}
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.HmacRfc4231TestCase7
*
* Validates against the test vectors from RFC 4231 test case 7.
*/
TEST_F(SigningOperationsTest, HmacRfc4231TestCase7) {
string key(131, 0xaa);
string message =
"This is a test using a larger than block-size key and a larger than "
"block-size data. The key needs to be hashed before being used by the HMAC "
"algorithm.";
uint8_t sha_224_expected[] = {
0x3a, 0x85, 0x41, 0x66, 0xac, 0x5d, 0x9f, 0x02, 0x3f, 0x54, 0xd5, 0x17, 0xd0, 0xb3,
0x9d, 0xbd, 0x94, 0x67, 0x70, 0xdb, 0x9c, 0x2b, 0x95, 0xc9, 0xf6, 0xf5, 0x65, 0xd1,
};
uint8_t sha_256_expected[] = {
0x9b, 0x09, 0xff, 0xa7, 0x1b, 0x94, 0x2f, 0xcb, 0x27, 0x63, 0x5f,
0xbc, 0xd5, 0xb0, 0xe9, 0x44, 0xbf, 0xdc, 0x63, 0x64, 0x4f, 0x07,
0x13, 0x93, 0x8a, 0x7f, 0x51, 0x53, 0x5c, 0x3a, 0x35, 0xe2,
};
uint8_t sha_384_expected[] = {
0x66, 0x17, 0x17, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x1f, 0x02, 0x0d, 0x35, 0x1e, 0x2f, 0x25,
0x4e, 0x8f, 0xd3, 0x2c, 0x60, 0x24, 0x20, 0xfe, 0xb0, 0xb8, 0xfb, 0x9a,
0xdc, 0xce, 0xbb, 0x82, 0x46, 0x1e, 0x99, 0xc5, 0xa6, 0x78, 0xcc, 0x31,
0xe7, 0x99, 0x17, 0x6d, 0x38, 0x60, 0xe6, 0x11, 0x0c, 0x46, 0x52, 0x3e,
};
uint8_t sha_512_expected[] = {
0xe3, 0x7b, 0x6a, 0x77, 0x5d, 0xc8, 0x7d, 0xba, 0xa4, 0xdf, 0xa9, 0xf9, 0x6e,
0x5e, 0x3f, 0xfd, 0xde, 0xbd, 0x71, 0xf8, 0x86, 0x72, 0x89, 0x86, 0x5d, 0xf5,
0xa3, 0x2d, 0x20, 0xcd, 0xc9, 0x44, 0xb6, 0x02, 0x2c, 0xac, 0x3c, 0x49, 0x82,
0xb1, 0x0d, 0x5e, 0xeb, 0x55, 0xc3, 0xe4, 0xde, 0x15, 0x13, 0x46, 0x76, 0xfb,
0x6d, 0xe0, 0x44, 0x60, 0x65, 0xc9, 0x74, 0x40, 0xfa, 0x8c, 0x6a, 0x58,
};
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_256, make_string(sha_256_expected));
if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_224, make_string(sha_224_expected));
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_384, make_string(sha_384_expected));
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_512, make_string(sha_512_expected));
}
}
typedef KeymasterHidlTest VerificationOperationsTest;
/*
* VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
*
* Verifies that a simple RSA signature/verification sequence succeeds.
*/
TEST_F(VerificationOperationsTest, RsaSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
string signature = SignMessage(
message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
VerifyMessage(message, signature,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
}
/*
* VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
*
* Verifies RSA signature/verification for all padding modes and digests.
*/
TEST_F(VerificationOperationsTest, RsaAllPaddingsAndDigests) {
auto authorizations = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */))
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN);
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(authorizations));
string message(128, 'a');
string corrupt_message(message);
++corrupt_message[corrupt_message.size() / 2];
for (auto padding :
{PaddingMode::NONE, PaddingMode::RSA_PSS, PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN}) {
for (auto digest : ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */)) {
if (padding == PaddingMode::NONE && digest != Digest::NONE) {
// Digesting only makes sense with padding.
continue;
}
if (padding == PaddingMode::RSA_PSS && digest == Digest::NONE) {
// PSS requires digesting.
continue;
}
string signature =
SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding));
VerifyMessage(message, signature,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding));
if (digest != Digest::NONE) {
// Verify with OpenSSL.
HidlBuf pubkey;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ExportKey(KeyFormat::X509, &pubkey));
const uint8_t* p = pubkey.data();
EVP_PKEY_Ptr pkey(d2i_PUBKEY(nullptr /* alloc new */, &p, pubkey.size()));
ASSERT_TRUE(pkey.get());
EVP_MD_CTX digest_ctx;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&digest_ctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX* pkey_ctx;
const EVP_MD* md = openssl_digest(digest);
ASSERT_NE(md, nullptr);
EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&digest_ctx, &pkey_ctx, md, nullptr /* engine */,
pkey.get()));
switch (padding) {
case PaddingMode::RSA_PSS:
EXPECT_GT(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkey_ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING), 0);
EXPECT_GT(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkey_ctx, EVP_MD_size(md)), 0);
break;
case PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN:
// PKCS1 is the default; don't need to set anything.
break;
default:
FAIL();
break;
}
EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&digest_ctx, message.data(), message.size()));
EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(
&digest_ctx, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(signature.data()),
signature.size()));
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&digest_ctx);
}
// Corrupt signature shouldn't verify.
string corrupt_signature(signature);
++corrupt_signature[corrupt_signature.size() / 2];
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding)));
string result;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(message, corrupt_signature, &result));
// Corrupt message shouldn't verify
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding)));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(corrupt_message, signature, &result));
}
}
}
/*
* VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
*
* Verifies ECDSA signature/verification for all digests and curves.
*/
TEST_F(VerificationOperationsTest, EcdsaAllDigestsAndCurves) {
auto digests = ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, false /* withMD5 */);
string message = "1234567890";
string corrupt_message = "2234567890";
for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
ErrorCode error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
.Digest(digests));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Failed to generate key for EC curve " << curve;
if (error != ErrorCode::OK) {
continue;
}
for (auto digest : digests) {
string signature = SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
VerifyMessage(message, signature, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
// Verify with OpenSSL
if (digest != Digest::NONE) {
HidlBuf pubkey;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ExportKey(KeyFormat::X509, &pubkey))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
const uint8_t* p = pubkey.data();
EVP_PKEY_Ptr pkey(d2i_PUBKEY(nullptr /* alloc new */, &p, pubkey.size()));
ASSERT_TRUE(pkey.get());
EVP_MD_CTX digest_ctx;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&digest_ctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX* pkey_ctx;
const EVP_MD* md = openssl_digest(digest);
EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&digest_ctx, &pkey_ctx, md, nullptr /* engine */,
pkey.get()))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&digest_ctx, message.data(), message.size()))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(
&digest_ctx, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(signature.data()),
signature.size()))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&digest_ctx);
}
// Corrupt signature shouldn't verify.
string corrupt_signature(signature);
++corrupt_signature[corrupt_signature.size() / 2];
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest)))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
string result;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(message, corrupt_signature, &result))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
// Corrupt message shouldn't verify
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest)))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(corrupt_message, signature, &result))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
}
auto rc = DeleteKey();
ASSERT_TRUE(rc == ErrorCode::OK || rc == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
}
}
/*
* VerificationOperationsTest.HmacSigningKeyCannotVerify
*
* Verifies HMAC signing and verification, but that a signing key cannot be used to verify.
*/
TEST_F(VerificationOperationsTest, HmacSigningKeyCannotVerify) {
string key_material = "HelloThisIsAKey";
HidlBuf signing_key, verification_key;
KeyCharacteristics signing_key_chars, verification_key_chars;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC)
.Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 160),
KeyFormat::RAW, key_material, &signing_key, &signing_key_chars));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC)
.Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::VERIFY)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 160),
KeyFormat::RAW, key_material, &verification_key, &verification_key_chars));
string message = "This is a message.";
string signature = SignMessage(
signing_key, message,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 160));
// Signing key should not work.
AuthorizationSet out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE,
Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, signing_key, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256),
&out_params, &op_handle_));
// Verification key should work.
