/******************************************************************************
*
* Copyright (C) 2003-2012 Broadcom Corporation
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at:
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
******************************************************************************/
#include <string.h>
#include "device/include/interop.h"
#include "include/bt_target.h"
#include "stack/btm/btm_int.h"
#include "stack/include/l2c_api.h"
#include "stack/smp/smp_int.h"
#include "utils/include/bt_utils.h"
#if SMP_INCLUDED == TRUE
const UINT8 smp_association_table[2][SMP_IO_CAP_MAX][SMP_IO_CAP_MAX] =
{
/* initiator */
{{SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY}, /* Display Only */
{SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY}, /* SMP_CAP_IO = 1 */
{SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF}, /* keyboard only */
{SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY},/* No Input No Output */
{SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF}}, /* keyboard display */
/* responder */
{{SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF}, /* Display Only */
{SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF}, /* SMP_CAP_IO = 1 */
{SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY}, /* keyboard only */
{SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY},/* No Input No Output */
{SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY}} /* keyboard display */
/* display only */ /*SMP_CAP_IO = 1 */ /* keyboard only */ /* No InputOutput */ /* keyboard display */
};
#define SMP_KEY_DIST_TYPE_MAX 4
const tSMP_ACT smp_distribute_act [] =
{
smp_generate_ltk,
smp_send_id_info,
smp_generate_csrk,
smp_set_derive_link_key
};
static bool lmp_version_below(BD_ADDR bda, uint8_t version)
{
tACL_CONN *acl = btm_bda_to_acl(bda, BT_TRANSPORT_LE);
if (acl == NULL || acl->lmp_version == 0)
{
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("%s cannot retrieve LMP version...", __func__);
return false;
}
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("%s LMP version %d < %d", __func__, acl->lmp_version, version);
return acl->lmp_version < version;
}
static bool pts_test_send_authentication_complete_failure(tSMP_CB *p_cb)
{
uint8_t reason = 0;
if (p_cb->cert_failure < 2 || p_cb->cert_failure > 6)
return false;
SMP_TRACE_ERROR("%s failure case = %d", __func__, p_cb->cert_failure);
switch (p_cb->cert_failure)
{
case 2:
reason = SMP_PAIR_AUTH_FAIL;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
break;
case 3:
reason = SMP_PAIR_FAIL_UNKNOWN;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
break;
case 4:
reason = SMP_PAIR_NOT_SUPPORT;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
break;
case 5:
reason = SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAIL;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
break;
case 6:
reason = SMP_REPEATED_ATTEMPTS;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
break;
}
return true;;
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_update_key_mask
** Description This function updates the key mask for sending or receiving.
*******************************************************************************/
static void smp_update_key_mask (tSMP_CB *p_cb, UINT8 key_type, BOOLEAN recv)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s before update role=%d recv=%d local_i_key = %02x, local_r_key = %02x",
__func__, p_cb->role, recv, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key);
if (((p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used) ||
(p_cb->smp_over_br)) &&
((key_type == SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ENC) || (key_type == SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK)))
{
/* in LE SC mode LTK, CSRK and BR/EDR LK are derived locally instead of
** being exchanged with the peer */
p_cb->local_i_key &= ~key_type;
p_cb->local_r_key &= ~key_type;
}
else
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
{
if (recv)
p_cb->local_i_key &= ~key_type;
else
p_cb->local_r_key &= ~key_type;
}
else
{
if (recv)
p_cb->local_r_key &= ~key_type;
else
p_cb->local_i_key &= ~key_type;
}
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("updated local_i_key = %02x, local_r_key = %02x", p_cb->local_i_key,
p_cb->local_r_key);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_send_app_cback
** Description notifies application about the events the application is interested in
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_send_app_cback(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
tSMP_EVT_DATA cb_data;
tSMP_STATUS callback_rc;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s p_cb->cb_evt=%d", __func__, p_cb->cb_evt);
if (p_cb->p_callback && p_cb->cb_evt != 0)
{
switch (p_cb->cb_evt)
{
case SMP_IO_CAP_REQ_EVT:
cb_data.io_req.auth_req = p_cb->peer_auth_req;
cb_data.io_req.oob_data = SMP_OOB_NONE;
cb_data.io_req.io_cap = SMP_DEFAULT_IO_CAPS;
cb_data.io_req.max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
cb_data.io_req.init_keys = p_cb->local_i_key ;
cb_data.io_req.resp_keys = p_cb->local_r_key ;
SMP_TRACE_WARNING ( "io_cap = %d",cb_data.io_req.io_cap);
break;
case SMP_NC_REQ_EVT:
cb_data.passkey = p_data->passkey;
break;
case SMP_SC_OOB_REQ_EVT:
cb_data.req_oob_type = p_data->req_oob_type;
break;
case SMP_SC_LOC_OOB_DATA_UP_EVT:
cb_data.loc_oob_data = p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data;
break;
case SMP_BR_KEYS_REQ_EVT:
cb_data.io_req.auth_req = 0;
cb_data.io_req.oob_data = SMP_OOB_NONE;
cb_data.io_req.io_cap = 0;
cb_data.io_req.max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
cb_data.io_req.init_keys = SMP_BR_SEC_DEFAULT_KEY;
cb_data.io_req.resp_keys = SMP_BR_SEC_DEFAULT_KEY;
break;
default:
break;
}
callback_rc = (*p_cb->p_callback)(p_cb->cb_evt, p_cb->pairing_bda, &cb_data);
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("callback_rc=%d p_cb->cb_evt=%d",callback_rc, p_cb->cb_evt );
if (callback_rc == SMP_SUCCESS)
{
switch (p_cb->cb_evt)
{
case SMP_IO_CAP_REQ_EVT:
p_cb->loc_auth_req = cb_data.io_req.auth_req;
p_cb->local_io_capability = cb_data.io_req.io_cap;
p_cb->loc_oob_flag = cb_data.io_req.oob_data;
p_cb->loc_enc_size = cb_data.io_req.max_key_size;
p_cb->local_i_key = cb_data.io_req.init_keys;
p_cb->local_r_key = cb_data.io_req.resp_keys;
if (!(p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND))
{
SMP_TRACE_WARNING ("Non bonding: No keys will be exchanged");
p_cb->local_i_key = 0;
p_cb->local_r_key = 0;
}
SMP_TRACE_WARNING ( "rcvd auth_req: 0x%02x, io_cap: %d \
loc_oob_flag: %d loc_enc_size: %d,"
"local_i_key: 0x%02x, local_r_key: 0x%02x",
p_cb->loc_auth_req, p_cb->local_io_capability, p_cb->loc_oob_flag,
p_cb->loc_enc_size, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key);
p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required =
(btm_cb.security_mode == BTM_SEC_MODE_SC) ? TRUE : FALSE;
if (p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required)
{
p_cb->loc_auth_req |= SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT;
}
if (!(p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT)
|| lmp_version_below(p_cb->pairing_bda, HCI_PROTO_VERSION_4_2)
|| interop_match_addr(INTEROP_DISABLE_LE_SECURE_CONNECTIONS,
(const bt_bdaddr_t *)&p_cb->pairing_bda))
{
p_cb->loc_auth_req &= ~SMP_KP_SUPPORT_BIT;
p_cb->local_i_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK;
p_cb->local_r_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK;
}
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("set auth_req: 0x%02x, local_i_key: 0x%02x, local_r_key: 0x%02x",
p_cb->loc_auth_req, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key);
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_IO_RSP_EVT, NULL);
break;
case SMP_BR_KEYS_REQ_EVT:
p_cb->loc_enc_size = cb_data.io_req.max_key_size;
p_cb->local_i_key = cb_data.io_req.init_keys;
p_cb->local_r_key = cb_data.io_req.resp_keys;
p_cb->local_i_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK;
p_cb->local_r_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK;
SMP_TRACE_WARNING ( "for SMP over BR max_key_size: 0x%02x,\
local_i_key: 0x%02x, local_r_key: 0x%02x",
p_cb->loc_enc_size, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key);
smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_KEYS_RSP_EVT, NULL);
break;
}
}
}
if (!p_cb->cb_evt && p_cb->discard_sec_req)
{
p_cb->discard_sec_req = FALSE;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_DISCARD_SEC_REQ_EVT, NULL);
}
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s return", __func__);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_send_pair_fail
** Description pairing failure to peer device if needed.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_send_pair_fail(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
p_cb->status = *(UINT8 *)p_data;
p_cb->failure = *(UINT8 *)p_data;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s status=%d failure=%d ", __func__, p_cb->status, p_cb->failure);
if (p_cb->status <= SMP_MAX_FAIL_RSN_PER_SPEC && p_cb->status != SMP_SUCCESS)
{
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_PAIRING_FAILED, p_cb);
