/*
* Copyright 2015 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include "rsa_keymaster1_operation.h"
#include <memory>
#include <keymaster/android_keymaster_utils.h>
#include "openssl_err.h"
#include "openssl_utils.h"
#include "rsa_keymaster1_key.h"
using std::unique_ptr;
namespace keymaster {
keymaster_error_t RsaKeymaster1WrappedOperation::Begin(EVP_PKEY* rsa_key,
const AuthorizationSet& input_params) {
Keymaster1Engine::KeyData* key_data = engine_->GetData(rsa_key);
if (!key_data)
return KM_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
// Copy the input params and substitute KM_DIGEST_NONE for whatever was specified. Also change
// KM_PAD_RSA_PSS and KM_PAD_OAEP to KM_PAD_NONE, if necessary. These are the params we'll pass
// to the hardware module. The regular Rsa*Operation classes will do software digesting and
// padding where we've told the HW not to.
//
// The reason we don't change KM_PAD_RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN or KM_PAD_RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT to
// KM_PAD_NONE is because the hardware can perform those padding modes, since they don't involve
// digesting.
//
// We also cache in the key the padding value that we expect to be passed to the engine crypto
// operation. This just allows us to double-check that the correct padding value is reaching
// that layer.
AuthorizationSet begin_params(input_params);
int pos = begin_params.find(TAG_DIGEST);
if (pos == -1)
return KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST;
begin_params[pos].enumerated = KM_DIGEST_NONE;
pos = begin_params.find(TAG_PADDING);
if (pos == -1)
return KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE;
switch (begin_params[pos].enumerated) {
case KM_PAD_RSA_PSS:
case KM_PAD_RSA_OAEP:
key_data->expected_openssl_padding = RSA_NO_PADDING;
begin_params[pos].enumerated = KM_PAD_NONE;
break;
case KM_PAD_RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT:
case KM_PAD_RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN:
key_data->expected_openssl_padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
break;
}
return engine_->device()->begin(engine_->device(), purpose_, &key_data->key_material,
&begin_params, nullptr /* out_params */, &operation_handle_);
}
keymaster_error_t
RsaKeymaster1WrappedOperation::PrepareFinish(EVP_PKEY* rsa_key,
const AuthorizationSet& input_params) {
Keymaster1Engine::KeyData* key_data = engine_->GetData(rsa_key);
if (!key_data) {
LOG_E("Could not get extended key data... not a Keymaster1Engine key?", 0);
return KM_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
key_data->op_handle = operation_handle_;
key_data->finish_params.Reinitialize(input_params);
return KM_ERROR_OK;
}
keymaster_error_t RsaKeymaster1WrappedOperation::Abort() {
return engine_->device()->abort(engine_->device(), operation_handle_);
}
keymaster_error_t RsaKeymaster1WrappedOperation::GetError(EVP_PKEY* rsa_key) {
Keymaster1Engine::KeyData* key_data = engine_->GetData(rsa_key); // key_data is owned by rsa
if (!key_data)
return KM_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
return key_data->error;
}
static EVP_PKEY* GetEvpKey(const RsaKeymaster1Key& key, keymaster_error_t* error) {
if (!key.key()) {
*error = KM_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
return nullptr;
}
UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_Delete> pkey(EVP_PKEY_new());
if (!key.InternalToEvp(pkey.get())) {
*error = KM_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
return nullptr;
}
return pkey.release();
}
Operation* RsaKeymaster1OperationFactory::CreateOperation(const Key& key,
const AuthorizationSet& begin_params,
keymaster_error_t* error) {
keymaster_digest_t digest;
if (!GetAndValidateDigest(begin_params, key, &digest, error))
return nullptr;
keymaster_padding_t padding;
if (!GetAndValidatePadding(begin_params, key, &padding, error))
return nullptr;
const RsaKeymaster1Key& rsa_km1_key(static_cast<const RsaKeymaster1Key&>(key));
unique_ptr<EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_Delete> rsa(GetEvpKey(rsa_km1_key, error));
if (!rsa)
return nullptr;
switch (purpose_) {
case KM_PURPOSE_SIGN:
return new RsaKeymaster1Operation<RsaSignOperation>(digest, padding, rsa.release(),
engine_);
case KM_PURPOSE_DECRYPT:
return new RsaKeymaster1Operation<RsaDecryptOperation>(digest, padding, rsa.release(),
engine_);
default:
LOG_E("Bug: Pubkey operation requested. Those should be handled by normal RSA operations.",
0);
*error = KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE;
return nullptr;
}
}
static const keymaster_digest_t supported_digests[] = {
KM_DIGEST_NONE, KM_DIGEST_MD5, KM_DIGEST_SHA1, KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_224,
KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_256, KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_384, KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_512};
const keymaster_digest_t*
RsaKeymaster1OperationFactory::SupportedDigests(size_t* digest_count) const {
*digest_count = array_length(supported_digests);
return supported_digests;
}
static const keymaster_padding_t supported_sig_padding[] = {
KM_PAD_NONE, KM_PAD_RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN, KM_PAD_RSA_PSS,
};
static const keymaster_padding_t supported_crypt_padding[] = {
KM_PAD_NONE, KM_PAD_RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT, KM_PAD_RSA_OAEP,
};
const keymaster_padding_t*
RsaKeymaster1OperationFactory::SupportedPaddingModes(size_t* padding_mode_count) const {
switch (purpose_) {
case KM_PURPOSE_SIGN:
case KM_PURPOSE_VERIFY:
*padding_mode_count = array_length(supported_sig_padding);
return supported_sig_padding;
case KM_PURPOSE_ENCRYPT:
case KM_PURPOSE_DECRYPT:
*padding_mode_count = array_length(supported_crypt_padding);
return supported_crypt_padding;
default:
*padding_mode_count = 0;
return nullptr;
}
}
} // namespace keymaster