VerifyMessage(verification_key, message, signature,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256));
CheckedDeleteKey(&signing_key);
CheckedDeleteKey(&verification_key);
}
typedef KeymasterHidlTest ExportKeyTest;
/*
* ExportKeyTest.RsaUnsupportedKeyFormat
*
* Verifies that attempting to export RSA keys in PKCS#8 format fails with the correct error.
*/
TEST_F(ExportKeyTest, RsaUnsupportedKeyFormat) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
HidlBuf export_data;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_FORMAT, ExportKey(KeyFormat::PKCS8, &export_data));
}
/*
* ExportKeyTest.RsaCorruptedKeyBlob
*
* Verifies that attempting to export RSA keys from corrupted key blobs fails. This is essentially
* a poor-man's key blob fuzzer.
*/
TEST_F(ExportKeyTest, RsaCorruptedKeyBlob) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
for (size_t i = 0; i < key_blob_.size(); ++i) {
HidlBuf corrupted(key_blob_);
++corrupted[i];
HidlBuf export_data;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
ExportKey(KeyFormat::X509, corrupted, HidlBuf(), HidlBuf(), &export_data))
<< "Blob corrupted at offset " << i << " erroneously accepted as valid";
}
}
/*
* ExportKeyTest.RsaCorruptedKeyBlob
*
* Verifies that attempting to export ECDSA keys from corrupted key blobs fails. This is
* essentially a poor-man's key blob fuzzer.
*/
TEST_F(ExportKeyTest, EcCorruptedKeyBlob) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)));
for (size_t i = 0; i < key_blob_.size(); ++i) {
HidlBuf corrupted(key_blob_);
++corrupted[i];
HidlBuf export_data;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
ExportKey(KeyFormat::X509, corrupted, HidlBuf(), HidlBuf(), &export_data))
<< "Blob corrupted at offset " << i << " erroneously accepted as valid";
}
}
/*
* ExportKeyTest.AesKeyUnexportable
*
* Verifies that attempting to export AES keys fails in the expected way.
*/
TEST_F(ExportKeyTest, AesKeyUnexportable) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.EcbMode()
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
HidlBuf export_data;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_FORMAT, ExportKey(KeyFormat::X509, &export_data));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_FORMAT, ExportKey(KeyFormat::PKCS8, &export_data));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_FORMAT, ExportKey(KeyFormat::RAW, &export_data));
}
class ImportKeyTest : public KeymasterHidlTest {
public:
template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag, typename ValueT>
void CheckCryptoParam(TypedTag<tag_type, tag> ttag, ValueT expected) {
SCOPED_TRACE("CheckCryptoParam");
if (IsSecure()) {
EXPECT_TRUE(contains(key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced, ttag, expected))
<< "Tag " << tag << " with value " << expected << " not found";
EXPECT_FALSE(contains(key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced, ttag))
<< "Tag " << tag << " found";
} else {
EXPECT_TRUE(contains(key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced, ttag, expected))
<< "Tag " << tag << " with value " << expected << " not found";
EXPECT_FALSE(contains(key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced, ttag))
<< "Tag " << tag << " found";
}
}
void CheckOrigin() {
SCOPED_TRACE("CheckOrigin");
if (IsSecure()) {
EXPECT_TRUE(
contains(key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced, TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::IMPORTED));
} else {
EXPECT_TRUE(
contains(key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced, TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::IMPORTED));
}
}
};
/*
* ImportKeyTest.RsaSuccess
*
* Verifies that importing and using an RSA key pair works correctly.
*/
TEST_F(ImportKeyTest, RsaSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS),
KeyFormat::PKCS8, rsa_key));
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 1024U);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537U);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::RSA_PSS);
CheckOrigin();
string message(1024 / 8, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS);
string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
}
/*
* ImportKeyTest.RsaKeySizeMismatch
*
* Verifies that importing an RSA key pair with a size that doesn't match the key fails in the
* correct way.
*/
TEST_F(ImportKeyTest, RsaKeySizeMismatch) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH,
ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(2048 /* Doesn't match key */, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
KeyFormat::PKCS8, rsa_key));
}
/*
* ImportKeyTest.RsaPublicExponentMismatch
*
* Verifies that importing an RSA key pair with a public exponent that doesn't match the key fails
* in the correct way.
*/
TEST_F(ImportKeyTest, RsaPublicExponentMismatch) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH,
ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3 /* Doesn't match key */)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
KeyFormat::PKCS8, rsa_key));
}
/*
* ImportKeyTest.EcdsaSuccess
*
* Verifies that importing and using an ECDSA P-256 key pair works correctly.
*/
TEST_F(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(256)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256),
KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key));
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256U);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256);
CheckOrigin();
string message(32, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
}
/*
* ImportKeyTest.EcdsaP256RFC5915Success
*
* Verifies that importing and using an ECDSA P-256 key pair encoded using RFC5915 works correctly.
*/
TEST_F(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaP256RFC5915Success) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(256)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256),
KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key_rfc5915));
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256U);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256);
CheckOrigin();
string message(32, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
}
/*
* ImportKeyTest.EcdsaP256SEC1Success
*
* Verifies that importing and using an ECDSA P-256 key pair encoded using SEC1 works correctly.
*/
TEST_F(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaP256SEC1Success) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(256)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256),
KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key_sec1));
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256U);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256);
CheckOrigin();
string message(32, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
}
/*
* ImportKeyTest.Ecdsa521Success
*
* Verifies that importing and using an ECDSA P-521 key pair works correctly.
*/
TEST_F(ImportKeyTest, Ecdsa521Success) {
if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(521)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256),
KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_521_key));
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 521U);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_521);
CheckOrigin();
string message(32, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
}
/*
* ImportKeyTest.EcdsaSizeMismatch
*
* Verifies that importing an ECDSA key pair with a size that doesn't match the key fails in the
* correct way.
*/
TEST_F(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaSizeMismatch) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH,
ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.EcdsaSigningKey(224 /* Doesn't match key */)
.Digest(Digest::NONE),
KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key));
}
/*
* ImportKeyTest.EcdsaCurveMismatch
*
* Verifies that importing an ECDSA key pair with a curve that doesn't match the key fails in the
* correct way.
*/
TEST_F(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaCurveMismatch) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH,
ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_224 /* Doesn't match key */)
.Digest(Digest::NONE),
KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key));
}
/*
* ImportKeyTest.AesSuccess
*
* Verifies that importing and using an AES key works.
*/
TEST_F(ImportKeyTest, AesSuccess) {
string key = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(key.size() * 8)
.EcbMode()
.Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
KeyFormat::RAW, key));
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::AES);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 128U);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::PKCS7);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB);
CheckOrigin();
string message = "Hello World!";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
}
/*
* ImportKeyTest.AesSuccess
*
* Verifies that importing and using an HMAC key works.