p_cb->wait_for_authorization_complete = TRUE;
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_send_pair_req
** Description actions related to sending pairing request
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_send_pair_req(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec = btm_find_dev (p_cb->pairing_bda);
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
/* erase all keys when master sends pairing req*/
if (p_dev_rec)
btm_sec_clear_ble_keys(p_dev_rec);
/* do not manipulate the key, let app decide,
leave out to BTM to mandate key distribution for bonding case */
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_PAIRING_REQ, p_cb);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_send_pair_rsp
** Description actions related to sending pairing response
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_send_pair_rsp(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
p_cb->local_i_key &= p_cb->peer_i_key;
p_cb->local_r_key &= p_cb->peer_r_key;
if (smp_send_cmd (SMP_OPCODE_PAIRING_RSP, p_cb))
{
if (p_cb->selected_association_model == SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_OOB)
smp_use_oob_private_key(p_cb, NULL);
else
smp_decide_association_model(p_cb, NULL);
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_send_confirm
** Description send confirmation to the peer
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_send_confirm(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_CONFIRM, p_cb);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_send_init
** Description process pairing initializer to slave device
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_send_init(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_INIT, p_cb);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_send_rand
** Description send pairing random to the peer
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_send_rand(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_RAND, p_cb);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_send_pair_public_key
** Description send pairing public key command to the peer
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_send_pair_public_key(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_PUBLIC_KEY, p_cb);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function SMP_SEND_COMMITMENT
** Description send commitment command to the peer
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_send_commitment(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_COMMITM, p_cb);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_send_dhkey_check
** Description send DHKey Check command to the peer
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_send_dhkey_check(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_DHKEY_CHECK, p_cb);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_send_keypress_notification
** Description send Keypress Notification command to the peer
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_send_keypress_notification(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
p_cb->local_keypress_notification = *(UINT8 *) p_data;
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_KEYPR_NOTIF, p_cb);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_send_enc_info
** Description send encryption information command.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_send_enc_info(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
tBTM_LE_LENC_KEYS le_key;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s p_cb->loc_enc_size = %d", __func__, p_cb->loc_enc_size);
smp_update_key_mask (p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ENC, FALSE);
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_ENCRYPT_INFO, p_cb);
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_MASTER_ID, p_cb);
/* save the DIV and key size information when acting as slave device */
memcpy(le_key.ltk, p_cb->ltk, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
le_key.div = p_cb->div;
le_key.key_size = p_cb->loc_enc_size;
le_key.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level;
if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) && (p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND))
btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, BTM_LE_KEY_LENC,
(tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE *)&le_key, TRUE);
SMP_TRACE_WARNING ("%s", __func__);
smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_send_id_info
** Description send ID information command.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_send_id_info(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE le_key;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_update_key_mask (p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ID, FALSE);
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_IDENTITY_INFO, p_cb);
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_ID_ADDR, p_cb);
if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) && (p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND))
btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, BTM_LE_KEY_LID,
&le_key, TRUE);
SMP_TRACE_WARNING ("%s", __func__);
smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_send_csrk_info
** Description send CSRK command.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_send_csrk_info(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
tBTM_LE_LCSRK_KEYS key;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_update_key_mask (p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_CSRK, FALSE);
if (smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_SIGN_INFO, p_cb))
{
key.div = p_cb->div;
key.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level;
key.counter = 0; /* initialize the local counter */
memcpy (key.csrk, p_cb->csrk, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, BTM_LE_KEY_LCSRK, (tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE *)&key, TRUE);
}
smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_send_ltk_reply
** Description send LTK reply
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_send_ltk_reply(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
/* send stk as LTK response */
btm_ble_ltk_request_reply(p_cb->pairing_bda, TRUE, p_data->key.p_data);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_proc_sec_req
** Description process security request.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_proc_sec_req(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
tBTM_LE_AUTH_REQ auth_req = *(tBTM_LE_AUTH_REQ *)p_data;
tBTM_BLE_SEC_REQ_ACT sec_req_act;
UINT8 reason;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s auth_req=0x%x", __func__, auth_req);
p_cb->cb_evt = 0;
btm_ble_link_sec_check(p_cb->pairing_bda, auth_req, &sec_req_act);
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s sec_req_act=0x%x", __func__, sec_req_act);
switch (sec_req_act)
{
case BTM_BLE_SEC_REQ_ACT_ENCRYPT:
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s BTM_BLE_SEC_REQ_ACT_ENCRYPT", __func__);
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_ENC_REQ_EVT, NULL);
break;
case BTM_BLE_SEC_REQ_ACT_PAIR:
p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required =
(btm_cb.security_mode == BTM_SEC_MODE_SC) ? TRUE : FALSE;
/* respond to non SC pairing request as failure in SC only mode */
if (p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required &&
(auth_req & SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT) == 0)
{
reason = SMP_PAIR_AUTH_FAIL;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
}
else
{
/* initialize local i/r key to be default keys */
p_cb->peer_auth_req = auth_req;
p_cb->local_r_key = p_cb->local_i_key = SMP_SEC_DEFAULT_KEY ;
p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_SEC_REQUEST_EVT;
}
break;
case BTM_BLE_SEC_REQ_ACT_DISCARD:
p_cb->discard_sec_req = TRUE;
break;
default:
/* do nothing */
break;
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_proc_sec_grant
** Description process security grant.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_proc_sec_grant(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 res= *(UINT8 *)p_data;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (res != SMP_SUCCESS)
{
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, p_data);
}
else /*otherwise, start pairing */
{
/* send IO request callback */
p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_IO_CAP_REQ_EVT;
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_proc_pair_fail
** Description process pairing failure from peer device
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_proc_pair_fail(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
p_cb->status = *(UINT8 *)p_data;
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_proc_pair_cmd
** Description Process the SMP pairing request/response from peer device
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_proc_pair_cmd(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data;
UINT8 reason = SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec = btm_find_dev (p_cb->pairing_bda);
