- 根目录:
- kernel
- seccomp.c
/*
* linux/kernel/seccomp.c
*
* Copyright 2004-2005 Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com>
*
* Copyright (C) 2012 Google, Inc.
* Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
*
* This defines a simple but solid secure-computing facility.
*
* Mode 1 uses a fixed list of allowed system calls.
* Mode 2 allows user-defined system call filters in the form
* of Berkeley Packet Filters/Linux Socket Filters.
*/
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
/* #define SECCOMP_DEBUG 1 */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
#include <asm/syscall.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/pid.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
/**
* struct seccomp_filter - container for seccomp BPF programs
*
* @usage: reference count to manage the object lifetime.
* get/put helpers should be used when accessing an instance
* outside of a lifetime-guarded section. In general, this
* is only needed for handling filters shared across tasks.
* @prev: points to a previously installed, or inherited, filter
* @len: the number of instructions in the program
* @insns: the BPF program instructions to evaluate
*
* seccomp_filter objects are organized in a tree linked via the @prev
* pointer. For any task, it appears to be a singly-linked list starting
* with current->seccomp.filter, the most recently attached or inherited filter.
* However, multiple filters may share a @prev node, by way of fork(), which
* results in a unidirectional tree existing in memory. This is similar to
* how namespaces work.
*
* seccomp_filter objects should never be modified after being attached
* to a task_struct (other than @usage).
*/
struct seccomp_filter {
atomic_t usage;
struct seccomp_filter *prev;
unsigned short len; /* Instruction count */
struct sock_filter insns[];
};
/* Limit any path through the tree to 256KB worth of instructions. */
#define MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH ((1 << 18) / sizeof(struct sock_filter))
/**
* get_u32 - returns a u32 offset into data
* @data: a unsigned 64 bit value
* @index: 0 or 1 to return the first or second 32-bits
*
* This inline exists to hide the length of unsigned long. If a 32-bit
* unsigned long is passed in, it will be extended and the top 32-bits will be
* 0. If it is a 64-bit unsigned long, then whatever data is resident will be
* properly returned.
*
* Endianness is explicitly ignored and left for BPF program authors to manage
* as per the specific architecture.
*/
static inline u32 get_u32(u64 data, int index)
{
return ((u32 *)&data)[index];
}
/* Helper for bpf_load below. */
#define BPF_DATA(_name) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, _name)
/**
* bpf_load: checks and returns a pointer to the requested offset
* @off: offset into struct seccomp_data to load from
*
* Returns the requested 32-bits of data.
* seccomp_check_filter() should assure that @off is 32-bit aligned
* and not out of bounds. Failure to do so is a BUG.
*/
u32 seccomp_bpf_load(int off)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
if (off == BPF_DATA(nr))
return syscall_get_nr(current, regs);
if (off == BPF_DATA(arch))
return syscall_get_arch();
if (off >= BPF_DATA(args[0]) && off < BPF_DATA(args[6])) {
unsigned long value;
int arg = (off - BPF_DATA(args[0])) / sizeof(u64);
int index = !!(off % sizeof(u64));
syscall_get_arguments(current, regs, arg, 1, &value);
return get_u32(value, index);
}
if (off == BPF_DATA(instruction_pointer))
return get_u32(KSTK_EIP(current), 0);
if (off == BPF_DATA(instruction_pointer) + sizeof(u32))
return get_u32(KSTK_EIP(current), 1);
/* seccomp_check_filter should make this impossible. */
BUG();
}
/**
* seccomp_check_filter - verify seccomp filter code
* @filter: filter to verify
* @flen: length of filter
*
* Takes a previously checked filter (by sk_chk_filter) and
* redirects all filter code that loads struct sk_buff data
* and related data through seccomp_bpf_load. It also
* enforces length and alignment checking of those loads.
*
* Returns 0 if the rule set is legal or -EINVAL if not.