*/
TEST_F(ImportKeyTest, HmacKeySuccess) {
string key = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.HmacKey(key.size() * 8)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 256),
KeyFormat::RAW, key));
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 128U);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
CheckOrigin();
string message = "Hello World!";
string signature = MacMessage(message, Digest::SHA_2_256, 256);
VerifyMessage(message, signature, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256));
}
auto wrapped_key = hex2str(
"3082017902010004820100A0E69B1395D382354FC0E7F74AC068C5818279D76D46745C7274997D045BAA8B9763B3F3"
"09E5E59ECA99273AAAE0A37449DA9B1E67B66EC4E42BB62C25346683A43A9F2ACBCA6D350B25551CC53CE0721D29BE"
"90F60686877478F82B3BB111C5EAC0BAE9310D7AD11F5A82948B31C322820F24E20DDB0FBD07D1566DAEAA058D4645"
"2607352699E1F631D2ABAF60B13E41ED5EDBB90D252331BDB9CDB1B672E871F37CAC009FE9028B3B1E0ACE8F6F0678"
"3F581B860620BDD478969EDE3101AAEFF65C6DB03E143E586167DC87D0CCE39E9119782F7B60A7A1CF2B7EE234E013"
"E3DE6C56F0D51F30C389D31FA37C5F2875ACB44434E82EF40B316C93DE129BA0040CD796B02C370F1FA4CC0124F130"
"2E0201033029A1083106020100020101A203020120A30402020100A4053103020101A6053103020140BF8377020500"
"0420CCD540855F833A5E1480BFD2D36FAF3AEEE15DF5BEABE2691BC82DDE2A7AA910041064C9F689C60FF6223AB6E6"
"999E0EB6E5");
auto wrapped_key_masked = hex2str(
"30820179020100048201001EF5320D3C920D7614688A439409ACE4318C48395ABB7247A68671BD4B7156A7773B31A4"
"4459B73858625988A312E4D8855138F555678F525E4C52D91444FDC936BE6AEB63FD73FD84201EF46F88A0B622F528"
"956C92C9C731EB65BCBC6A03BEAB45959B54A768E2842D2CE174EE542EF2A15DCAA7542F3574BEEB1A991F95439466"
"E1960A9CE9E4CBC77DB23765191E4758C850908BCC74E158B77AB774141F171262C1AC771FDFA2E942F2F7633E97E8"
"0BD492C3E821361AC6B4F568DE351C816C8C997212C707F728FB3BCAAA796EA6B8E7A80BE010970B380122940277E9"
"4C5E9288F7CB6878A4C4CC1E83AB85A81FD68E43B14F1F81AD21E0D3545D70EE040C6D9721D08589581AB49204A330"
"2E0201033029A1083106020100020101A203020120A30402020100A4053103020101A6053103020140BF8377020500"
"0420A61C6E247E25B3E6E69AA78EB03C2D4AC20D1F99A9A024A76F35C8E2CAB9B68D04102560C70109AE67C030F00B"
"98B512A670");
auto wrapping_key = hex2str(
"308204be020100300d06092a864886f70d0101010500048204a8308204a40201000282010100aec367931d8900ce56"
"b0067f7d70e1fc653f3f34d194c1fed50018fb43db937b06e673a837313d56b1c725150a3fef86acbddc41bb759c28"
"54eae32d35841efb5c18d82bc90a1cb5c1d55adf245b02911f0b7cda88c421ff0ebafe7c0d23be312d7bd5921ffaea"
"1347c157406fef718f682643e4e5d33c6703d61c0cf7ac0bf4645c11f5c1374c3886427411c449796792e0bef75dec"
"858a2123c36753e02a95a96d7c454b504de385a642e0dfc3e60ac3a7ee4991d0d48b0172a95f9536f02ba13cecccb9"
"2b727db5c27e5b2f5cec09600b286af5cf14c42024c61ddfe71c2a8d7458f185234cb00e01d282f10f8fc6721d2aed"
"3f4833cca2bd8fa62821dd55020301000102820100431447b6251908112b1ee76f99f3711a52b6630960046c2de70d"
"e188d833f8b8b91e4d785caeeeaf4f0f74414e2cda40641f7fe24f14c67a88959bdb27766df9e710b630a03adc683b"
"5d2c43080e52bee71e9eaeb6de297a5fea1072070d181c822bccff087d63c940ba8a45f670feb29fb4484d1c95e6d2"
"579ba02aae0a00900c3ebf490e3d2cd7ee8d0e20c536e4dc5a5097272888cddd7e91f228b1c4d7474c55b8fcd618c4"
"a957bbddd5ad7407cc312d8d98a5caf7e08f4a0d6b45bb41c652659d5a5ba05b663737a8696281865ba20fbdd7f851"
"e6c56e8cbe0ddbbf24dc03b2d2cb4c3d540fb0af52e034a2d06698b128e5f101e3b51a34f8d8b4f8618102818100de"
"392e18d682c829266cc3454e1d6166242f32d9a1d10577753e904ea7d08bff841be5bac82a164c5970007047b8c517"
"db8f8f84e37bd5988561bdf503d4dc2bdb38f885434ae42c355f725c9a60f91f0788e1f1a97223b524b5357fdf72e2"
"f696bab7d78e32bf92ba8e1864eab1229e91346130748a6e3c124f9149d71c743502818100c95387c0f9d35f137b57"
"d0d65c397c5e21cc251e47008ed62a542409c8b6b6ac7f8967b3863ca645fcce49582a9aa17349db6c4a95affdae0d"
"ae612e1afac99ed39a2d934c880440aed8832f9843163a47f27f392199dc1202f9a0f9bd08308007cb1e4e7f583093"
"66a7de25f7c3c9b880677c068e1be936e81288815252a8a102818057ff8ca1895080b2cae486ef0adfd791fb0235c0"
"b8b36cd6c136e52e4085f4ea5a063212a4f105a3764743e53281988aba073f6e0027298e1c4378556e0efca0e14ece"
"1af76ad0b030f27af6f0ab35fb73a060d8b1a0e142fa2647e93b32e36d8282ae0a4de50ab7afe85500a16f43a64719"
"d6e2b9439823719cd08bcd03178102818100ba73b0bb28e3f81e9bd1c568713b101241acc607976c4ddccc90e65b65"
"56ca31516058f92b6e09f3b160ff0e374ec40d78ae4d4979fde6ac06a1a400c61dd31254186af30b22c10582a8a43e"
"34fe949c5f3b9755bae7baa7b7b7a6bd03b38cef55c86885fc6c1978b9cee7ef33da507c9df6b9277cff1e6aaa5d57"
"aca528466102818100c931617c77829dfb1270502be9195c8f2830885f57dba869536811e6864236d0c4736a0008a1"
"45af36b8357a7c3d139966d04c4e00934ea1aede3bb6b8ec841dc95e3f579751e2bfdfe27ae778983f959356210723"
"287b0affcc9f727044d48c373f1babde0724fa17a4fd4da0902c7c9b9bf27ba61be6ad02dfddda8f4e6822");
string zero_masking_key =
hex2str("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000");
string masking_key = hex2str("D796B02C370F1FA4CC0124F14EC8CBEBE987E825246265050F399A51FD477DFC");
class ImportWrappedKeyTest : public KeymasterHidlTest {};
TEST_F(ImportWrappedKeyTest, Success) {
auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::SHA1)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
.Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY);
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
ImportWrappedKey(
wrapped_key, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, zero_masking_key,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA1).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
string message = "Hello World!";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
}
TEST_F(ImportWrappedKeyTest, SuccessMasked) {
auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::SHA1)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
.Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY);
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
ImportWrappedKey(
wrapped_key_masked, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, masking_key,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA1).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
}
TEST_F(ImportWrappedKeyTest, WrongMask) {
auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::SHA1)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
.Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY);
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED,
ImportWrappedKey(
wrapped_key_masked, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, zero_masking_key,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA1).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
}
TEST_F(ImportWrappedKeyTest, WrongPurpose) {
auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::SHA1)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP);
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE,
ImportWrappedKey(
wrapped_key_masked, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, zero_masking_key,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA1).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
}
typedef KeymasterHidlTest EncryptionOperationsTest;
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingSuccess
*
* Verifies that raw RSA encryption works.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
string message = string(2048 / 8, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext1.size());
string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext2.size());
// Unpadded RSA is deterministic
EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingShortMessage
*
* Verifies that raw RSA encryption of short messages works.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingShortMessage) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
string message = "1";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext.size());
string expected_plaintext = string(2048U / 8 - 1, 0) + message;
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
EXPECT_EQ(expected_plaintext, plaintext);
// Degenerate case, encrypting a numeric 1 yields 0x00..01 as the ciphertext.
message = static_cast<char>(1);
ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext.size());
EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext, string(2048U / 8 - 1, 0) + message);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingTooLong
*
* Verifies that raw RSA encryption of too-long messages fails in the expected way.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingTooLong) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
string message(2048 / 8 + 1, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
string result;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &result));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingTooLarge
*
* Verifies that raw RSA encryption of too-large (numerically) messages fails in the expected way.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingTooLarge) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
HidlBuf exported;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ExportKey(KeyFormat::X509, &exported));
const uint8_t* p = exported.data();
EVP_PKEY_Ptr pkey(d2i_PUBKEY(nullptr /* alloc new */, &p, exported.size()));
RSA_Ptr rsa(EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey.get()));
size_t modulus_len = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
ASSERT_EQ(2048U / 8, modulus_len);
std::unique_ptr<uint8_t[]> modulus_buf(new uint8_t[modulus_len]);
BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, modulus_buf.get());
// The modulus is too big to encrypt.
string message(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(modulus_buf.get()), modulus_len);
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
string result;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, Finish(message, &result));
// One smaller than the modulus is okay.