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
/* erase all keys if it is slave proc pairing req*/
if (p_dev_rec && (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE))
btm_sec_clear_ble_keys(p_dev_rec);
p_cb->flags |= SMP_PAIR_FLAG_ENC_AFTER_PAIR;
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_io_caps, p);
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_oob_flag, p);
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_auth_req, p);
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_enc_size, p);
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_i_key, p);
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_r_key, p);
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb))
{
reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
// PTS Testing failure modes
if (pts_test_send_authentication_complete_failure(p_cb))
return;
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
{
if (!(p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAGS_WE_STARTED_DD))
{
/* peer (master) started pairing sending Pairing Request */
p_cb->local_i_key = p_cb->peer_i_key;
p_cb->local_r_key = p_cb->peer_r_key;
p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_SEC_REQUEST_EVT;
}
else /* update local i/r key according to pairing request */
{
/* pairing started with this side (slave) sending Security Request */
p_cb->local_i_key &= p_cb->peer_i_key;
p_cb->local_r_key &= p_cb->peer_r_key;
p_cb->selected_association_model = smp_select_association_model(p_cb);
if (p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required &&
(!(p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used) ||
(p_cb->selected_association_model == SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS)))
{
SMP_TRACE_ERROR("%s pairing failed - slave requires secure connection only mode",
__func__);
reason = SMP_PAIR_AUTH_FAIL;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
if (p_cb->selected_association_model == SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_OOB)
{
if (smp_request_oob_data(p_cb)) return;
}
else
{
smp_send_pair_rsp(p_cb, NULL);
}
}
}
else /* Master receives pairing response */
{
p_cb->selected_association_model = smp_select_association_model(p_cb);
if (p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required &&
(!(p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used) ||
(p_cb->selected_association_model == SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS)))
{
SMP_TRACE_ERROR ("Master requires secure connection only mode \
but it can't be provided -> Master fails pairing");
reason = SMP_PAIR_AUTH_FAIL;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
if (p_cb->selected_association_model == SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_OOB)
{
if (smp_request_oob_data(p_cb)) return;
}
else
{
smp_decide_association_model(p_cb, NULL);
}
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_proc_confirm
** Description process pairing confirm from peer device
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_proc_confirm(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data;
UINT8 reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb))
{
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
if (p != NULL)
{
/* save the SConfirm for comparison later */
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->rconfirm, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
}
p_cb->flags |= SMP_PAIR_FLAGS_CMD_CONFIRM;
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_proc_init
** Description process pairing initializer from peer device
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_proc_init(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data;
UINT8 reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb))
{
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
/* save the SRand for comparison */
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->rrand, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_proc_rand
** Description process pairing random (nonce) from peer device
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_proc_rand(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data;
UINT8 reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb))
{
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
/* save the SRand for comparison */
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->rrand, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_process_pairing_public_key
** Description process pairing public key command from the peer device
** - saves the peer public key;
** - sets the flag indicating that the peer public key is received;
** - calls smp_wait_for_both_public_keys(...).
**
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_process_pairing_public_key(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data;
UINT8 reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb))
{
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->peer_publ_key.x, p, BT_OCTET32_LEN);
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->peer_publ_key.y, p, BT_OCTET32_LEN);
p_cb->flags |= SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_PUBL_KEY;
smp_wait_for_both_public_keys(p_cb, NULL);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_process_pairing_commitment
** Description process pairing commitment from peer device
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_process_pairing_commitment(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data;
UINT8 reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb))
{
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
p_cb->flags |= SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_COMM;
if (p != NULL)
{
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->remote_commitment, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_process_dhkey_check
** Description process DHKey Check from peer device
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_process_dhkey_check(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data;
UINT8 reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb))
{
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
if (p != NULL)
{
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->remote_dhkey_check, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
}
p_cb->flags |= SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_DHK_CHK;
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_process_keypress_notification
** Description process pairing keypress notification from peer device
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_process_keypress_notification(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data;
UINT8 reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
p_cb->status = *(UINT8 *)p_data;
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb))
{
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
if (p != NULL)
{
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_keypress_notification, p);
}
else
{
p_cb->peer_keypress_notification = BTM_SP_KEY_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_PEER_KEYPR_NOT_EVT;
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_br_process_pairing_command
** Description Process the SMP pairing request/response from peer device via
** BR/EDR transport.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_br_process_pairing_command(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data;
UINT8 reason = SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec = btm_find_dev (p_cb->pairing_bda);
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
/* rejecting BR pairing request over non-SC BR link */
if (!p_dev_rec->new_encryption_key_is_p256 && p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
{
reason = SMP_XTRANS_DERIVE_NOT_ALLOW;
smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
/* erase all keys if it is slave proc pairing req*/
if (p_dev_rec && (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE))
btm_sec_clear_ble_keys(p_dev_rec);
p_cb->flags |= SMP_PAIR_FLAG_ENC_AFTER_PAIR;
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_io_caps, p);
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_oob_flag, p);
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_auth_req, p);
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_enc_size, p);
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_i_key, p);
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_r_key, p);
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb))
{
reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
/* peer (master) started pairing sending Pairing Request */
/* or being master device always use received i/r key as keys to distribute */
p_cb->local_i_key = p_cb->peer_i_key;
p_cb->local_r_key = p_cb->peer_r_key;
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
{
p_dev_rec->new_encryption_key_is_p256 = FALSE;
/* shortcut to skip Security Grant step */
p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_BR_KEYS_REQ_EVT;
}
else /* Master receives pairing response */
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s master rcvs valid PAIRING RESPONSE."