*/
static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen)
{
int pc;
for (pc = 0; pc < flen; pc++) {
struct sock_filter *ftest = &filter[pc];
u16 code = ftest->code;
u32 k = ftest->k;
switch (code) {
case BPF_S_LD_W_ABS:
ftest->code = BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W;
/* 32-bit aligned and not out of bounds. */
if (k >= sizeof(struct seccomp_data) || k & 3)
return -EINVAL;
continue;
case BPF_S_LD_W_LEN:
ftest->code = BPF_S_LD_IMM;
ftest->k = sizeof(struct seccomp_data);
continue;
case BPF_S_LDX_W_LEN:
ftest->code = BPF_S_LDX_IMM;
ftest->k = sizeof(struct seccomp_data);
continue;
/* Explicitly include allowed calls. */
case BPF_S_RET_K:
case BPF_S_RET_A:
case BPF_S_ALU_ADD_K:
case BPF_S_ALU_ADD_X:
case BPF_S_ALU_SUB_K:
case BPF_S_ALU_SUB_X:
case BPF_S_ALU_MUL_K:
case BPF_S_ALU_MUL_X:
case BPF_S_ALU_DIV_X:
case BPF_S_ALU_AND_K:
case BPF_S_ALU_AND_X:
case BPF_S_ALU_OR_K:
case BPF_S_ALU_OR_X:
case BPF_S_ALU_XOR_K:
case BPF_S_ALU_XOR_X:
case BPF_S_ALU_LSH_K:
case BPF_S_ALU_LSH_X:
case BPF_S_ALU_RSH_K:
case BPF_S_ALU_RSH_X:
case BPF_S_ALU_NEG:
case BPF_S_LD_IMM:
case BPF_S_LDX_IMM:
case BPF_S_MISC_TAX:
case BPF_S_MISC_TXA:
case BPF_S_ALU_DIV_K:
case BPF_S_LD_MEM:
case BPF_S_LDX_MEM:
case BPF_S_ST:
case BPF_S_STX:
case BPF_S_JMP_JA:
case BPF_S_JMP_JEQ_K:
case BPF_S_JMP_JEQ_X:
case BPF_S_JMP_JGE_K:
case BPF_S_JMP_JGE_X:
case BPF_S_JMP_JGT_K:
case BPF_S_JMP_JGT_X:
case BPF_S_JMP_JSET_K:
case BPF_S_JMP_JSET_X:
continue;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
/**
* seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @syscall
* @syscall: number of the current system call
*
* Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes.
*/
static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
{
struct seccomp_filter *f = ACCESS_ONCE(current->seccomp.filter);
u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
/* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
if (unlikely(WARN_ON(f == NULL)))
return SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
/* Make sure cross-thread synced filter points somewhere sane. */
smp_read_barrier_depends();
/*
* All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return
* value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA).
*/
for (; f; f = f->prev) {
u32 cur_ret = sk_run_filter(NULL, f->insns);
if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION))
ret = cur_ret;
}
return ret;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
static inline bool seccomp_may_assign_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode)
{
assert_spin_locked(¤t->sighand->siglock);
if (current->seccomp.mode && current->seccomp.mode != seccomp_mode)
return false;
return true;
}
static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task,
unsigned long seccomp_mode)
{
assert_spin_locked(&task->sighand->siglock);
task->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode;
/*
* Make sure TIF_SECCOMP cannot be set before the mode (and
* filter) is set.
*/
smp_mb();
set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SECCOMP);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
/* Returns 1 if the parent is an ancestor of the child. */
static int is_ancestor(struct seccomp_filter *parent,
struct seccomp_filter *child)
{
/* NULL is the root ancestor. */
if (parent == NULL)
return 1;
for (; child; child = child->prev)
if (child == parent)
return 1;
return 0;
}
/**
* seccomp_can_sync_threads: checks if all threads can be synchronized
*
* Expects sighand and cred_guard_mutex locks to be held.
*
* Returns 0 on success, -ve on error, or the pid of a thread which was
* either not in the correct seccomp mode or it did not have an ancestral
* seccomp filter.