BN_sub(rsa->n, rsa->n, BN_value_one());
modulus_len = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
ASSERT_EQ(2048U / 8, modulus_len);
BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, modulus_buf.get());
message = string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(modulus_buf.get()), modulus_len);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(message, &result));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepSuccess
*
* Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations work, with all digests.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepSuccess) {
auto digests = ValidDigests(false /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */);
size_t key_size = 2048; // Need largish key for SHA-512 test.
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaEncryptionKey(key_size, 65537)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
.Digest(digests)));
string message = "Hello";
for (auto digest : digests) {
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP);
string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
if (HasNonfatalFailure()) std::cout << "-->" << digest << std::endl;
EXPECT_EQ(key_size / 8, ciphertext1.size());
string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(key_size / 8, ciphertext2.size());
// OAEP randomizes padding so every result should be different (with astronomically high
// probability).
EXPECT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
string plaintext1 = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext1) << "RSA-OAEP failed with digest " << digest;
string plaintext2 = DecryptMessage(ciphertext2, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext2) << "RSA-OAEP failed with digest " << digest;
// Decrypting corrupted ciphertext should fail.
size_t offset_to_corrupt = random() % ciphertext1.size();
char corrupt_byte;
do {
corrupt_byte = static_cast<char>(random() % 256);
} while (corrupt_byte == ciphertext1[offset_to_corrupt]);
ciphertext1[offset_to_corrupt] = corrupt_byte;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
string result;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR, Finish(ciphertext1, &result));
EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
}
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepInvalidDigest
*
* Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to operate
* without a digest.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepInvalidDigest) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)));
string message = "Hello World!";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP).Digest(Digest::NONE);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepInvalidDigest
*
* Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to decrypt with a
* different digest than was used to encrypt.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepDecryptWithWrongDigest) {
if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaEncryptionKey(1024, 65537)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_224, Digest::SHA_2_256)));
string message = "Hello World!";
string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(
message,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_224).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP));
EXPECT_EQ(
ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
string result;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR, Finish(ciphertext, &result));
EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepTooLarge
*
* Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to encrypt a
* too-large message.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepTooLarge) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)));
constexpr size_t digest_size = 256 /* SHA_2_256 */ / 8;
constexpr size_t oaep_overhead = 2 * digest_size + 2;
string message(2048 / 8 - oaep_overhead + 1, 'a');
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP).Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)));
string result;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, Finish(message, &result));
EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1Success
*
* Verifies that RSA PKCS encryption/decrypts works.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1Success) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT)));
string message = "Hello World!";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT);
string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext1.size());
string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext2.size());
// PKCS1 v1.5 randomizes padding so every result should be different.
EXPECT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
// Decrypting corrupted ciphertext should fail.
size_t offset_to_corrupt = random() % ciphertext1.size();
char corrupt_byte;
do {
corrupt_byte = static_cast<char>(random() % 256);
} while (corrupt_byte == ciphertext1[offset_to_corrupt]);
ciphertext1[offset_to_corrupt] = corrupt_byte;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
string result;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR, Finish(ciphertext1, &result));
EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1TooLarge
*
* Verifies that RSA PKCS encryption fails in the correct way when the mssage is too large.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1TooLarge) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT)));
string message(2048 / 8 - 10, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
string result;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, Finish(message, &result));
EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.EcdsaEncrypt
*
* Verifies that attempting to use ECDSA keys to encrypt fails in the correct way.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, EcdsaEncrypt) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(256)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)));
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE);
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.HmacEncrypt
*
* Verifies that attempting to use HMAC keys to encrypt fails in the correct way.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, HmacEncrypt) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.HmacKey(128)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbRoundTripSuccess
*
* Verifies that AES ECB mode works.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbRoundTripSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
// Two-block message.
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(string(message), params);
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext2.size());
// ECB is deterministic.
EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbRoundTripSuccess
*
* Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when an unauthorized mode is specified.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesWrongMode) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
// Two-block message.
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
EXPECT_EQ(
ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE,
Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbNoPaddingWrongInputSize
*
* Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when provided an input that is not a
* multiple of the block size and no padding is specified.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbNoPaddingWrongInputSize) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
// Message is slightly shorter than two blocks.
string message(16 * 2 - 1, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
string ciphertext;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &ciphertext));
EXPECT_EQ(0U, ciphertext.size());
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbPkcs7Padding
*
* Verifies that AES PKCS7 padding works for any message length.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbPkcs7Padding) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
.Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
// Try various message lengths; all should work.
for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
string message(i, 'a');
string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(i + 16 - (i % 16), ciphertext.size());
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
}
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbWrongPadding
*
* Verifies that AES enryption fails in the correct way when an unauthorized padding mode is
* specified.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbWrongPadding) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
// Try various message lengths; all should fail
for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
string message(i, 'a');
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
}
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbPkcs7PaddingCorrupted
*
* Verifies that AES decryption fails in the correct way when the padding is corrupted.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbPkcs7PaddingCorrupted) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
.Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
string message = "a";
string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(16U, ciphertext.size());
EXPECT_NE(ciphertext, message);
++ciphertext[ciphertext.size() / 2];
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
string plaintext;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &plaintext));
}
HidlBuf CopyIv(const AuthorizationSet& set) {
auto iv = set.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE);
EXPECT_TRUE(iv.isOk());
return iv.value();
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrRoundTripSuccess
*
* Verifies that AES CTR mode works.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCtrRoundTripSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CTR)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
string message = "123";
AuthorizationSet out_params;
string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
HidlBuf iv1 = CopyIv(out_params);
EXPECT_EQ(16U, iv1.size());
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
out_params.Clear();
string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
HidlBuf iv2 = CopyIv(out_params);
EXPECT_EQ(16U, iv2.size());
// IVs should be random, so ciphertexts should differ.
EXPECT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
auto params_iv1 =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorizations(params).Authorization(TAG_NONCE, iv1);
auto params_iv2 =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorizations(params).Authorization(TAG_NONCE, iv2);
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params_iv1);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext2, params_iv2);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
// Using the wrong IV will result in a "valid" decryption, but the data will be garbage.
plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params_iv2);
EXPECT_NE(message, plaintext);
plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext2, params_iv1);
EXPECT_NE(message, plaintext);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesIncremental
*
* Verifies that AES works, all modes, when provided data in various size increments.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesIncremental) {
auto block_modes = {
BlockMode::ECB, BlockMode::CBC, BlockMode::CTR, BlockMode::GCM,
};
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.BlockMode(block_modes)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
for (int increment = 1; increment <= 240; ++increment) {
for (auto block_mode : block_modes) {
string message(240, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(block_mode)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128) /* for GCM */;
AuthorizationSet output_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &output_params));
string ciphertext;
size_t input_consumed;
string to_send;
for (size_t i = 0; i < message.size(); i += increment) {
to_send.append(message.substr(i, increment));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(to_send, &ciphertext, &input_consumed));
EXPECT_EQ(to_send.length(), input_consumed);
to_send = to_send.substr(input_consumed);
EXPECT_EQ(0U, to_send.length());
switch (block_mode) {
case BlockMode::ECB:
case BlockMode::CBC:
// Implementations must take as many blocks as possible, leaving less than
// a block.
EXPECT_LE(to_send.length(), 16U);
break;
case BlockMode::GCM:
case BlockMode::CTR:
// Implementations must always take all the data.