" Supposed to move to key distribution phase. ", __func__);
}
/* auth_req received via BR/EDR SM channel is set to 0,
but everything derived/exchanged has to be saved */
p_cb->peer_auth_req |= SMP_AUTH_BOND;
p_cb->loc_auth_req |= SMP_AUTH_BOND;
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_br_process_security_grant
** Description process security grant in case of pairing over BR/EDR transport.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_br_process_security_grant(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 res= *(UINT8 *)p_data;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (res != SMP_SUCCESS)
{
smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, p_data);
}
else /*otherwise, start pairing */
{
/* send IO request callback */
p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_BR_KEYS_REQ_EVT;
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_br_check_authorization_request
** Description sets the SMP kes to be derived/distribute over BR/EDR transport
** before starting the distribution/derivation
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_br_check_authorization_request(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 reason = SMP_SUCCESS;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s rcvs i_keys=0x%x r_keys=0x%x "
"(i-initiator r-responder)", __FUNCTION__, p_cb->local_i_key,
p_cb->local_r_key);
/* In LE SC mode LK field is ignored when BR/EDR transport is used */
p_cb->local_i_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK;
p_cb->local_r_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK;
/* In LE SC mode only IRK, IAI, CSRK are exchanged with the peer.
** Set local_r_key on master to expect only these keys. */
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
{
p_cb->local_r_key &= (SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ID | SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_CSRK);
}
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s rcvs upgrades: i_keys=0x%x r_keys=0x%x "
"(i-initiator r-responder)", __FUNCTION__, p_cb->local_i_key,
p_cb->local_r_key);
if (/*((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) ||
(p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND)) &&*/
(p_cb->local_i_key || p_cb->local_r_key))
{
smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_BOND_REQ_EVT, NULL);
/* if no peer key is expected, start master key distribution */
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER && p_cb->local_r_key == 0)
smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL);
}
else
{
smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_br_select_next_key
** Description selects the next key to derive/send when BR/EDR transport is
** used.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_br_select_next_key(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 reason = SMP_SUCCESS;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s role=%d (0-master) r_keys=0x%x i_keys=0x%x",
__func__, p_cb->role, p_cb->local_r_key, p_cb->local_i_key);
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE||
(!p_cb->local_r_key && p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER))
{
smp_key_pick_key(p_cb, p_data);
}
if (!p_cb->local_i_key && !p_cb->local_r_key)
{
/* state check to prevent re-entrance */
if (smp_get_br_state() == SMP_BR_STATE_BOND_PENDING)
{
if (p_cb->total_tx_unacked == 0)
smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
else
p_cb->wait_for_authorization_complete = TRUE;
}
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_proc_enc_info
** Description process encryption information from peer device
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_proc_enc_info(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->ltk, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_proc_master_id
** Description process master ID from slave device
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_proc_master_id(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data;
tBTM_LE_PENC_KEYS le_key;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_update_key_mask (p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ENC, TRUE);
STREAM_TO_UINT16(le_key.ediv, p);
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(le_key.rand, p, BT_OCTET8_LEN );
/* store the encryption keys from peer device */
memcpy(le_key.ltk, p_cb->ltk, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
le_key.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level;
le_key.key_size = p_cb->loc_enc_size;
if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) && (p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND))
btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda,
BTM_LE_KEY_PENC,
(tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE *)&le_key, TRUE);
smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_proc_enc_info
** Description process identity information from peer device
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_proc_id_info(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
STREAM_TO_ARRAY (p_cb->tk, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN); /* reuse TK for IRK */
smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_proc_id_addr
** Description process identity address from peer device
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_proc_id_addr(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data;
tBTM_LE_PID_KEYS pid_key;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_update_key_mask (p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ID, TRUE);
STREAM_TO_UINT8(pid_key.addr_type, p);
STREAM_TO_BDADDR(pid_key.static_addr, p);
memcpy(pid_key.irk, p_cb->tk, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
/* to use as BD_ADDR for lk derived from ltk */
p_cb->id_addr_rcvd = TRUE;
p_cb->id_addr_type = pid_key.addr_type;
memcpy(p_cb->id_addr, pid_key.static_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN);
/* store the ID key from peer device */
if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) && (p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND))
btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, BTM_LE_KEY_PID,
(tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE *)&pid_key, TRUE);
smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_proc_srk_info
** Description process security information from peer device
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_proc_srk_info(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
tBTM_LE_PCSRK_KEYS le_key;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_update_key_mask (p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_CSRK, TRUE);
/* save CSRK to security record */
le_key.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level;
memcpy (le_key.csrk, p_data, BT_OCTET16_LEN); /* get peer CSRK */
le_key.counter = 0; /* initialize the peer counter */
if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) && (p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND))
btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda,
BTM_LE_KEY_PCSRK,
(tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE *)&le_key, TRUE);
smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_proc_compare
** Description process compare value
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_proc_compare(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 reason;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (!memcmp(p_cb->rconfirm, p_data->key.p_data, BT_OCTET16_LEN))
{
/* compare the max encryption key size, and save the smaller one for the link */
if ( p_cb->peer_enc_size < p_cb->loc_enc_size)
p_cb->loc_enc_size = p_cb->peer_enc_size;
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_RAND_EVT, NULL);
else
{
/* master device always use received i/r key as keys to distribute */
p_cb->local_i_key = p_cb->peer_i_key;
p_cb->local_r_key = p_cb->peer_r_key;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_ENC_REQ_EVT, NULL);
}
}
else
{
reason = p_cb->failure = SMP_CONFIRM_VALUE_ERR;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_proc_sl_key
** Description process key ready events.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_proc_sl_key(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 key_type = p_data->key.key_type;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (key_type == SMP_KEY_TYPE_TK)
{
smp_generate_srand_mrand_confirm(p_cb, NULL);
}
else if (key_type == SMP_KEY_TYPE_CFM)
{
smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_WAIT_CONFIRM);
if (p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAGS_CMD_CONFIRM)
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_CONFIRM_EVT, NULL);
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_start_enc
** Description start encryption
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_start_enc(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
tBTM_STATUS cmd;
UINT8 reason = SMP_ENC_FAIL;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (p_data != NULL)
cmd = btm_ble_start_encrypt(p_cb->pairing_bda, TRUE, p_data->key.p_data);
else
cmd = btm_ble_start_encrypt(p_cb->pairing_bda, FALSE, NULL);
if (cmd != BTM_CMD_STARTED && cmd != BTM_BUSY)
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_proc_discard
** Description processing for discard security request
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_proc_discard(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (!(p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAGS_WE_STARTED_DD))
smp_reset_control_value(p_cb);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_enc_cmpl
** Description encryption success
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_enc_cmpl(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 enc_enable = *(UINT8 *)p_data;
UINT8 reason = enc_enable ? SMP_SUCCESS : SMP_ENC_FAIL;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_check_auth_req
** Description check authentication request
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_check_auth_req(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 enc_enable = *(UINT8 *)p_data;
UINT8 reason = enc_enable ? SMP_SUCCESS : SMP_ENC_FAIL;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s rcvs enc_enable=%d i_keys=0x%x r_keys=0x%x "
"(i-initiator r-responder)",
__func__, enc_enable, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key);
if (enc_enable == 1)
{
if (p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used)
{
/* In LE SC mode LTK is used instead of STK and has to be always saved */
p_cb->local_i_key |= SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ENC;
p_cb->local_r_key |= SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ENC;
/* In LE SC mode LK is derived from LTK only if both sides request it */
if (!(p_cb->local_i_key & SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK) ||
!(p_cb->local_r_key & SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK))
{
p_cb->local_i_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK;
p_cb->local_r_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK;
}
/* In LE SC mode only IRK, IAI, CSRK are exchanged with the peer.