*/
static inline pid_t seccomp_can_sync_threads(void)
{
struct task_struct *thread, *caller;
BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex));
assert_spin_locked(¤t->sighand->siglock);
/* Validate all threads being eligible for synchronization. */
caller = current;
for_each_thread(caller, thread) {
pid_t failed;
/* Skip current, since it is initiating the sync. */
if (thread == caller)
continue;
if (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED ||
(thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER &&
is_ancestor(thread->seccomp.filter,
caller->seccomp.filter)))
continue;
/* Return the first thread that cannot be synchronized. */
failed = task_pid_vnr(thread);
/* If the pid cannot be resolved, then return -ESRCH */
if (unlikely(WARN_ON(failed == 0)))
failed = -ESRCH;
return failed;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* seccomp_sync_threads: sets all threads to use current's filter
*
* Expects sighand and cred_guard_mutex locks to be held, and for
* seccomp_can_sync_threads() to have returned success already
* without dropping the locks.
*
*/
static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(void)
{
struct task_struct *thread, *caller;
BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex));
assert_spin_locked(¤t->sighand->siglock);
/* Synchronize all threads. */
caller = current;
for_each_thread(caller, thread) {
/* Skip current, since it needs no changes. */
if (thread == caller)
continue;
/* Get a task reference for the new leaf node. */
get_seccomp_filter(caller);
/*
* Drop the task reference to the shared ancestor since
* current's path will hold a reference. (This also
* allows a put before the assignment.)
*/
put_seccomp_filter(thread);
smp_store_release(&thread->seccomp.filter,
caller->seccomp.filter);
/*
* Opt the other thread into seccomp if needed.
* As threads are considered to be trust-realm
* equivalent (see ptrace_may_access), it is safe to
* allow one thread to transition the other.
*/
if (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED) {
/*
* Don't let an unprivileged task work around
* the no_new_privs restriction by creating
* a thread that sets it up, enters seccomp,
* then dies.
*/
if (task_no_new_privs(caller))
task_set_no_new_privs(thread);
seccomp_assign_mode(thread, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER);
}
}
}
/**
* seccomp_prepare_filter: Prepares a seccomp filter for use.
* @fprog: BPF program to install
*
* Returns filter on success or an ERR_PTR on failure.
*/
static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
{
struct seccomp_filter *filter;
unsigned long fp_size = fprog->len * sizeof(struct sock_filter);
unsigned long total_insns = fprog->len;
long ret;
if (fprog->len == 0 || fprog->len > BPF_MAXINSNS)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
BUG_ON(INT_MAX / fprog->len < sizeof(struct sock_filter));
for (filter = current->seccomp.filter; filter; filter = filter->prev)
total_insns += filter->len + 4; /* include a 4 instr penalty */
if (total_insns > MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
/*
* Installing a seccomp filter requires that the task have
* CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace or be running with no_new_privs.
* This avoids scenarios where unprivileged tasks can affect the
* behavior of privileged children.
*/
if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0)
return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
/* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
filter = kzalloc(sizeof(struct seccomp_filter) + fp_size,
GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN);
if (!filter)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);;
atomic_set(&filter->usage, 1);
filter->len = fprog->len;
/* Copy the instructions from fprog. */
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(filter->insns, fprog->filter, fp_size))
goto fail;
/* Check and rewrite the fprog via the skb checker */
ret = sk_chk_filter(filter->insns, filter->len);
if (ret)
goto fail;
/* Check and rewrite the fprog for seccomp use */
ret = seccomp_check_filter(filter->insns, filter->len);
if (ret)
goto fail;
return filter;
fail:
kfree(filter);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
/**
* seccomp_prepare_user_filter - prepares a user-supplied sock_fprog
* @user_filter: pointer to the user data containing a sock_fprog.
*
* Returns 0 on success and non-zero otherwise.