EXPECT_EQ(0U, to_send.length());
break;
}
}
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(to_send, &ciphertext)) << "Error sending " << to_send;
switch (block_mode) {
case BlockMode::GCM:
EXPECT_EQ(message.size() + 16, ciphertext.size());
break;
case BlockMode::CTR:
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext.size());
break;
case BlockMode::CBC:
case BlockMode::ECB:
EXPECT_EQ(message.size() + message.size() % 16, ciphertext.size());
break;
}
auto iv = output_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE);
switch (block_mode) {
case BlockMode::CBC:
case BlockMode::GCM:
case BlockMode::CTR:
ASSERT_TRUE(iv.isOk()) << "No IV for block mode " << block_mode;
EXPECT_EQ(block_mode == BlockMode::GCM ? 12U : 16U, iv.value().size());
params.push_back(TAG_NONCE, iv.value());
break;
case BlockMode::ECB:
EXPECT_FALSE(iv.isOk()) << "ECB mode should not generate IV";
break;
}
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params))
<< "Decrypt begin() failed for block mode " << block_mode;
string plaintext;
for (size_t i = 0; i < ciphertext.size(); i += increment) {
to_send.append(ciphertext.substr(i, increment));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(to_send, &plaintext, &input_consumed));
to_send = to_send.substr(input_consumed);
}
ErrorCode error = Finish(to_send, &plaintext);
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Decryption failed for block mode " << block_mode
<< " and increment " << increment;
if (error == ErrorCode::OK) {
ASSERT_EQ(message, plaintext) << "Decryption didn't match for block mode "
<< block_mode << " and increment " << increment;
}
}
}
}
struct AesCtrSp80038aTestVector {
const char* key;
const char* nonce;
const char* plaintext;
const char* ciphertext;
};
// These test vectors are taken from
// http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf, section F.5.
static const AesCtrSp80038aTestVector kAesCtrSp80038aTestVectors[] = {
// AES-128
{
"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c", "f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff",
"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51"
"30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710",
"874d6191b620e3261bef6864990db6ce9806f66b7970fdff8617187bb9fffdff"
"5ae4df3edbd5d35e5b4f09020db03eab1e031dda2fbe03d1792170a0f3009cee",
},
// AES-192
{
"8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b", "f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff",
"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51"
"30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710",
"1abc932417521ca24f2b0459fe7e6e0b090339ec0aa6faefd5ccc2c6f4ce8e94"
"1e36b26bd1ebc670d1bd1d665620abf74f78a7f6d29809585a97daec58c6b050",
},
// AES-256
{
"603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d77811f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4",
"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff",
"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51"
"30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710",
"601ec313775789a5b7a7f504bbf3d228f443e3ca4d62b59aca84e990cacaf5c5"
"2b0930daa23de94ce87017ba2d84988ddfc9c58db67aada613c2dd08457941a6",
},
};
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrSp80038aTestVector
*
* Verifies AES CTR implementation against SP800-38A test vectors.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCtrSp80038aTestVector) {
std::vector<uint32_t> InvalidSizes = InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES);
for (size_t i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
const AesCtrSp80038aTestVector& test(kAesCtrSp80038aTestVectors[i]);
const string key = hex2str(test.key);
if (std::find(InvalidSizes.begin(), InvalidSizes.end(), (key.size() * 8)) !=
InvalidSizes.end())
continue;
const string nonce = hex2str(test.nonce);
const string plaintext = hex2str(test.plaintext);
const string ciphertext = hex2str(test.ciphertext);
CheckAesCtrTestVector(key, nonce, plaintext, ciphertext);
}
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrIncompatiblePaddingMode
*
* Verifies that keymaster rejects use of CTR mode with PKCS7 padding in the correct way.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCtrIncompatiblePaddingMode) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CTR)
.Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrInvalidCallerNonce
*
* Verifies that keymaster fails correctly when the user supplies an incorrect-size nonce.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCtrInvalidCallerNonce) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CTR)
.Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NONCE, HidlBuf(string(1, 'a')));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NONCE, HidlBuf(string(15, 'a')));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NONCE, HidlBuf(string(17, 'a')));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrInvalidCallerNonce
*
* Verifies that keymaster fails correctly when the user supplies an incorrect-size nonce.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCbcRoundTripSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
// Two-block message.
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
AuthorizationSet out_params;
string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
HidlBuf iv1 = CopyIv(out_params);
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
out_params.Clear();
string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
HidlBuf iv2 = CopyIv(out_params);
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext2.size());
// IVs should be random, so ciphertexts should differ.
EXPECT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
params.push_back(TAG_NONCE, iv1);
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCallerNonce
*
* Verifies that AES caller-provided nonces work correctly.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCallerNonce) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
.Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
// Don't specify nonce, should get a random one.
AuthorizationSetBuilder params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
AuthorizationSet out_params;
string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext.size());
EXPECT_EQ(16U, out_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE).value().size());
params.push_back(TAG_NONCE, out_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE).value());
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
// Now specify a nonce, should also work.
params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NONCE, HidlBuf("abcdefghijklmnop"));
out_params.Clear();
ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
// Decrypt with correct nonce.
plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
// Try with wrong nonce.
params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NONCE, HidlBuf("aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"));
plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
EXPECT_NE(message, plaintext);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCallerNonceProhibited
*
* Verifies that caller-provided nonces are not permitted when not specified in the key
* authorizations.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCallerNonceProhibited) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
// Don't specify nonce, should get a random one.
AuthorizationSetBuilder params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
AuthorizationSet out_params;
string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext.size());
EXPECT_EQ(16U, out_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE).value().size());
params.push_back(TAG_NONCE, out_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE).value());
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
// Now specify a nonce, should fail
params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NONCE, HidlBuf("abcdefghijklmnop"));
out_params.Clear();
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &out_params));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmRoundTripSuccess
*
* Verifies that AES GCM mode works.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmRoundTripSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
string aad = "foobar";
string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
auto update_params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, aad.data(), aad.size());
// Encrypt
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params))
<< "Begin encrypt";
string ciphertext;
AuthorizationSet update_out_params;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Finish(op_handle_, update_params, message, "", &update_out_params, &ciphertext));
ASSERT_EQ(ciphertext.length(), message.length() + 16);
// Grab nonce
begin_params.push_back(begin_out_params);
// Decrypt.
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params)) << "Begin decrypt";
string plaintext;
size_t input_consumed;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(op_handle_, update_params, ciphertext, &update_out_params,
&plaintext, &input_consumed));
EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext.size(), input_consumed);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish("", &plaintext));
EXPECT_EQ(message.length(), plaintext.length());
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmTooShortTag
*
* Verifies that AES GCM mode fails correctly when a too-short tag length is specified.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmTooShortTag) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 96);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmTooShortTagOnDecrypt
*
* Verifies that AES GCM mode fails correctly when a too-short tag is provided to decryption.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmTooShortTagOnDecrypt) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
string aad = "foobar";
string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
auto finish_params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, aad.data(), aad.size());
// Encrypt
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &begin_out_params));
EXPECT_EQ(1U, begin_out_params.size());
ASSERT_TRUE(begin_out_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE).isOk());
AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
string ciphertext;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(op_handle_, finish_params, message, "" /* signature */,
&finish_out_params, &ciphertext));
params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorizations(begin_out_params)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 96);
// Decrypt.