** Set local_r_key on master to expect only these keys.
*/
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
{
p_cb->local_r_key &= (SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ID | SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_CSRK);
}
}
else
{
/* in legacy mode derivation of BR/EDR LK is not supported */
p_cb->local_i_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK;
p_cb->local_r_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK;
}
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s rcvs upgrades: i_keys=0x%x r_keys=0x%x "
"(i-initiator r-responder)",
__func__, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key);
if (/*((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) ||
(p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND)) &&*/
(p_cb->local_i_key || p_cb->local_r_key))
{
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_BOND_REQ_EVT, NULL);
}
else
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
}
else if (enc_enable == 0)
{
/* if failed for encryption after pairing, send callback */
if (p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAG_ENC_AFTER_PAIR)
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
/* if enc failed for old security information */
/* if master device, clean up and abck to idle; slave device do nothing */
else if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
{
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
}
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_key_pick_key
** Description Pick a key distribution function based on the key mask.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_key_pick_key(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 key_to_dist = (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) ? p_cb->local_r_key : p_cb->local_i_key;
UINT8 i = 0;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s key_to_dist=0x%x", __func__, key_to_dist);
while (i < SMP_KEY_DIST_TYPE_MAX)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("key to send = %02x, i = %d", key_to_dist, i);
if (key_to_dist & (1 << i))
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("smp_distribute_act[%d]", i);
(* smp_distribute_act[i])(p_cb, p_data);
break;
}
i ++;
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_key_distribution
** Description start key distribution if required.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_key_distribution(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 reason = SMP_SUCCESS;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s role=%d (0-master) r_keys=0x%x i_keys=0x%x",
__func__, p_cb->role, p_cb->local_r_key, p_cb->local_i_key);
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE ||
(!p_cb->local_r_key && p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER))
{
smp_key_pick_key(p_cb, p_data);
}
if (!p_cb->local_i_key && !p_cb->local_r_key)
{
/* state check to prevent re-entrant */
if (smp_get_state() == SMP_STATE_BOND_PENDING)
{
if (p_cb->derive_lk)
{
smp_derive_link_key_from_long_term_key(p_cb, NULL);
p_cb->derive_lk = FALSE;
}
if (p_cb->total_tx_unacked == 0)
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
else
p_cb->wait_for_authorization_complete = TRUE;
}
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_decide_association_model
** Description This function is called to select assoc model to be used for
** STK generation and to start STK generation process.
**
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_decide_association_model(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 failure = SMP_UNKNOWN_IO_CAP;
UINT8 int_evt = 0;
tSMP_KEY key;
tSMP_INT_DATA *p = NULL;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s Association Model = %d", __func__, p_cb->selected_association_model);
switch (p_cb->selected_association_model)
{
case SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY: /* TK = 0, go calculate Confirm */
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER &&
((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_YN_BIT) != 0) &&
((p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_YN_BIT) == 0))
{
SMP_TRACE_ERROR ("IO capability does not meet authentication requirement");
failure = SMP_PAIR_AUTH_FAIL;
p = (tSMP_INT_DATA *)&failure;
int_evt = SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT;
}
else
{
p_cb->sec_level = SMP_SEC_UNAUTHENTICATE;
SMP_TRACE_EVENT ("p_cb->sec_level =%d (SMP_SEC_UNAUTHENTICATE) ", p_cb->sec_level );
key.key_type = SMP_KEY_TYPE_TK;
key.p_data = p_cb->tk;
p = (tSMP_INT_DATA *)&key;
memset(p_cb->tk, 0, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
/* TK, ready */
int_evt = SMP_KEY_READY_EVT;
}
break;
case SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY:
p_cb->sec_level = SMP_SEC_AUTHENTICATED;
SMP_TRACE_EVENT ("p_cb->sec_level =%d (SMP_SEC_AUTHENTICATED) ", p_cb->sec_level );
p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_PASSKEY_REQ_EVT;
int_evt = SMP_TK_REQ_EVT;
break;
case SMP_MODEL_OOB:
SMP_TRACE_ERROR ("Association Model = SMP_MODEL_OOB");
p_cb->sec_level = SMP_SEC_AUTHENTICATED;
SMP_TRACE_EVENT ("p_cb->sec_level =%d (SMP_SEC_AUTHENTICATED) ", p_cb->sec_level );
p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_OOB_REQ_EVT;
int_evt = SMP_TK_REQ_EVT;
break;
case SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF:
p_cb->sec_level = SMP_SEC_AUTHENTICATED;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("Need to generate Passkey");
/* generate passkey and notify application */
smp_generate_passkey(p_cb, NULL);
break;
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS:
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP:
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT:
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP:
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_OOB:
int_evt = SMP_PUBL_KEY_EXCH_REQ_EVT;
break;
case SMP_MODEL_OUT_OF_RANGE:
SMP_TRACE_ERROR("Association Model = SMP_MODEL_OUT_OF_RANGE (failed)");
p = (tSMP_INT_DATA *)&failure;
int_evt = SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT;
break;
default:
SMP_TRACE_ERROR("Association Model = %d (SOMETHING IS WRONG WITH THE CODE)",
p_cb->selected_association_model);
p = (tSMP_INT_DATA *)&failure;
int_evt = SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT;
}
SMP_TRACE_EVENT ("sec_level=%d ", p_cb->sec_level );
if (int_evt)
smp_sm_event(p_cb, int_evt, p);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_process_io_response
** Description process IO response for a slave device.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_process_io_response(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
uint8_t reason = SMP_PAIR_AUTH_FAIL;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAGS_WE_STARTED_DD)
{
/* pairing started by local (slave) Security Request */
smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_SEC_REQ_PENDING);
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_SEC_REQ, p_cb);
}
else /* plan to send pairing respond */
{
/* pairing started by peer (master) Pairing Request */
p_cb->selected_association_model = smp_select_association_model(p_cb);
if (p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required &&
(!(p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used) ||
(p_cb->selected_association_model == SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS)))
{
SMP_TRACE_ERROR ("Slave requires secure connection only mode \
but it can't be provided -> Slave fails pairing");
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
if (p_cb->selected_association_model == SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_OOB)
{
if (smp_request_oob_data(p_cb)) return;
}
// PTS Testing failure modes
if (pts_test_send_authentication_complete_failure(p_cb))
return;
smp_send_pair_rsp(p_cb, NULL);
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_br_process_slave_keys_response