*/
static struct seccomp_filter *
seccomp_prepare_user_filter(const char __user *user_filter)
{
struct sock_fprog fprog;
struct seccomp_filter *filter = ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (is_compat_task()) {
struct compat_sock_fprog fprog32;
if (copy_from_user(&fprog32, user_filter, sizeof(fprog32)))
goto out;
fprog.len = fprog32.len;
fprog.filter = compat_ptr(fprog32.filter);
} else /* falls through to the if below. */
#endif
if (copy_from_user(&fprog, user_filter, sizeof(fprog)))
goto out;
filter = seccomp_prepare_filter(&fprog);
out:
return filter;
}
/**
* seccomp_attach_filter: validate and attach filter
* @flags: flags to change filter behavior
* @filter: seccomp filter to add to the current process
*
* Caller must be holding current->sighand->siglock lock.
*
* Returns 0 on success, -ve on error.
*/
static long seccomp_attach_filter(unsigned int flags,
struct seccomp_filter *filter)
{
unsigned long total_insns;
struct seccomp_filter *walker;
assert_spin_locked(¤t->sighand->siglock);
/* Validate resulting filter length. */
total_insns = filter->len;
for (walker = current->seccomp.filter; walker; walker = walker->prev)
total_insns += walker->len + 4; /* 4 instr penalty */
if (total_insns > MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH)
return -ENOMEM;
/* If thread sync has been requested, check that it is possible. */
if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC) {
int ret;
ret = seccomp_can_sync_threads();
if (ret)
return ret;
}
/*
* If there is an existing filter, make it the prev and don't drop its
* task reference.
*/
filter->prev = current->seccomp.filter;
current->seccomp.filter = filter;
/* Now that the new filter is in place, synchronize to all threads. */
if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
seccomp_sync_threads();
return 0;
}
/* get_seccomp_filter - increments the reference count of the filter on @tsk */
void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter;
if (!orig)
return;
/* Reference count is bounded by the number of total processes. */
atomic_inc(&orig->usage);
}
static inline void seccomp_filter_free(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
{
if (filter) {
kfree(filter);
}
}
/* put_seccomp_filter - decrements the ref count of tsk->seccomp.filter */
void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter;
/* Clean up single-reference branches iteratively. */
while (orig && atomic_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) {
struct seccomp_filter *freeme = orig;
orig = orig->prev;
seccomp_filter_free(freeme);
}
}
/**
* seccomp_send_sigsys - signals the task to allow in-process syscall emulation
* @syscall: syscall number to send to userland
* @reason: filter-supplied reason code to send to userland (via si_errno)
*
* Forces a SIGSYS with a code of SYS_SECCOMP and related sigsys info.
*/
static void seccomp_send_sigsys(int syscall, int reason)
{
struct siginfo info;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
info.si_signo = SIGSYS;
info.si_code = SYS_SECCOMP;
info.si_call_addr = (void __user *)KSTK_EIP(current);
info.si_errno = reason;
info.si_arch = syscall_get_arch();
info.si_syscall = syscall;
force_sig_info(SIGSYS, &info, current);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
/*
* Secure computing mode 1 allows only read/write/exit/sigreturn.
* To be fully secure this must be combined with rlimit
* to limit the stack allocations too.
*/
static int mode1_syscalls[] = {
__NR_seccomp_read, __NR_seccomp_write, __NR_seccomp_exit, __NR_seccomp_sigreturn,
0, /* null terminated */
};
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
static int mode1_syscalls_32[] = {
__NR_seccomp_read_32, __NR_seccomp_write_32, __NR_seccomp_exit_32, __NR_seccomp_sigreturn_32,
0, /* null terminated */
};
#endif
int __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
{
int exit_sig = 0;
int *syscall;
u32 ret;
/*
* Make sure that any changes to mode from another thread have
* been seen after TIF_SECCOMP was seen.