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmCorruptKey
*
* Verifies that AES GCM mode fails correctly when the decryption key is incorrect.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmCorruptKey) {
const uint8_t nonce_bytes[] = {
0xb7, 0x94, 0x37, 0xae, 0x08, 0xff, 0x35, 0x5d, 0x7d, 0x8a, 0x4d, 0x0f,
};
string nonce = make_string(nonce_bytes);
const uint8_t ciphertext_bytes[] = {
0xb3, 0xf6, 0x79, 0x9e, 0x8f, 0x93, 0x26, 0xf2, 0xdf, 0x1e, 0x80, 0xfc, 0xd2, 0xcb, 0x16,
0xd7, 0x8c, 0x9d, 0xc7, 0xcc, 0x14, 0xbb, 0x67, 0x78, 0x62, 0xdc, 0x6c, 0x63, 0x9b, 0x3a,
0x63, 0x38, 0xd2, 0x4b, 0x31, 0x2d, 0x39, 0x89, 0xe5, 0x92, 0x0b, 0x5d, 0xbf, 0xc9, 0x76,
0x76, 0x5e, 0xfb, 0xfe, 0x57, 0xbb, 0x38, 0x59, 0x40, 0xa7, 0xa4, 0x3b, 0xdf, 0x05, 0xbd,
0xda, 0xe3, 0xc9, 0xd6, 0xa2, 0xfb, 0xbd, 0xfc, 0xc0, 0xcb, 0xa0,
};
string ciphertext = make_string(ciphertext_bytes);
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128)
.Authorization(TAG_NONCE, nonce.data(), nonce.size());
auto import_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
// Import correct key and decrypt
const uint8_t key_bytes[] = {
0xba, 0x76, 0x35, 0x4f, 0x0a, 0xed, 0x6e, 0x8d,
0x91, 0xf4, 0x5c, 0x4f, 0xf5, 0xa0, 0x62, 0xdb,
};
string key = make_string(key_bytes);
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(import_params, KeyFormat::RAW, key));
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
CheckedDeleteKey();
// Corrupt key and attempt to decrypt
key[0] = 0;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(import_params, KeyFormat::RAW, key));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(ciphertext, &plaintext));
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmAadNoData
*
* Verifies that AES GCM mode works when provided additional authenticated data, but no data to
* encrypt.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmAadNoData) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
string aad = "1234567890123456";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
auto finish_params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, aad.data(), aad.size());
// Encrypt
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &begin_out_params));
string ciphertext;
AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(op_handle_, finish_params, "" /* input */, "" /* signature */,
&finish_out_params, &ciphertext));
EXPECT_TRUE(finish_out_params.empty());
// Grab nonce
params.push_back(begin_out_params);
// Decrypt.
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
string plaintext;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(op_handle_, finish_params, ciphertext, "" /* signature */,
&finish_out_params, &plaintext));
EXPECT_TRUE(finish_out_params.empty());
EXPECT_EQ("", plaintext);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmMultiPartAad
*
* Verifies that AES GCM mode works when provided additional authenticated data in multiple chunks.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmMultiPartAad) {
const size_t tag_bits = 128;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, tag_bits);
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
auto update_params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, "foo", (size_t)3);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
// No data, AAD only.
string ciphertext;
size_t input_consumed;
AuthorizationSet update_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(op_handle_, update_params, "" /* input */, &update_out_params,
&ciphertext, &input_consumed));
EXPECT_EQ(0U, input_consumed);
EXPECT_EQ(0U, ciphertext.size());
EXPECT_TRUE(update_out_params.empty());
// AAD and data.
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(op_handle_, update_params, message, &update_out_params,
&ciphertext, &input_consumed));
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), input_consumed);
EXPECT_TRUE(update_out_params.empty());
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish("" /* input */, &ciphertext));
// Expect 128-bit (16-byte) tag appended to ciphertext.
EXPECT_EQ(message.size() + (tag_bits >> 3), ciphertext.size());
// Grab nonce.
begin_params.push_back(begin_out_params);
// Decrypt
update_params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, "foofoo", (size_t)6);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params));
string plaintext;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(op_handle_, update_params, ciphertext, "" /* signature */,
&update_out_params, &plaintext));
EXPECT_TRUE(update_out_params.empty());
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmAadOutOfOrder
*
* Verifies that AES GCM mode fails correctly when given AAD after data to encipher.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmAadOutOfOrder) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
auto update_params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, "foo", (size_t)3);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
// No data, AAD only.
string ciphertext;
size_t input_consumed;
AuthorizationSet update_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(op_handle_, update_params, "" /* input */, &update_out_params,
&ciphertext, &input_consumed));
EXPECT_EQ(0U, input_consumed);
EXPECT_EQ(0U, ciphertext.size());
EXPECT_TRUE(update_out_params.empty());
// AAD and data.
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(op_handle_, update_params, message, &update_out_params,
&ciphertext, &input_consumed));
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), input_consumed);
EXPECT_TRUE(update_out_params.empty());
// More AAD
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG, Update(op_handle_, update_params, "", &update_out_params,
&ciphertext, &input_consumed));
op_handle_ = kOpHandleSentinel;
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmBadAad
*
* Verifies that AES GCM decryption fails correctly when additional authenticated date is wrong.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmBadAad) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
auto finish_params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, "foobar", (size_t)6);
// Encrypt
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
string ciphertext;
AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(op_handle_, finish_params, message, "" /* signature */,
&finish_out_params, &ciphertext));
// Grab nonce
begin_params.push_back(begin_out_params);
finish_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA,
"barfoo" /* Wrong AAD */, (size_t)6);
// Decrypt.
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
string plaintext;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED,
Finish(op_handle_, finish_params, ciphertext, "" /* signature */, &finish_out_params,
&plaintext));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmWrongNonce
*
* Verifies that AES GCM decryption fails correctly when the nonce is incorrect.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmWrongNonce) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
auto finish_params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, "foobar", (size_t)6);
// Encrypt
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
string ciphertext;
AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(op_handle_, finish_params, message, "" /* signature */,
&finish_out_params, &ciphertext));
// Wrong nonce
begin_params.push_back(TAG_NONCE, HidlBuf("123456789012"));
// Decrypt.
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
string plaintext;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED,
Finish(op_handle_, finish_params, ciphertext, "" /* signature */, &finish_out_params,
&plaintext));
// With wrong nonce, should have gotten garbage plaintext (or none).
EXPECT_NE(message, plaintext);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmCorruptTag
*
* Verifies that AES GCM decryption fails correctly when the tag is wrong.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmCorruptTag) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
string aad = "1234567890123456";
string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
auto finish_params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, aad.data(), aad.size());
// Encrypt
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &begin_out_params));
string ciphertext;
AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(op_handle_, finish_params, message, "" /* signature */,
&finish_out_params, &ciphertext));
EXPECT_TRUE(finish_out_params.empty());
// Corrupt tag
++(*ciphertext.rbegin());
// Grab nonce
params.push_back(begin_out_params);
// Decrypt.
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
string plaintext;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED,
Finish(op_handle_, finish_params, ciphertext, "" /* signature */, &finish_out_params,
&plaintext));
EXPECT_TRUE(finish_out_params.empty());
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesEcbRoundTripSuccess
*
* Verifies that 3DES is basically functional.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesEcbRoundTripSuccess) {
auto auths = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(auths));
// Two-block message.
string message = "1234567890123456";
auto inParams = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, inParams);
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(string(message), inParams);
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext2.size());
// ECB is deterministic.
EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, inParams);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesEcbNotAuthorized
*
* Verifies that CBC keys reject ECB usage.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesEcbNotAuthorized) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
auto inParams = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, inParams));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesEcbPkcs7Padding
*
* Tests ECB mode with PKCS#7 padding, various message sizes.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesEcbPkcs7Padding) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
string message(i, 'a');
auto inParams =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, inParams);
EXPECT_EQ(i + 8 - (i % 8), ciphertext.size());
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, inParams);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
}
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesEcbNoPaddingKeyWithPkcs7Padding
*
* Verifies that keys configured for no padding reject PKCS7 padding
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesEcbNoPaddingKeyWithPkcs7Padding) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
auto inParams =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, inParams));
}
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesEcbPkcs7PaddingCorrupted
*
* Verifies that corrupted padding is detected.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesEcbPkcs7PaddingCorrupted) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
string message = "a";
string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::ECB, PaddingMode::PKCS7);
EXPECT_EQ(8U, ciphertext.size());
EXPECT_NE(ciphertext, message);
++ciphertext[ciphertext.size() / 2];
AuthorizationSetBuilder begin_params;
begin_params.push_back(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB);
begin_params.push_back(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::PKCS7);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params));
string plaintext;
size_t input_consumed;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(ciphertext, &plaintext, &input_consumed));
EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext.size(), input_consumed);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, Finish(&plaintext));
}
struct TripleDesTestVector {
const char* name;
const KeyPurpose purpose;
const BlockMode block_mode;
const PaddingMode padding_mode;
const char* key;
const char* iv;
const char* input;
const char* output;
};
// These test vectors are from NIST CAVP, plus a few custom variants to test padding, since all of
// the NIST vectors are multiples of the block size.