** Description process application keys response for a slave device
** (BR/EDR transport).
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_br_process_slave_keys_response(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
smp_br_send_pair_response(p_cb, NULL);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_br_send_pair_response
** Description actions related to sending pairing response over BR/EDR transport.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_br_send_pair_response(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
p_cb->local_i_key &= p_cb->peer_i_key;
p_cb->local_r_key &= p_cb->peer_r_key;
smp_send_cmd (SMP_OPCODE_PAIRING_RSP, p_cb);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_pairing_cmpl
** Description This function is called to send the pairing complete callback
** and remove the connection if needed.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_pairing_cmpl(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
if (p_cb->total_tx_unacked == 0)
{
/* update connection parameter to remote preferred */
L2CA_EnableUpdateBleConnParams(p_cb->pairing_bda, TRUE);
/* process the pairing complete */
smp_proc_pairing_cmpl(p_cb);
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_pair_terminate
** Description This function is called to send the pairing complete callback
** and remove the connection if needed.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_pair_terminate(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
p_cb->status = SMP_CONN_TOUT;
smp_proc_pairing_cmpl(p_cb);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_idle_terminate
** Description This function calledin idle state to determine to send authentication
** complete or not.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_idle_terminate(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
if (p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAGS_WE_STARTED_DD)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("Pairing terminated at IDLE state.");
p_cb->status = SMP_FAIL;
smp_proc_pairing_cmpl(p_cb);
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_fast_conn_param
** Description apply default connection parameter for pairing process
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_fast_conn_param(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
/* disable connection parameter update */
L2CA_EnableUpdateBleConnParams(p_cb->pairing_bda, FALSE);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_both_have_public_keys
** Description The function is called when both local and peer public keys are
** saved.
** Actions:
** - invokes DHKey computation;
** - on slave side invokes sending local public key to the peer.
** - invokes SC phase 1 process.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_both_have_public_keys(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s",__func__);
/* invokes DHKey computation */
smp_compute_dhkey(p_cb);
/* on slave side invokes sending local public key to the peer */
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
smp_send_pair_public_key(p_cb, NULL);
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_SC_DHKEY_CMPLT_EVT, NULL);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_start_secure_connection_phase1
** Description The function starts Secure Connection phase1 i.e. invokes initialization of Secure Connection
** phase 1 parameters and starts building/sending to the peer
** messages appropriate for the role and association model.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_start_secure_connection_phase1(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (p_cb->selected_association_model == SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS)
{
p_cb->sec_level = SMP_SEC_UNAUTHENTICATE;
SMP_TRACE_EVENT ("p_cb->sec_level =%d (SMP_SEC_UNAUTHENTICATE) ", p_cb->sec_level );
}
else
{
p_cb->sec_level = SMP_SEC_AUTHENTICATED;
SMP_TRACE_EVENT ("p_cb->sec_level =%d (SMP_SEC_AUTHENTICATED) ", p_cb->sec_level );
}
switch(p_cb->selected_association_model)
{
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS:
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP:
memset(p_cb->local_random, 0, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
smp_start_nonce_generation(p_cb);
break;
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT:
/* user has to provide passkey */
p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_PASSKEY_REQ_EVT;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_TK_REQ_EVT, NULL);
break;
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP:
/* passkey has to be provided to user */
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("Need to generate SC Passkey");
smp_generate_passkey(p_cb, NULL);
break;
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_OOB:
/* use the available OOB information */
smp_process_secure_connection_oob_data(p_cb, NULL);
break;
default:
SMP_TRACE_ERROR ("Association Model = %d is not used in LE SC",
p_cb->selected_association_model);
break;
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_process_local_nonce
** Description The function processes new local nonce.
**
** Note It is supposed to be called in SC phase1.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_process_local_nonce(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
switch(p_cb->selected_association_model)
{
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS:
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP:
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
{
/* slave calculates and sends local commitment */
smp_calculate_local_commitment(p_cb);
smp_send_commitment(p_cb, NULL);
/* slave has to wait for peer nonce */
smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_WAIT_NONCE);
}
else /* i.e. master */
{
if (p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_COMM)
{
/* slave commitment is already received, send local nonce, wait for remote nonce*/
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("master in assoc mode = %d \
already rcvd slave commitment - race condition",
p_cb->selected_association_model);
p_cb->flags &= ~SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_COMM;
smp_send_rand(p_cb, NULL);
smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_WAIT_NONCE);
}
}
break;
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT:
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP:
smp_calculate_local_commitment(p_cb);
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
{
smp_send_commitment(p_cb, NULL);
}
else /* slave */
{
if (p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_COMM)
{
/* master commitment is already received */
smp_send_commitment(p_cb, NULL);
smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_WAIT_NONCE);
}
}
break;
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_OOB:
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
{
smp_send_rand(p_cb, NULL);
}
smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_WAIT_NONCE);
break;
default:
SMP_TRACE_ERROR ("Association Model = %d is not used in LE SC",
p_cb->selected_association_model);
break;