*/
rmb();
switch (current->seccomp.mode) {
case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
syscall = mode1_syscalls;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (is_compat_task())
syscall = mode1_syscalls_32;
#endif
do {
if (*syscall == this_syscall)
return 0;
} while (*++syscall);
exit_sig = SIGKILL;
ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: {
int data;
struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
ret = seccomp_run_filters(this_syscall);
data = ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;
ret &= SECCOMP_RET_ACTION;
switch (ret) {
case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
/* Set low-order bits as an errno, capped at MAX_ERRNO. */
if (data > MAX_ERRNO)
data = MAX_ERRNO;
syscall_set_return_value(current, regs,
-data, 0);
goto skip;
case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
/* Show the handler the original registers. */
syscall_rollback(current, regs);
/* Let the filter pass back 16 bits of data. */
seccomp_send_sigsys(this_syscall, data);
goto skip;
case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
/* Skip these calls if there is no tracer. */
if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)) {
syscall_set_return_value(current, regs,
-ENOSYS, 0);
goto skip;
}
/* Allow the BPF to provide the event message */
ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, data);
/*
* The delivery of a fatal signal during event
* notification may silently skip tracer notification.
* Terminating the task now avoids executing a system
* call that may not be intended.
*/
if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
break;
if (syscall_get_nr(current, regs) < 0)
goto skip; /* Explicit request to skip. */
return 0;
case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
return 0;
case SECCOMP_RET_KILL:
default:
break;
}
exit_sig = SIGSYS;
break;
}
#endif
default:
BUG();
}
#ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG
dump_stack();
#endif
audit_seccomp(this_syscall, exit_sig, ret);
do_exit(exit_sig);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
skip:
audit_seccomp(this_syscall, exit_sig, ret);
#endif
return -1;
}
long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
{
return current->seccomp.mode;
}
/**
* seccomp_set_mode_strict: internal function for setting strict seccomp
*
* Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
*
* Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
*/
static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void)
{
const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT;
long ret = -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode))
goto out;
#ifdef TIF_NOTSC
disable_TSC();
#endif
seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode);
ret = 0;
out:
spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
return ret;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
/**
* seccomp_set_mode_filter: internal function for setting seccomp filter
* @flags: flags to change filter behavior
* @filter: struct sock_fprog containing filter
*
* This function may be called repeatedly to install additional filters.
* Every filter successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order)
* for each system call the task makes.
*
* Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
*
* Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
*/
static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
const char __user *filter)
{
const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER;
struct seccomp_filter *prepared = NULL;
long ret = -EINVAL;
/* Validate flags. */
if (flags & ~SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK)
return -EINVAL;
/* Prepare the new filter before holding any locks. */
prepared = seccomp_prepare_user_filter(filter);
if (IS_ERR(prepared))
return PTR_ERR(prepared);
/*
* Make sure we cannot change seccomp or nnp state via TSYNC
* while another thread is in the middle of calling exec.
*/
if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC &&
mutex_lock_killable(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
goto out_free;
spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode))
goto out;
ret = seccomp_attach_filter(flags, prepared);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* Do not free the successfully attached filter. */
prepared = NULL;
seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode);
out:
spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
out_free:
seccomp_filter_free(prepared);
return ret;
}
#else
static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
const char __user *filter)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
#endif
/* Common entry point for both prctl and syscall. */
static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
const char __user *uargs)
{
switch (op) {
case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT:
if (flags != 0 || uargs != NULL)
return -EINVAL;
return seccomp_set_mode_strict();
case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER:
return seccomp_set_mode_filter(flags, uargs);
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(seccomp, unsigned int, op, unsigned int, flags,
const char __user *, uargs)
{
return do_seccomp(op, flags, uargs);
}
/**
* prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode
* @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use
* @filter: optional struct sock_fprog for use with SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
*
* Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
*/
long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
{
unsigned int op;
char __user *uargs;
switch (seccomp_mode) {
case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
op = SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT;
/*
* Setting strict mode through prctl always ignored filter,
* so make sure it is always NULL here to pass the internal
* check in do_seccomp().
*/
uargs = NULL;
break;
case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
op = SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER;
uargs = filter;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
/* prctl interface doesn't have flags, so they are always zero. */
return do_seccomp(op, 0, uargs);
}