static const TripleDesTestVector kTripleDesTestVectors[] = {
{
"TECBMMT3 Encrypt 0", KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, BlockMode::ECB, PaddingMode::NONE,
"a2b5bc67da13dc92cd9d344aa238544a0e1fa79ef76810cd", // key
"", // IV
"329d86bdf1bc5af4", // input
"d946c2756d78633f", // output
},
{
"TECBMMT3 Encrypt 1", KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, BlockMode::ECB, PaddingMode::NONE,
"49e692290d2a5e46bace79b9648a4c5d491004c262dc9d49", // key
"", // IV
"6b1540781b01ce1997adae102dbf3c5b", // input
"4d0dc182d6e481ac4a3dc6ab6976ccae", // output
},
{
"TECBMMT3 Decrypt 0", KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, BlockMode::ECB, PaddingMode::NONE,
"52daec2ac7dc1958377392682f37860b2cc1ea2304bab0e9", // key
"", // IV
"6daad94ce08acfe7", // input
"660e7d32dcc90e79", // output
},
{
"TECBMMT3 Decrypt 1", KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, BlockMode::ECB, PaddingMode::NONE,
"7f8fe3d3f4a48394fb682c2919926d6ddfce8932529229ce", // key
"", // IV
"e9653a0a1f05d31b9acd12d73aa9879d", // input
"9b2ae9d998efe62f1b592e7e1df8ff38", // output
},
{
"TCBCMMT3 Encrypt 0", KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE,
"b5cb1504802326c73df186e3e352a20de643b0d63ee30e37", // key
"43f791134c5647ba", // IV
"dcc153cef81d6f24", // input
"92538bd8af18d3ba", // output
},
{
"TCBCMMT3 Encrypt 1", KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE,
"a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f7358", // key
"c2e999cb6249023c", // IV
"c689aee38a301bb316da75db36f110b5", // input
"e9afaba5ec75ea1bbe65506655bb4ecb", // output
},
{
"TCBCMMT3 Encrypt 1 PKCS7 variant", KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::PKCS7,
"a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f7358", // key
"c2e999cb6249023c", // IV
"c689aee38a301bb316da75db36f110b500", // input
"e9afaba5ec75ea1bbe65506655bb4ecb825aa27ec0656156", // output
},
{
"TCBCMMT3 Encrypt 1 PKCS7 decrypted", KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, BlockMode::CBC,
PaddingMode::PKCS7,
"a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f7358", // key
"c2e999cb6249023c", // IV
"e9afaba5ec75ea1bbe65506655bb4ecb825aa27ec0656156", // input
"c689aee38a301bb316da75db36f110b500", // output
},
{
"TCBCMMT3 Decrypt 0", KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE,
"5eb6040d46082c7aa7d06dfd08dfeac8c18364c1548c3ba1", // key
"41746c7e442d3681", // IV
"c53a7b0ec40600fe", // input
"d4f00eb455de1034", // output
},
{
"TCBCMMT3 Decrypt 1", KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE,
"5b1cce7c0dc1ec49130dfb4af45785ab9179e567f2c7d549", // key
"3982bc02c3727d45", // IV
"6006f10adef52991fcc777a1238bbb65", // input
"edae09288e9e3bc05746d872b48e3b29", // output
},
};
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesTestVector
*
* Verifies that NIST (plus a few extra) test vectors produce the correct results.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesTestVector) {
constexpr size_t num_tests = sizeof(kTripleDesTestVectors) / sizeof(TripleDesTestVector);
for (auto* test = kTripleDesTestVectors; test < kTripleDesTestVectors + num_tests; ++test) {
SCOPED_TRACE(test->name);
CheckTripleDesTestVector(test->purpose, test->block_mode, test->padding_mode,
hex2str(test->key), hex2str(test->iv), hex2str(test->input),
hex2str(test->output));
}
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCbcRoundTripSuccess
*
* Validates CBC mode functionality.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcRoundTripSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
// Two-block message.
string message = "1234567890123456";
HidlBuf iv1;
string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, &iv1);
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
HidlBuf iv2;
string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, &iv2);
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext2.size());
// IVs should be random, so ciphertexts should differ.
EXPECT_NE(iv1, iv2);
EXPECT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, iv1);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCallerIv
*
* Validates that 3DES keys can allow caller-specified IVs, and use them correctly.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCallerIv) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
string message = "1234567890123456";
HidlBuf iv;
// Don't specify IV, should get a random one.
string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, &iv);
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
EXPECT_EQ(8U, iv.size());
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, iv);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
// Now specify an IV, should also work.
iv = HidlBuf("abcdefgh");
string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, iv);
// Decrypt with correct IV.
plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext2, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, iv);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
// Now try with wrong IV.
plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext2, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, HidlBuf("aaaaaaaa"));
EXPECT_NE(message, plaintext);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCallerNonceProhibited.
*
* Verifies that 3DES keys without TAG_CALLER_NONCE do not allow caller-specified IVS.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCallerNonceProhibited) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
HidlBuf iv;
// Don't specify nonce, should get a random one.
string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, &iv);
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
EXPECT_EQ(8U, iv.size());
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::NONE, iv);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
// Now specify a nonce, should fail.
auto input_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NONCE, HidlBuf("abcdefgh"))
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
AuthorizationSet output_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED,
Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, input_params, &output_params));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCbcNotAuthorized
*
* Verifies that 3DES ECB-only keys do not allow CBC usage.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcNotAuthorized) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
// Two-block message.
string message = "1234567890123456";
auto begin_params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize
*
* Verifies that unpadded CBC operations reject inputs that are not a multiple of block size.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
// Message is slightly shorter than two blocks.
string message = "123456789012345";
auto begin_params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
AuthorizationSet output_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &output_params));
string ciphertext;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, "", &ciphertext));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcPkcs7Padding.
*
* Verifies that PKCS7 padding works correctly in CBC mode.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcPkcs7Padding) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
// Try various message lengths; all should work.
for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
string message(i, 'a');
HidlBuf iv;
string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::PKCS7, &iv);
EXPECT_EQ(i + 8 - (i % 8), ciphertext.size());
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::PKCS7, iv);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
}
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCbcNoPaddingKeyWithPkcs7Padding
*
* Verifies that a key that requires PKCS7 padding cannot be used in unpadded mode.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcNoPaddingKeyWithPkcs7Padding) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
// Try various message lengths; all should fail.
for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
auto begin_params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params));
}
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCbcPkcs7PaddingCorrupted
*
* Verifies that corrupted PKCS7 padding is rejected during decryption.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcPkcs7PaddingCorrupted) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
string message = "a";
HidlBuf iv;
string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::CBC, PaddingMode::PKCS7, &iv);
EXPECT_EQ(8U, ciphertext.size());
EXPECT_NE(ciphertext, message);
++ciphertext[ciphertext.size() / 2];
auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
.Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)
.Authorization(TAG_NONCE, iv);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params));
string plaintext;
size_t input_consumed;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(ciphertext, &plaintext, &input_consumed));
EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext.size(), input_consumed);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, Finish(&plaintext));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcIncrementalNoPadding.
*
* Verifies that 3DES CBC works with many different input sizes.
*/
TEST_F(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcIncrementalNoPadding) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
int increment = 7;
string message(240, 'a');
AuthorizationSet input_params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
AuthorizationSet output_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, input_params, &output_params));
string ciphertext;
size_t input_consumed;
for (size_t i = 0; i < message.size(); i += increment)
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Update(message.substr(i, increment), &ciphertext, &input_consumed));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(&ciphertext));
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext.size());
// Move TAG_NONCE into input_params
input_params = output_params;
input_params.push_back(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC);
input_params.push_back(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::NONE);
output_params.Clear();
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, input_params, &output_params));
string plaintext;
for (size_t i = 0; i < ciphertext.size(); i += increment)
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Update(ciphertext.substr(i, increment), &plaintext, &input_consumed));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(&plaintext));
EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext.size(), plaintext.size());
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
}
typedef KeymasterHidlTest MaxOperationsTest;
/*
* MaxOperationsTest.TestLimitAes
*
* Verifies that the max uses per boot tag works correctly with AES keys.
*/
TEST_F(MaxOperationsTest, TestLimitAes) {
if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.EcbMode()
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAX_USES_PER_BOOT, 3)));
string message = "1234567890123456";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcbMode().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
EncryptMessage(message, params);
EncryptMessage(message, params);
EncryptMessage(message, params);
// Fourth time should fail.