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_process_peer_nonce
** Description The function processes newly received and saved in CB peer nonce.
** The actions depend on the selected association model and the role.
**
** Note It is supposed to be called in SC phase1.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_process_peer_nonce(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 reason;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s start ", __func__);
// PTS Testing failure modes
if (p_cb->cert_failure == 1) {
SMP_TRACE_ERROR("%s failure case = %d", __func__, p_cb->cert_failure);
reason = p_cb->failure = SMP_CONFIRM_VALUE_ERR;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
switch(p_cb->selected_association_model)
{
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS:
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP:
/* in these models only master receives commitment */
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
{
if (!smp_check_commitment(p_cb))
{
reason = p_cb->failure = SMP_CONFIRM_VALUE_ERR;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
break;
}
}
else
{
/* slave sends local nonce */
smp_send_rand(p_cb, NULL);
}
if(p_cb->selected_association_model == SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS)
{
/* go directly to phase 2 */
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_SC_PHASE1_CMPLT_EVT, NULL);
}
else /* numeric comparison */
{
smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_WAIT_NONCE);
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_SC_CALC_NC_EVT, NULL);
}
break;
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT:
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP:
if (!smp_check_commitment(p_cb) && p_cb->cert_failure != 9)
{
reason = p_cb->failure = SMP_CONFIRM_VALUE_ERR;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
break;
}
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
{
smp_send_rand(p_cb, NULL);
}
if (++p_cb->round < 20)
{
smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_SEC_CONN_PHS1_START);
p_cb->flags &= ~SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_COMM;
smp_start_nonce_generation(p_cb);
break;
}
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_SC_PHASE1_CMPLT_EVT, NULL);
break;
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_OOB:
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
{
smp_send_rand(p_cb, NULL);
}
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_SC_PHASE1_CMPLT_EVT, NULL);
break;
default:
SMP_TRACE_ERROR ("Association Model = %d is not used in LE SC",
p_cb->selected_association_model);
break;
}
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s end ",__FUNCTION__);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_match_dhkey_checks
** Description checks if the calculated peer DHKey Check value is the same as
** received from the peer DHKey check value.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_match_dhkey_checks(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 reason = SMP_DHKEY_CHK_FAIL;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (memcmp(p_data->key.p_data, p_cb->remote_dhkey_check, BT_OCTET16_LEN))
{
SMP_TRACE_WARNING ("dhkey chcks do no match");
p_cb->failure = reason;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
SMP_TRACE_EVENT ("dhkey chcks match");
/* compare the max encryption key size, and save the smaller one for the link */
if (p_cb->peer_enc_size < p_cb->loc_enc_size)
p_cb->loc_enc_size = p_cb->peer_enc_size;
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
{
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_PAIR_DHKEY_CHCK_EVT, NULL);
}
else
{
/* master device always use received i/r key as keys to distribute */
p_cb->local_i_key = p_cb->peer_i_key;
p_cb->local_r_key = p_cb->peer_r_key;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_ENC_REQ_EVT, NULL);
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_move_to_secure_connections_phase2
** Description Signal State Machine to start SC phase 2 initialization (to
** compute local DHKey Check value).
**
** Note SM is supposed to be in the state SMP_STATE_SEC_CONN_PHS2_START.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_move_to_secure_connections_phase2(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s",__func__);
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_SC_PHASE1_CMPLT_EVT, NULL);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_phase_2_dhkey_checks_are_present
** Description generates event if dhkey check from the peer is already received.
**
** Note It is supposed to be used on slave to prevent race condition.
** It is supposed to be called after slave dhkey check is calculated.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_phase_2_dhkey_checks_are_present(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s",__func__);
if (p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_DHK_CHK)
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_SC_2_DHCK_CHKS_PRES_EVT, NULL);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_wait_for_both_public_keys
** Description generates SMP_BOTH_PUBL_KEYS_RCVD_EVT event when both local and master
** public keys are available.
**
** Note on the slave it is used to prevent race condition.
**
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_wait_for_both_public_keys(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s",__func__);
if ((p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_PUBL_KEY) &&
(p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_LOCAL_PUBL_KEY))
{
if ((p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) &&
((p_cb->req_oob_type == SMP_OOB_LOCAL) || (p_cb->req_oob_type == SMP_OOB_BOTH)))
{
smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_PUBLIC_KEY_EXCH);
}
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_BOTH_PUBL_KEYS_RCVD_EVT, NULL);
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_start_passkey_verification
** Description Starts SC passkey entry verification.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_start_passkey_verification(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
UINT8 *p = NULL;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
p = p_cb->local_random;
UINT32_TO_STREAM(p, p_data->passkey);
p = p_cb->peer_random;
UINT32_TO_STREAM(p, p_data->passkey);
p_cb->round = 0;
smp_start_nonce_generation(p_cb);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_process_secure_connection_oob_data
** Description Processes local/peer SC OOB data received from somewhere.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_process_secure_connection_oob_data(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
tSMP_SC_OOB_DATA *p_sc_oob_data = &p_cb->sc_oob_data;
if (p_sc_oob_data->loc_oob_data.present)
{
memcpy(p_cb->local_random, p_sc_oob_data->loc_oob_data.randomizer,
sizeof(p_cb->local_random));
}
else
{
SMP_TRACE_EVENT ("local OOB randomizer is absent");
memset(p_cb->local_random, 0, sizeof (p_cb->local_random));
}
if (!p_sc_oob_data->peer_oob_data.present)
{
SMP_TRACE_EVENT ("peer OOB data is absent");
memset(p_cb->peer_random, 0, sizeof (p_cb->peer_random));
}
else
{
memcpy(p_cb->peer_random, p_sc_oob_data->peer_oob_data.randomizer,
sizeof(p_cb->peer_random));
memcpy(p_cb->remote_commitment, p_sc_oob_data->peer_oob_data.commitment,
sizeof(p_cb->remote_commitment));
UINT8 reason = SMP_CONFIRM_VALUE_ERR;
/* check commitment */
if (!smp_check_commitment(p_cb))
{
p_cb->failure = reason;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
if (p_cb->peer_oob_flag != SMP_OOB_PRESENT)
{
/* the peer doesn't have local randomiser */
SMP_TRACE_EVENT ("peer didn't receive local OOB data, set local randomizer to 0");
memset(p_cb->local_random, 0, sizeof (p_cb->local_random));
}
}
print128(p_cb->local_random, (const UINT8 *)"local OOB randomizer");
print128(p_cb->peer_random, (const UINT8 *)"peer OOB randomizer");
smp_start_nonce_generation(p_cb);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_set_local_oob_keys
** Description Saves calculated private/public keys in sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data,
** starts nonce generation
** (to be saved in sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.randomizer).
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_set_local_oob_keys(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
memcpy(p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.private_key_used, p_cb->private_key,
BT_OCTET32_LEN);
p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.publ_key_used = p_cb->loc_publ_key;
smp_start_nonce_generation(p_cb);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_set_local_oob_random_commitment
** Description Saves calculated randomizer and commitment in sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data,
** passes sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data up for safekeeping.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_set_local_oob_random_commitment(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
memcpy(p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.randomizer, p_cb->rand,
BT_OCTET16_LEN);
smp_calculate_f4(p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.publ_key_used.x,
p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.publ_key_used.x,
p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.randomizer, 0,
p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.commitment);
#if SMP_DEBUG == TRUE
UINT8 *p_print = NULL;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("local SC OOB data set:");
p_print = (UINT8*) &p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.addr_sent_to;
smp_debug_print_nbyte_little_endian (p_print, (const UINT8 *)"addr_sent_to",
sizeof(tBLE_BD_ADDR));
p_print = (UINT8*) &p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.private_key_used;
smp_debug_print_nbyte_little_endian (p_print, (const UINT8 *)"private_key_used",
BT_OCTET32_LEN);
p_print = (UINT8*) &p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.publ_key_used.x;
smp_debug_print_nbyte_little_endian (p_print, (const UINT8 *)"publ_key_used.x",
BT_OCTET32_LEN);
p_print = (UINT8*) &p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.publ_key_used.y;
smp_debug_print_nbyte_little_endian (p_print, (const UINT8 *)"publ_key_used.y",
BT_OCTET32_LEN);
p_print = (UINT8*) &p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.randomizer;
smp_debug_print_nbyte_little_endian (p_print, (const UINT8 *)"randomizer",
BT_OCTET16_LEN);
p_print = (UINT8*) &p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.commitment;
smp_debug_print_nbyte_little_endian (p_print,(const UINT8 *) "commitment",
BT_OCTET16_LEN);
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("");
#endif
/* pass created OOB data up */
p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_SC_LOC_OOB_DATA_UP_EVT;
smp_send_app_cback(p_cb, NULL);
smp_cb_cleanup(p_cb);
}
/*******************************************************************************
**
** Function smp_link_encrypted
**
** Description This function is called when link is encrypted and notified to
** slave device. Proceed to to send LTK, DIV and ER to master if
** bonding the devices.
**
**
** Returns void
**
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_link_encrypted(BD_ADDR bda, UINT8 encr_enable)
{
tSMP_CB *p_cb = &smp_cb;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s encr_enable=%d", __func__, encr_enable);
if (memcmp(&smp_cb.pairing_bda[0], bda, BD_ADDR_LEN) == 0)
{
/* encryption completed with STK, remmeber the key size now, could be overwite
* when key exchange happens */
if (p_cb->loc_enc_size != 0 && encr_enable)
{
/* update the link encryption key size if a SMP pairing just performed */
btm_ble_update_sec_key_size(bda, p_cb->loc_enc_size);
}
smp_sm_event(&smp_cb, SMP_ENCRYPTED_EVT, &encr_enable);
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
**
** Function smp_proc_ltk_request
**
** Description This function is called when LTK request is received from
** controller.
**
** Returns void
**
*******************************************************************************/
BOOLEAN smp_proc_ltk_request(BD_ADDR bda)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s state = %d", __func__, smp_cb.state);
BOOLEAN match = FALSE;
if (!memcmp(bda, smp_cb.pairing_bda, BD_ADDR_LEN))
{
match = TRUE;
} else {
BD_ADDR dummy_bda = {0};
tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec = btm_find_dev(bda);
if (p_dev_rec != NULL &&
0 == memcmp(p_dev_rec->ble.pseudo_addr, smp_cb.pairing_bda, BD_ADDR_LEN) &&
0 != memcmp(p_dev_rec->ble.pseudo_addr, dummy_bda, BD_ADDR_LEN))
{
match = TRUE;
}
}
if (match && smp_cb.state == SMP_STATE_ENCRYPTION_PENDING)
{
smp_sm_event(&smp_cb, SMP_ENC_REQ_EVT, NULL);
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
/*******************************************************************************
**
** Function smp_process_secure_connection_long_term_key
**
** Description This function is called to process SC LTK.
** SC LTK is calculated and used instead of STK.
** Here SC LTK is saved in BLE DB.
**
** Returns void
**
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_process_secure_connection_long_term_key(void)
{
tSMP_CB *p_cb = &smp_cb;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_save_secure_connections_long_term_key(p_cb);
smp_update_key_mask (p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ENC, FALSE);
smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL);
}
/*******************************************************************************
**
** Function smp_set_derive_link_key
**
** Description This function is called to set flag that indicates that
** BR/EDR LK has to be derived from LTK after all keys are
** distributed.
**
** Returns void
**
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_set_derive_link_key(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG ("%s", __func__);
p_cb->derive_lk = TRUE;
smp_update_key_mask (p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK, FALSE);
smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL);
}
/*******************************************************************************
**
** Function smp_derive_link_key_from_long_term_key
**
** Description This function is called to derive BR/EDR LK from LTK.
**
** Returns void
**
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_derive_link_key_from_long_term_key(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
tSMP_STATUS status = SMP_PAIR_FAIL_UNKNOWN;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (!smp_calculate_link_key_from_long_term_key(p_cb))
{
SMP_TRACE_ERROR("%s failed", __FUNCTION__);
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &status);
return;
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
**
** Function smp_br_process_link_key
**
** Description This function is called to process BR/EDR LK:
** - to derive SMP LTK from BR/EDR LK;
*8 - to save SMP LTK.
**
** Returns void
**
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_br_process_link_key(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
tSMP_STATUS status = SMP_PAIR_FAIL_UNKNOWN;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (!smp_calculate_long_term_key_from_link_key(p_cb))
{
SMP_TRACE_ERROR ("%s failed",__FUNCTION__);
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &status);
return;
}
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: LTK derivation from LK successfully completed", __FUNCTION__);
smp_save_secure_connections_long_term_key(p_cb);
smp_update_key_mask (p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ENC, FALSE);
smp_br_select_next_key(p_cb, NULL);
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_key_distribution_by_transport
** Description depending on the transport used at the moment calls either
** smp_key_distribution(...) or smp_br_key_distribution(...).
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_key_distribution_by_transport(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (p_cb->smp_over_br)
{
smp_br_select_next_key(p_cb, NULL);
}
else
{
smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL);
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_br_pairing_complete
** Description This function is called to send the pairing complete callback
** and remove the connection if needed.
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_br_pairing_complete(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (p_cb->total_tx_unacked == 0)
{
/* process the pairing complete */
smp_proc_pairing_cmpl(p_cb);
}
}
#endif