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::KEY_MAX_OPS_EXCEEDED, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
}
/*
* MaxOperationsTest.TestLimitAes
*
* Verifies that the max uses per boot tag works correctly with RSA keys.
*/
TEST_F(MaxOperationsTest, TestLimitRsa) {
if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 65537)
.NoDigestOrPadding()
.Authorization(TAG_MAX_USES_PER_BOOT, 3)));
string message = "1234567890123456";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().NoDigestOrPadding();
SignMessage(message, params);
SignMessage(message, params);
SignMessage(message, params);
// Fourth time should fail.
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::KEY_MAX_OPS_EXCEEDED, Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, params));
}
typedef KeymasterHidlTest AddEntropyTest;
/*
* AddEntropyTest.AddEntropy
*
* Verifies that the addRngEntropy method doesn't blow up. There's no way to test that entropy is
* actually added.
*/
TEST_F(AddEntropyTest, AddEntropy) {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, keymaster().addRngEntropy(HidlBuf("foo")));
}
/*
* AddEntropyTest.AddEmptyEntropy
*
* Verifies that the addRngEntropy method doesn't blow up when given an empty buffer.
*/
TEST_F(AddEntropyTest, AddEmptyEntropy) {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, keymaster().addRngEntropy(HidlBuf()));
}
/*
* AddEntropyTest.AddLargeEntropy
*
* Verifies that the addRngEntropy method doesn't blow up when given a largish amount of data.
*/
TEST_F(AddEntropyTest, AddLargeEntropy) {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, keymaster().addRngEntropy(HidlBuf(string(2 * 1024, 'a'))));
}
typedef KeymasterHidlTest AttestationTest;
/*
* AttestationTest.RsaAttestation
*
* Verifies that attesting to RSA keys works and generates the expected output.
*/
TEST_F(AttestationTest, RsaAttestation) {
auto creation_time = std::chrono::system_clock::now();
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
.Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)));
hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
AttestKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, HidlBuf("challenge"))
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("foo")),
&cert_chain));
EXPECT_GE(cert_chain.size(), 2U);
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
string signature = SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_chain(cert_chain, message, signature));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("challenge", "foo", //
key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced, //
key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced, //
SecLevel(), cert_chain[0], creation_time));
}
/*
* AttestationTest.RsaAttestationRequiresAppId
*
* Verifies that attesting to RSA requires app ID.
*/
TEST_F(AttestationTest, RsaAttestationRequiresAppId) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)));
hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID_MISSING,
AttestKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE,
HidlBuf("challenge")),
&cert_chain));
}
/*
* AttestationTest.EcAttestation
*
* Verifies that attesting to EC keys works and generates the expected output.
*/
TEST_F(AttestationTest, EcAttestation) {
auto creation_time = std::chrono::system_clock::now();
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)));
hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
AttestKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, HidlBuf("challenge"))
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("foo")),
&cert_chain));
EXPECT_GE(cert_chain.size(), 2U);
string message(1024, 'a');
string signature = SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_chain(cert_chain, message, signature));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("challenge", "foo", //
key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced, //
key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced, //
SecLevel(), cert_chain[0], creation_time));
}
/*
* AttestationTest.EcAttestationRequiresAttestationAppId
*
* Verifies that attesting to EC keys requires app ID
*/
TEST_F(AttestationTest, EcAttestationRequiresAttestationAppId) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)));
hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID_MISSING,
AttestKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE,
HidlBuf("challenge")),
&cert_chain));
}
/*
* AttestationTest.AesAttestation
*
* Verifies that attesting to AES keys fails in the expected way.
*/
TEST_F(AttestationTest, AesAttestation) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.EcbMode()
.Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM,
AttestKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, HidlBuf("challenge"))
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("foo")),
&cert_chain));
}
/*
* AttestationTest.HmacAttestation
*
* Verifies that attesting to HMAC keys fails in the expected way.
*/
TEST_F(AttestationTest, HmacAttestation) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.HmacKey(128)
.EcbMode()
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM,
AttestKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, HidlBuf("challenge"))
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("foo")),
&cert_chain));
}
typedef KeymasterHidlTest KeyDeletionTest;
/**
* KeyDeletionTest.DeleteKey
*
* This test checks that if rollback protection is implemented, DeleteKey invalidates a formerly
* valid key blob.
*
* TODO(swillden): Update to incorporate changes in rollback resistance semantics.
*/
TEST_F(KeyDeletionTest, DeleteKey) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)));
// Delete must work if rollback protection is implemented
AuthorizationSet hardwareEnforced(key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced);
bool rollback_protected = hardwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE);
if (rollback_protected) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, DeleteKey(true /* keep key blob */));
} else {
auto delete_result = DeleteKey(true /* keep key blob */);
ASSERT_TRUE(delete_result == ErrorCode::OK | delete_result == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
}
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
if (rollback_protected) {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
&begin_out_params, &op_handle_));
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
&begin_out_params, &op_handle_));
}
AbortIfNeeded();
key_blob_ = HidlBuf();
}
/**
* KeyDeletionTest.DeleteInvalidKey
*
* This test checks that the HAL excepts invalid key blobs.
*
* TODO(swillden): Update to incorporate changes in rollback resistance semantics.
*/
TEST_F(KeyDeletionTest, DeleteInvalidKey) {
// Generate key just to check if rollback protection is implemented
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)));
// Delete must work if rollback protection is implemented
AuthorizationSet hardwareEnforced(key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced);
bool rollback_protected = hardwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE);
// Delete the key we don't care about the result at this point.
DeleteKey();
// Now create an invalid key blob and delete it.
key_blob_ = HidlBuf("just some garbage data which is not a valid key blob");
if (rollback_protected) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, DeleteKey());
} else {
auto delete_result = DeleteKey();
ASSERT_TRUE(delete_result == ErrorCode::OK | delete_result == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
}
}
/**
* KeyDeletionTest.DeleteAllKeys
*
* This test is disarmed by default. To arm it use --arm_deleteAllKeys.
*
* BEWARE: This test has serious side effects. All user keys will be lost! This includes
* FBE/FDE encryption keys, which means that the device will not even boot until after the
* device has been wiped manually (e.g., fastboot flashall -w), and new FBE/FDE keys have
* been provisioned. Use this test only on dedicated testing devices that have no valuable
* credentials stored in Keystore/Keymaster.
*
* TODO(swillden): Update to incorporate changes in rollback resistance semantics.
*/
TEST_F(KeyDeletionTest, DeleteAllKeys) {
if (!arm_deleteAllKeys) return;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)));
// Delete must work if rollback protection is implemented
AuthorizationSet hardwareEnforced(key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced);
bool rollback_protected = hardwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE);
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, DeleteAllKeys());
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
if (rollback_protected) {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
&begin_out_params, &op_handle_));
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
&begin_out_params, &op_handle_));
}
AbortIfNeeded();
key_blob_ = HidlBuf();
}
using UpgradeKeyTest = KeymasterHidlTest;
/*
* UpgradeKeyTest.UpgradeKey
*
* Verifies that calling upgrade key on an up-to-date key works (i.e. does nothing).
*/
TEST_F(UpgradeKeyTest, UpgradeKey) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)));
auto result = UpgradeKey(key_blob_);
// Key doesn't need upgrading. Should get okay, but no new key blob.
EXPECT_EQ(result, std::make_pair(ErrorCode::OK, HidlBuf()));
}
} // namespace test
} // namespace V4_0
} // namespace keymaster
} // namespace hardware
} // namespace android
using android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::test::KeymasterHidlEnvironment;
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
::testing::AddGlobalTestEnvironment(KeymasterHidlEnvironment::Instance());
::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
KeymasterHidlEnvironment::Instance()->init(&argc, argv);
for (int i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
if (argv[i][0] == '-') {
if (std::string(argv[i]) == "--arm_deleteAllKeys") {
arm_deleteAllKeys = true;
}
if (std::string(argv[i]) == "--dump_attestations") {
dump_Attestations = true;
}
}
}
int status = RUN_ALL_TESTS();
ALOGI("Test result = %d", status);
return status;
}